Abstract
This chapter aims to put Saul Kripke’s formulation of Wittgensteinian rule-following paradox in the context of Kant’s critical philosophy. I attempt to argue that a thorough re-examination of the Kantian critique can contribute to our better understanding of this paradox, because Kant himself strove to overcome a parallel form of scepticism—Hume’s. Moreover, I seek to demonstrate that Kantian views on normativity may contribute to avoiding the consequences of “Kripkenstein”’s radicalism without a simultaneous refutation of its main premises. Taking the interlinking between Hume’s and Kripkenstein’s thinking for a starting point, I attempt to reformulate Kantian arguments against Humean scepticism so that they could be applied to Kripkenstein’s paradox. These reflections are organised around two main ideas of Kant’s Critique: (1) arguments against the assumption of discontinuity of time; (2) the existence of two formal instances guaranteeing the coherence of experience: namely the “thing-in-itself” and the transcendental unity of apperception (TUA). Reassessment of the Kantian concept of the TUA gives an opportunity to propose a new perspective on normativity, whose core mechanism would lie in our readiness to correct ourselves. Finally, I juxtapose “Kripkenstein” and “Kantstein”—the latter being Kripke’s imaginary opponent, who accepts some premises of the rule-following paradox, yet puts them in a broader context which explains our effective usage of rules.
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Notes
- 1.
My exposition—drawing chiefly upon Kant’s The Critique of Pure Reason—converges in some regards with arguments developed by other commentators of Kripke. It should be of no surprise because the debate on “Kripkenstein” retraces old discussions on Hume and Kant. In some way I propose explicitly Kantian solution of the paradox, whereas manifold arguments in a Kantian spirit have been already formulated. P.G. Baker and P.M.S. Hacker reconsidered the scope of “blindness” of rule application and re-assessed the idea of grasping a rule in the logic of Kantianism (Baker and Hacker 1984, pp. 76–84). Colin McGinn (1984, p. 146 ff.), who suggested that rule-application might be viewed in terms of concepts—which changes the preservation of meaning of rules in time—makes an implicit reference to Kant. However, due to the limited length of this paper, I cannot refer to Baker’s, Hacker’s and McGinn’s arguments. I will concentrate on applying Kant’s reasoning to Kripkenstein’s paradox.
- 2.
As it is not the focal point of my argumentation, I will not discuss various interpretations of Humean theory of causality, which are abundant. Equally I set aside Hume’s category of “relation of ideas”, similar to analytical statements, which provide legitimate knowledge with no reference to empirical data.
- 3.
Hume comes to a conclusion that memory and imagination are effectively of the same nature and the only difference between them consists in liveliness of perceptions that memory presents (Hume 1739, pp. 49–50). “As an idea of the memory can by losing its force and liveliness degenerate so far that it is taken to be an idea of the imagination, so on the other hand an idea of the imagination can acquire such force and liveliness that it passes for an idea of the memory and has a counterfeit effect on belief and judgment.” (Hume 1739, p. 50). Whereas there is no qualitative difference between memory and imagination, such a difference exists between memory and present impressions. As a consequence, present impressions constitute a privileged source of knowledge. If we do not experience hallucinations, imagination cannot produce impressions equally convincing as our senses.
- 4.
I set aside the question in which respects “Wittgenstein’s paradox as it struck Kripke” corresponds to real Wittgenstein’s views. My re-assessment of the paradox concerns the former. Moreover, I refrain from wider references to other commentators as they do not contribute substantially to the development of the Kantian answer to Kripkenstein.
- 5.
Naturally, to seek the core of Kripkenstein’s paradox in the problem of continuity of rules in time remains a controversial and selective interpretative option. I am well aware that the paradox might be interpreted differently—for instance Crispin Wright attempted to demonstrate that it concerns not fixing meaning in time, but fixing it at all (Wright 1984). However, the temporal aspect of the paradox is clearly manifest in the original exposition by Kripke, who neatly separates the current application from the past formulation of a rule (“was there some past fact about me—what I ‘meant’ by plus—that mandates what I should do now?” asks Kripke (1982, p. 15). Other commentators—such as G.P. Baker, P.M.S. Hacker (1984, p. 27, 65) and Colin McGinn (1984, pp. 140–147)—also highlight the temporal aspect of the paradox in Kripke’s formulation. I am convinced that “Kripkenstein’s paradox” does not have one coherent formulation, but resembles a bundle of multiple inextricably intertwined paradoxes. It might be then justified to go in different ways and reduce the initial set of questions to various “subparadoxes”. Wright’s comments on McGinn, which aim at abstracting from the temporal aspect in favour of the general problem of meaning, is one of them. Nevertheless, it does not exclude other formulations. In this light I feel entitled to concentrate solely on the temporal aspect, bearing in mind that my reasoning is equivalent to constructing a new “subparadox”.
- 6.
It is worth noting that in this Kantian approach we do not compare the present application and “real” past applications, which are inaccessible. We only juxtapose the present with its own record of past applications. Yet this record cannot be changed at will and continuity must be assumed.
- 7.
In the following part of the text I will use the abbreviation TUA.
- 8.
Originally Kant described the TUA exactly in this way, claiming that it is some inner awareness of us thinking, present even when we are not conscious of it. Thus the TUA always refers impressions to us perceiving them.
- 9.
Kripke writes: “if we think of Crusoe as following rules, we are taking him into our community and applying our criteria for rule following to him” (1982, p. 110).
- 10.
Baker and Hacker noted that community consent is not equivalent to the correctness of rule application (1984, p. 75). Kripke’s community could not be then identified with a real group of people. McGinn pointed to the fact that even if my community—construed as a real group of people—produces a unanimous judgment on the correct application of a rule, nothing guarantees that this judgment would be in line with past applications (McGinn 1984, p. 189). The community itself cannot avoid Kripkenstein’s scepticism. McGinn uses this argument to argue for a possibility of individual application of rules. However, it is not necessary to discard the idea of community. McGinn himself applied it to the description of Humean link (“community”) between events (1984, p. 67). Kantian approach allows to dissociate the idea of community from any kind of society and transpose it to the abstract structure of experience.
- 11.
Baker and Hacker note briefly that Robinson Crusoe might apply rules in isolation and correct himself (Baker and Hacker 1984, p. 39). In my exposition I put special accent on the ability to correct oneself, which in Kantian terms would prove that the instance of normativity is at work. An individual makes thus a distinction between herself applying a rule and the abstract order. Correcting oneself would not be just one of signs that an individual follows a rule, but a key feature of normativity.
- 12.
It does not matter here whether I recognise my mistake on my own or whether someone else points to it. As long as I am ready to acknowledge that my application might differ from what the rule entails, I am not using my private language, but true rules.
References
Baker, G. P., and P. M. S. Hacker. 1984. Scepticism, rules and language. Oxford: Basil Blackwell.
Hume, David. 1739. A treatise of human nature. http://www.earlymoderntexts.com/pdfs/hume1739book1_3.pdf. Accessed: 20 Jan 2014.
Hume, David. 1992. An enquiry concerning human understanding; my own life; an abstract of a Treatise of human nature. La Salle: Open Court.
Kant, Immanuel. 1855. The critique of pure reason. London: Henry G. Bohn.
Kripke, Saul A. 1982. Wittgenstein on rules and private language. An elementary exposition. Cambridge: Harvard University Press.
McGinn, Colin. 1984. Wittgenstein on meaning: an interpretation and evaluation. Oxford: Basil Blackwell.
Wittgenstein, Ludwig. 1974. Philosophical investigations. Oxford: Basil Blackwell.
Wright, Crispin. 1984. Kripke’s account of the argument against private language. The Journal of Philosophy LXXXI (12): 759–778.
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Tacik, P. (2015). On the Kantian Answer to “Kripkenstein”’s Rule-following Paradox. In: Araszkiewicz, M., Banaś, P., Gizbert-Studnicki, T., Płeszka, K. (eds) Problems of Normativity, Rules and Rule-Following. Law and Philosophy Library, vol 111. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-09375-8_6
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