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Distribution Effects of Extortion Racket Systems

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Advances in Artificial Economics

Part of the book series: Lecture Notes in Economics and Mathematical Systems ((LNE,volume 676))

Abstract

The paper discusses distribution effects of extortion racket systems which are quite frequent in several countries and sometimes are responsible for an unexpectedly high proportion of the regional gross domestic product. The model presented here takes a system perspective, leaving individual decision making processes for further publications. It represents consumers, enterprises, criminals and the state and tries to determine under which conditions extortion racket systems come into being, survive, and can be successfully fought.

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Notes

  1. 1.

    This is justified by the fact that it is not uncommon in Italy that negative effects of criminal activities are compensated by payments from a funds of confiscated mafia assets. See Legge 181/2008, Art. 2 comma 7, Gazetta Ufficiale n. 268, 15/11/2008, according to which at least one third of all confiscated assets are transferred to two funds, the solidarity fund for extortion victims and the solidarity fund for victims of other mafia type crimes.

  2. 2.

    The code of the model can be found at http://ccl.northwestern.edu/netlogo/models/community/ARDERS.

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Acknowledgements

The research leading to these results has received funding from the European Union Seventh Framework Programme (FP7/2007–2013) under grant agreement no. 315874 (http://www.gloders.eu, “Global dynamics of extortion racket systems”). This paper reflects only the author’s views, and the European Union is not liable for any use that may be made of the information contained therein. The author thanks his colleagues in this project for fruitful discussions over many years.

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Correspondence to Klaus G. Troitzsch .

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Troitzsch, K.G. (2015). Distribution Effects of Extortion Racket Systems. In: Amblard, F., Miguel, F., Blanchet, A., Gaudou, B. (eds) Advances in Artificial Economics. Lecture Notes in Economics and Mathematical Systems, vol 676. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-09578-3_15

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