Electronic Voting: How Logic Can Help

  • Véronique Cortier
Part of the Lecture Notes in Computer Science book series (LNCS, volume 8562)


Electronic voting should offer at least the same guarantees than traditional paper-based voting systems. In order to achieve this, electronic voting protocols make use of cryptographic primitives, as in the more traditional case of authentication or key exchange protocols. All these protocols are notoriously difficult to design and flaws may be found years after their first release. Formal models, such as process algebra, Horn clauses, or constraint systems, have been successfully applied to automatically analyze traditional protocols and discover flaws. Electronic voting protocols however significantly increase the difficulty of the analysis task. Indeed, they involve for example new and sophisticated cryptographic primitives, new dedicated security properties, and new execution structures.

After an introduction to electronic voting, we describe the current techniques for e-voting protocols analysis and review the key challenges towards a fully automated verification.


Vote System Security Protocol Blind Signature Homomorphic Encryption Cryptographic Primitive 
These keywords were added by machine and not by the authors. This process is experimental and the keywords may be updated as the learning algorithm improves.


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Copyright information

© Springer International Publishing Switzerland 2014

Authors and Affiliations

  • Véronique Cortier
    • 1
  1. 1.LORIA - CNRSFrance

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