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Low Entropy Masking Schemes, Revisited

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Smart Card Research and Advanced Applications (CARDIS 2013)

Part of the book series: Lecture Notes in Computer Science ((LNSC,volume 8419))

Abstract

Low Entropy Masking Schemes (LEMS) are a recent countermeasure against side-channel attacks. They aim at reducing the randomness requirements of masking schemes under certain (adversarial and implementation) conditions. Previous works have put forward the interest of this approach when such conditions are met. We complement these investigations by analyzing LEMS against adversaries and implementations that deviate from their expected behavior, in a realistic manner. Our conclusions are contrasted: they confirm the theoretical interest of the countermeasure, while suggesting that its exploitation in actual products may be risky, because of hard(er) to control hardware assumptions.

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Notes

  1. 1.

    Current results in LEMS do not provide generalizations to more shares.

  2. 2.

    Note that the univariate attacks considered in LEMS are different than the classical univariate higher-order DPAs, where a combination of the two leakage samples (e.g. their normalized product) is exploited by the adversary [10]. Any such combination would provide leakages and successful attacks similar to the ones of a bivariate attack, with an information loss similar to the one investigated in [13].

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Acknowledgments

Work funded in parts by the European Commission through the ERC project 280141 (acronym CRASH) and the European ISEC action grant HOME/2010/ISEC/AG/INT-011 B-CCENTRE project. F.-X. Standaert is an associate researcher of the Belgian Fund for Scientific Research (FNRS-F.R.S.).

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Authors and Affiliations

  1. ICTEAM/ELEN/Crypto Group, Université catholique de Louvain, Louvain-la-Neuve, Belgium

    Vincent Grosso & François-Xavier Standaert

  2. ANSSI, 51 Bd de la Tour-Maubourg, 75700, Paris 07 SP, France

    Emmanuel Prouff

Authors
  1. Vincent Grosso
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  2. François-Xavier Standaert
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  3. Emmanuel Prouff
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Corresponding author

Correspondence to Vincent Grosso .

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Editors and Affiliations

  1. EURECOM, Biot, France

    Aurélien Francillon

  2. Cryptography Research Inc., San Francisco, California, USA

    Pankaj Rohatgi

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Grosso, V., Standaert, FX., Prouff, E. (2014). Low Entropy Masking Schemes, Revisited. In: Francillon, A., Rohatgi, P. (eds) Smart Card Research and Advanced Applications. CARDIS 2013. Lecture Notes in Computer Science(), vol 8419. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-08302-5_3

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-08302-5_3

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  • Publisher Name: Springer, Cham

  • Print ISBN: 978-3-319-08301-8

  • Online ISBN: 978-3-319-08302-5

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