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Bilateral Negotiation of a Meeting Point in a Maze

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Part of the book series: Lecture Notes in Computer Science ((LNAI,volume 8473))

Abstract

Negotiation between agents aims at reaching an agreement in which the conflicting interests of agents are accommodated. In this paper, we present a concrete negotiation scenario where two agents are situated in a maze and the negotiation outcome is a cell where they will meet. Based on their individual preferences (a minimal distance from their location computed from their partial knowledge of the environment), we propose a negotiation protocol which allows agents to submit more than two proposals at the same time and a conciliatory strategy. Formally, we prove that the agreement reached by such a negotiation process is Pareto-optimal and a compromise, i.e. a solution which minimizes the maximum effort for one agent. Moreover, the path between the two agents emerges from the repeated negotiations in our experiments.

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© 2014 Springer International Publishing Switzerland

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Delecroix, F., Morge, M., Routier, JC. (2014). Bilateral Negotiation of a Meeting Point in a Maze. In: Demazeau, Y., Zambonelli, F., Corchado, J.M., Bajo, J. (eds) Advances in Practical Applications of Heterogeneous Multi-Agent Systems. The PAAMS Collection. PAAMS 2014. Lecture Notes in Computer Science(), vol 8473. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-07551-8_8

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-07551-8_8

  • Publisher Name: Springer, Cham

  • Print ISBN: 978-3-319-07550-1

  • Online ISBN: 978-3-319-07551-8

  • eBook Packages: Computer ScienceComputer Science (R0)

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