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Information Exchanges Among Competitors in EU Retail Financial Markets

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EU Competition Law, the Consumer Interest and Data Protection

Part of the book series: SpringerBriefs in Law ((BRIEFSLAW))

Abstract

In principle, each commercial venture is supposed to develop its own experience and knowledge of the market, which become a competitive asset to be used in its business strategies, offers, pricing, and marketing. Without a doubt, market intelligence is a key element of the competitiveness of commercial entities.

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Notes

  1. 1.

    Stiglitz and Weiss (1981), pp. 393–410; Berger and Udell (1995), pp. 351–381.

  2. 2.

    Ibid.

  3. 3.

    Stiglitz and Weiss (1981), pp. 393–410; Akelof (1970), pp. 523–547; Berger and Udell (1995), pp. 351–381; Diamond (1991), pp. 689–721; Admati and Pfleiderer (2000), pp. 479–519.

  4. 4.

    Riestra (2002), 4; Bertola et al. (2006a), pp. 347–371.

  5. 5.

    Miller (2003a), pp. 1–23, sp. 2. See also Miller (2003b), 25–79.

  6. 6.

    Bertola et al. (2006b), pp. 347–371; Riestra (2002).

  7. 7.

    European Commission (2009).

  8. 8.

    Alary and Gollier (2001).

  9. 9.

    Barron and Staten (2000, 2003), pp. 273–310.

  10. 10.

    Giannetti et al. (2010).

  11. 11.

    Ibid.

  12. 12.

    Bertola et al. (2006a), pp. 1–26.

  13. 13.

    Ibid.

  14. 14.

    Jappelli and Pagano (2002), pp. 2017–2045; Diamond (1991), pp. 689–721; Admati and Pfleiderer (2000), pp. 479–519. See also Jappelli and Pagano (2006), pp. 347–371.

  15. 15.

    Miller (2003a), pp. 1–23, sp. 2. See also Miller (2003b), pp. 25–79.

  16. 16.

    Klein (1992), pp. 117–136; Klein (1997), pp. 267–288.

  17. 17.

    See European Commission, Staff Working Paper on National Measures and Practices aimed at Avoiding Foreclosure Procedures for Residential Mortgage Loans SEC(2011) 357 final, which pointed to the severe consequences for individual homeowners losing their homes in a foreclosure procedure, but also for society as a whole, considering their impact on financial and social stability.

  18. 18.

    See Communication of the European Commission to the European Council of 4 March 2009 Driving European Recovery, COM (2009) 114. See also the Public Consultation on Responsible Lending and Borrowing, available atec.europa.eu/internal…/responsible_lending/consultation_en.pdf. the EU Commission has recently conducted a consultation with all stakeholders on responsible lending and borrowing in the EU to find measures to adequately assess, by all appropriate means, borrowers’ creditworthiness before granting them a loan and tackle over-indebtedness. The consultation covered, among other things, the advertising and marketing of credit products, the information to be provided to borrowers prior to granting any loans, ways to assess product suitability and borrower creditworthiness, advice standards, responsible borrowing and issues relating to the framework for credit intermediaries (for example, disclosures, registration, licensing and supervision).

  19. 19.

    Directive 2008/48/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 23 April 2008 on credit agreements for consumers and repealing Council Directive 87/102/EEC, OJ 2008 L 133/66.

  20. 20.

    Directive 2014/17/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 4 February 2014 on credit agreements for consumers relating to residential immovable property and amending Directives 2008/48/EC and 2013/36/EU and Regulation (EU) No 1093/2010, OJ 2014 L 60/34.

  21. 21.

    See Articles 18, 20 and 21 of the MCD.

  22. 22.

    Ferretti (2010), pp. 1–27.

  23. 23.

    For a detailed account of the securitisation of consumer loans see, for example, Engel and McCoy (2011).

  24. 24.

    European Commission (2009); Keys et al. (2008); Engel and McCoy (2011).

  25. 25.

    Ibid.

  26. 26.

    See, for example, Bigus (1996); Desai et al. (1997), pp. 323–346; Handzic et al. (2003), pp. 97–109; Jensen (1992), pp. 15–26; Yobas and Crook (2000), pp. 111–125.

  27. 27.

    For all see, for example, Poulton (1994).

  28. 28.

    Fractal Analytics (2003).

  29. 29.

    Thomas (2000), pp. 149–172.

  30. 30.

    Jappelli and Pagano (2000, 2003), pp. 81–114; Jappelli and Pagano (2006), pp. 347–371; Ferretti (2008); Brealey et al. (2001), sp. Chap. 2; Cartwright (2004), sp. 31–34; Lastra (1996); Lastra and Shams (2001), pp. 165–188.

  31. 31.

    Jappelli and Pagano (2003), pp. 81–114, Jappelli and Pagano (2006), pp. 347–371; Ferretti (2008). The state of affairs in Europe appears to be a mixed one: while in Belgium and France only public entities operate, in Denmark, Estonia, Finland, Greece, Cyprus, Hungary, Ireland, Malta, The Netherlands, Poland, Sweden, and the UK the business of information providers has been left to free market forces. In some Member States, however, private and public Credit Registries coexist (Austria, Bulgaria, Czech Republic, Germany, Italy, Latvia, Lithuania, Portugal, Romania, Slovakia, Slovenia, and Spain).

  32. 32.

    Hurst (1998), sp. 28.

  33. 33.

    Jappelli and Pagano (2003), pp. 81–114.

  34. 34.

    Jappelli and Pagano (2003), pp. 81–114; Ferretti (2008).

  35. 35.

    Ibid.

  36. 36.

    Miller (2003b), pp. 25–79.

  37. 37.

    Ibid. See also Jentzsch (2005).

  38. 38.

    Negative information usually refers to data about defaults on payments, delays, delinquencies, bankruptcies etc. That is, information with a negative connotation on the payment history and the financial behaviour of the consumer. Positive information, by contrast, refers to data with a positive connotation, such as data about the financial standing, payments and other details which do not indicate a default or a late payment. Attempts have also been made to classify information which refers to data on accounts which demonstrate some signs of problems but have not yet proceeded to the state of being negative, i.e. accounts which are in acceptable time arrears with no warning to the customer being yet issued by the lender. Usually, these categorisations vary from Member State to Member State.

  39. 39.

    For similar considerations about the value of public credit registries see also Majinoni et al. (2004).

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  1. Brunel Law School, Brunel University London, Uxbridge, Middlesex, UK

    Federico Ferretti

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Ferretti, F. (2014). Information Exchanges Among Competitors in EU Retail Financial Markets. In: EU Competition Law, the Consumer Interest and Data Protection. SpringerBriefs in Law. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-08906-5_2

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