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Abstract

After every ‘boom’ and ‘bust’, legislators around the world pass new disclosure legislation, often in a heated environment fuelled by politics and the media with little regard for existing regulation or for prior experience. This results in continuing amounts of duplicating and overlapping disclosure laws in securities (financial services) regulation. This book calls for assessment of disclosure laws, their administration and their enforcement. To earn investor confidence, financial markets depend on cultures of disclosure and compliance with the law. Disclosure is important because, as is often said, financial markets are markets for information. There are issues with disclosure, including the problems of cost of disclosure, conflicts of interest between the different needs of management and users in what to disclose and how to disclose it. The result is disparate and piecemeal disclosure laws with no common foundation, unfairly leaving stakeholders not fully informed. We argue that the solution is a short principles-based plain-English safety-net amendment to statutory laws like ‘you must keep the financial market fully informed’ to support effective mandatory continuous disclosure of information to financial markets, under the effective cooperation coregulation of both commission and by stock exchange.

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Notes

  1. 1.

    Chambers (1973), pp. ix and x.

  2. 2.

    Beaver (1978), pp. 44 and 52.

  3. 3.

    Commonwealth of Australia (1997), p. 261.

  4. 4.

    Paredes (2003), p. 417.

  5. 5.

    Hunt (1936), p. 8.

  6. 6.

    See, e.g., Coffee et al. (2012), pp. 4 and 5; Ratner and Hazen (2002), pp. 1–3.

  7. 7.

    See, e.g., Latimer (2009a), p. 9; Latimer (2009b), p. 55.

  8. 8.

    W.E. Gladstone, former British Prime Minister, 1844, when Secretary of Trade, in the House of Commons, quoted by Knauss (1964), pp. 607 and 611.

  9. 9.

    Clewes, cited in his Fifty Years in Wall Street (1908), p. 1053, quoted by Seligman (1983), pp. 1 and 45.

  10. 10.

    Brandeis (1914) Ch 5 (What publicity can do) 92; a title which to this day remains part of our national vocabulary. Brandeis was referring to the influence of the private investment banker such as the House of Morgan: Pecora (1939), p. 75.

  11. 11.

    See discussion in Chap. 2.

  12. 12.

    See, e.g., Douglas (1934), pp. 521, 523 and 524, quoted by Karmel (2005), pp. 79 and 83. Douglas was a member of and later chair of the SEC, 1936–1939.

  13. 13.

    English (1988), p. 45.

  14. 14.

    This is known as the ‘lemons problem’: see Akerlof (1970), p. 488; Black (2001), pp. 781 and 786.

  15. 15.

    International Organization of Securities Commissions (2011), p. 11.

  16. 16.

    Bhattacharya and Daouk (2002), pp. 75–77.

  17. 17.

    See Walker (2006), p. 481.

  18. 18.

    International Organization of Securities Commissions (2010), principles 1–8.

  19. 19.

    So-called ‘Null-Hypothesis’, for a comprehensive overview see La Porta et al. (2006), p. 1.

  20. 20.

    Financial services laws do not provide merit regulation.

  21. 21.

    International Organization of Securities Commissions (2010).

  22. 22.

    See, e.g., Panel Discussion (1973), p. 505, 505 per A.A. Somer Jr.

  23. 23.

    MacChesney and O’Brien (1937), pp. 133 and 153.

  24. 24.

    Cohen (1966), pp. 1340 and 1356.

  25. 25.

    Cohen (1966), p. 1353.

  26. 26.

    Chambers (1973), p. 19.

  27. 27.

    Pritchard (2013), pp. 999 and 1003.

  28. 28.

    1917–1999, Order of Australia; Australia’s pioneering accounting professor; details at http://fbe.unimelb.edu.au/accounting/caip/aahof/ceremonies/ray_chambers. Accessed 10 June 2014.

  29. 29.

    Chambers (1973), p. 7.

  30. 30.

    Kripke (1970), pp. 1151, 1169 and 1170.

  31. 31.

    This is discussed in Chap. 3.

  32. 32.

    Public goods include public facilities like public parks, public places and public payphone boxes. Because these public goods cannot exclude users, they attract freeloaders who use or consume them without paying. Therefore public goods tend to be underprovided.

  33. 33.

    Where there is perfect competition, a firm providing misleading or fraudulent information would ultimately be discovered by the market and may not survive.

  34. 34.

    This is as discussed in Chap. 2.

  35. 35.

    Brandeis (1914).

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Latimer, P., Maume, P. (2015). Introduction: Promoting Information. In: Promoting Information in the Marketplace for Financial Services. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-09459-5_1

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