Identifying Security Requirements and Privacy Concerns in Digital Health Applications

Chapter

Abstract

Security and privacy by design are important paradigms for establishing high protection levels in the eHealth domain. This means that security requirements and privacy concerns are considered and analyzed from the very beginning of any system design. For a reliable and robust system architecture and specification we recommend a four-step approach: (1) Decompose the system and identify the assets on the basis of the multilateral security concept, i.e., taking all participants of an eHealth scenario as potential attackers into account; (2) evaluate threats based on STRIDE for a holistic and systematic modelling of threats; (3) define use case-specific security requirements and privacy concerns as well as their relevance; and (4) mitigate threats by deciding what countermeasures should be implemented. After the introduction of each step this chapter illustrates the practical use in a step-by-step walkthrough with a real-world eHealth scenario and discusses advantages of security and privacy by design as well as its limitations.

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Copyright information

© Springer International Publishing Switzerland 2015

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.Fraunhofer AISECMunichGermany

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