Abstract
This book is an introduction to Trusted Computing and next generation Trusted Platform Modules (TPM2.0). Concepts are repeated throughout this book, in an effort to make individual chapters more complete on their own, and enable readers with specific objectives to dip in and out of this book. This book starts by describing the background of Trusted Computing and trusted platforms, and speculating about the future of Trusted Computing and trusted platforms. It then describes the features and architecture of trusted platforms from several different perspectives. The second half of this book is devoted to a description of second generation Trusted Platform Modules, including a technical description that is intended to supplement the Trusted Computing Group’s TPM2.0 specifications “Trusted Platform Module Library Specification, Family “2.0”, Level 00, Revision 00.96”. This book concludes with chapters written by experts in the TPM’s “Direct Anonymous Attestation” protocol and Trusted Virtualised Platforms.
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Notes
- 1.
It remains to be seen whether this has changed with the entry of Apple and Google into the mobile ‘phone market.
- 2.
Even so, part of a trusted platform does need to be secure. The Trusted Platform Module in PC platforms, for example, must have enough protection to defeat an attack by a competent engineer using readily available equipment. Otherwise the TPM cannot protect keys in stolen or lost computers—one of the touted benefits of trusted computers.
- 3.
None of the most outspoken commentators are known to have firsthand experience of the Trusted Computing initiative.
- 4.
If a platform has an anonymous identity , it’s impossible to distinguish a platform from any other platform, or even from previous interactions with the same platform. If a platform has a pseudonymous identify, it is still impossible to distinguish a platform from other platforms, but it is possible to correlate interactions with the same platform.
- 5.
Legal controls can provide means to obtain redress after the fact but can’t undo the disclosure of information. Further, even if laws exist, laws can be ignored and broken and might not be enforced. Laws might as well not exist unless one has the time and financial resources for legal proceedings.
References
TPM Platform Crypto-Provider Toolkit” (April 2014): search http://research.microsoft.com for “TPM Platform Crypto-Provider Toolkit”
TPM specifications (April 2014) http://www.trustedcomputinggroup.org/resources/tpm_library_specification
“TCG Design, Implementation, and Usage Principles” (commonly called “Best Practices”) (April 2014) http://www.trustedcomputinggroup.org/resources/tcg_design_implementation_and_usage_principles_best_practices
TCG’s “PC-Client TPM Certified Products List” (April 2014) www.trustedcomputinggroup.org/certification/certificationtpm_certified_products_list.
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Proudler, G., Chen, L., Dalton, C. (2014). Introduction. In: Trusted Computing Platforms. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-08744-3_1
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-08744-3_1
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