Essay #20: The Generalization Argument Defended

Abstract

Marcus George Singer, in his book Generalization In Ethics gives a detailed defense of the Kant inspired generalization argument. Singer’s formulation of the generalization argument consists of two premises, viz. the Principle of Consequences [If the results of everyone doing x would be disastrous, then no one ought to do x] and the Generalization Principle [If not everyone ought to do x, then no one ought to do x without adequate justification]. These premises taken together form a hypothetical syllogism yielding the conclusion which is sometimes called “the Generalization Argument” (GA): If the results of everyone doing x would be disastrous, then no one ought to do x without an adequate justification. The purpose of this essay is to defend the generalization argument from the vigorous attack that has been leveled against it by David Keyt. Keyt develops two lines of criticism which in the end dovetail into a dilemma of having either an unsound argument because of a false premise or an invalid argument. Keyt constructs three distinct counter-examples to Singer’s argument. To properly appreciate Singer’s defense of GA, it is necessary to understand the four restrictions that he places upon the argument. They involve (1) restricted generality, (2) invertability, (3) reiterability, and (4) the admission of exceptions, under conditions of non-reiterabilty. The dialectic of this paper consists in showing that each of Keyt’s three counter-examples fails precisely because, in each case, he has not properly understood or appreciated the logical force of Singer’s four restrictions.