Skip to main content
SpringerLink
Log in

Global and US Water Law and Sustainability: The Tragedy of the Commons and the Public Trust Doctrine

  • Chapter
  • First Online:
International Food Law and Policy

  • 1498 Accesses

Abstract

This chapter explores some of the theoretical foundations that underlie the governance of the production of seafood. It focuses on the theoretical problem at the heart of how to regulate oceans and other common areas: how to avoid the so-called “tragedy of the commons.” It focuses on the two juxtaposing types of public and private property regimes that have been erected to prevent such a tragedy. The former embraces the concept known as the Public Trust Doctrine. The latter type, private-property or “market-based” regimes, are exemplified by Individual Fishing Quotas, (also known as Individual Trading Quotas) and aquaculture, both of which are explored more in-depth in other chapters. Not left unexplored is critical literature indicating that the “tragedy of the commons” may be far too simplistic a model on which to base regulatory regimes.

This is a preview of subscription content, log in via an institution to check access.

Access this chapter

Log in via an institution
Chapter
USD 29.95
Price excludes VAT (USA)
  • Available as PDF
  • Read on any device
  • Instant download
  • Own it forever
eBook
USD 129.00
Price excludes VAT (USA)
  • Available as EPUB and PDF
  • Read on any device
  • Instant download
  • Own it forever
Hardcover Book
USD 169.99
Price excludes VAT (USA)
  • Durable hardcover edition
  • Dispatched in 3 to 5 business days
  • Free shipping worldwide - see info

Tax calculation will be finalised at checkout

Purchases are for personal use only

Institutional subscriptions

Notes

  1. 1.

    Black’s (2009), p. 1232.

  2. 2.

    For a discussion of the concept’s disputed origins, see Duncan (2002), n. 1. See Osherenko (2006), p. 331, for a discussion of the four categories: possession, use, exclusion, and disposition.

  3. 3.

    Osherenko (2006), pp. 332–333, citing Osherenko (1995), pp. 1086–1087.

  4. 4.

    Id.

  5. 5.

    Id.

  6. 6.

    Id.

  7. 7.

    Black’s (2009), p. 1286.

  8. 8.

    The first three are actually subcategories of a broader category of property, “res extra patrimonium,” which are things owned by no individual in particular. Blumm and Ritchie (2005a), p. 677, citing Buckland (1963); Wise 503, 508 (1996).

  9. 9.

    Buck (1998), p. 4.

  10. 10.

    Id.; Blumm and Ritchie (2005a), p. 677, citing J. Inst. 2.1.2; Dig. 1.8.5; Sohm (1907), p. 303–304.

  11. 11.

    Buck (1998), p. 4.

  12. 12.

    Gorina-Ysern (2004), p. 665, citing Fenn (1926), pp. 47, 52–53. This is also the basis for “the capture doctrine” which U.S. first-year law students are often taught through the case Pierson v. Post. See id. Some have interpreted this concept and used the term more broadly to mean “incapable of appropriation in the form of private ownership,” which is a definition that overlaps with property that is subject of appropriation by States such as res publicae, res universalis, and res communes. Gorina-Ysern (2004), p. 655.

  13. 13.

    Blumm and Ritchie (2005a), p. 677, citing Wise (1996), p. 503, 508; Sohm (1907), pp. 303–304.

  14. 14.

    Buck (1998), p. 4. Observers have pointed out the limitations of this categorical approach, as it does encapsulate the nature of the resource, the domain it is found, and how it is used. Other observers suggest that a better way to categorize the resources is by its multiple attributes. Buck (1998), p. 3. And some of these observers have noted that the most important characteristics for categorizing commons is the feasibility of excluding others from the resource and the degree to which one’s use can diminish the amount left for others. Id.

  15. 15.

    Buck (1998), p. 76.

  16. 16.

    Id.

  17. 17.

    Blumm and Ritchie (2005a), p. 678, citing Wise, p. 503.

  18. 18.

    Block-Lieb (1993).

  19. 19.

    These two characteristics: (1) that it is difficult to exclude other potential users and (2) the resource is finite and extractable by one to the detriment of other potential users are what turns simple communal property into what is called a “common-pool resource” which is subject to the tragedy of the commons of which Hardin and Gordon speak. See Buck (1998), p. 4; National Research Council (1999), p. 39.

  20. 20.

    Ostrom (1990), p. 2.

  21. 21.

    Id. p. 3.

  22. 22.

    id.

  23. 23.

    Gordon (1954), p. 130.

  24. 24.

    National Research Council (1999), p. 21.

  25. 25.

    Id. p. 22.

  26. 26.

    Gordon (1954), p. 131, 133, 141.

  27. 27.

    Turnipseed et al. (2009), pp. 5–7.

  28. 28.

    Id. p. 13.

  29. 29.

    Food and Agricultural Organization (2012), pp. 11, 13, 53.

  30. 30.

    Id.

  31. 31.

    Id. p. 12.

  32. 32.

    Id.

  33. 33.

    Id.

  34. 34.

    Ostrom (1990), pp. 9–10.

  35. 35.

    50 C.F.R. § 600.310(f)(1)-(7) (2014).

  36. 36.

    Id. § 600.310(g)(1)-(3).

  37. 37.

    See Ostrom (1990), pp. 12–13.

  38. 38.

    Osherenko, p. 329, citing Demsetz (1967), p. 354.

  39. 39.

    Thompson (2000), p. 244.

  40. 40.

    Rieser (1999), p. 397.

  41. 41.

    As law professor Hirokawa puts it “By operating as a condition precedent to both ownership of land and its use, the public trust doctrine intervenes in capture scenarios to prevent common resources from consumption, transformation, or other capture-like consequences of privatization.” Hirokawa (2010), p. 212.

  42. 42.

    See, e.g., Professor Rieser’s discussion of IFQs in “The Ecosystem Approach: New Departures For Land And Water: Fisheries Management: Property Rights and Ecosystem Management in U.S. Fisheries: Contracting for the Commons?” Rieser (1997), pp. 818–820.

  43. 43.

    Ostrom (1990), p. 14, 21; Rieser (1999), p. 400. For more on the Ostrom’s Nobel Prize, see http://www.nobelprize.org/nobel_prizes/economic-sciences/laureates/2009/ostrom-facts.html, last visited Apr. 4, 2014.

  44. 44.

    Rieser (1999), p. 402.

  45. 45.

    Macinko and Bromley (2004), pp. 650–654; Rieser (1999), p. 399, citing Bromley (1991), p. 30.

  46. 46.

    Macinko and Bromley (2004), pp. 650–654.

  47. 47.

    Id.

  48. 48.

    In their symposium article “Internationalizing the Public Trust Doctrine: Natural Law and Constitutional and Statutory Approaches to Fulfilling the Saxion Vision,” Professor Michael C. Blumm and Rachel D. Guthrie outline the importance of the doctrine in the countries on four continents India, Pakistan, the Philippines, Uganda, Kenya, Nigeria, South Africa, Brazil, Ecuador, and Canada. Blumm and Guthrie (2012).

  49. 49.

    Turnipseed et al. (2009), p. 10, citing Wilkinson (1989), pp. 428–430; Deveney (1976).

  50. 50.

    Lazarus (1986), p. 634; id. citing Deveney (1976), p. 17, 29.

  51. 51.

    Turnipseed et al. (2009), pp. 10–11.

  52. 52.

    Blumm and Ritchie (2005b), p. 341, citing Sax (1970).

  53. 53.

    National Research Council (1999), p. 49.

  54. 54.

    Id.

  55. 55.

    Ill. Cent. R.R. Co. v. Ill., 146 U.S. 387, 453–454 (1892).

  56. 56.

    Lazarus (1986), pp. 641–642.

  57. 57.

    Osherenko (2006), p. 362.

  58. 58.

    Sax (1970), p. 477; id. p. 367.

  59. 59.

    National Research Council (1999), p. 42.

  60. 60.

    Geer v. Connecticut, 161 U.S. 519 (1895).

  61. 61.

    Id. p. 521.

  62. 62.

    Id. p. 522.

  63. 63.

    Id.

  64. 64.

    Id. p. 527 (quoting 2 Blackstone Commentaries 410).

  65. 65.

    Id. p. 534.

  66. 66.

    See Mo. v. Holland, 252 U.S. 416, 434 (1920) (calling the state’s claim of title a “slender reed” because “[w]ild birds are not in the possession of anyone; and possession is the beginning of ownership”).

  67. 67.

    See Toomer v. Witsell, 334 U.S. 385, 401–402 (1948).

  68. 68.

    See Douglas v. Seacoast Prods., Inc., 431 U.S. 265, 283 (1977).

  69. 69.

    Hughes v. Oklahoma, 441 U.S. 322, 335 (1979). For an in-depth treatment of these cases and the demise of Geer, see Macinko and Bromley (2004), pp. 631–634.

  70. 70.

    National Research Council (1999), p. 42.

  71. 71.

    See Babcock (2007). And this concept has been bolstered by a number of state court decisions. National Research Council (1999), p. 42. Indeed, Justice Burger explained in his concurring opinion in Baldwin v. Fish & Game Comm’n: “A State does not ‘own’ wild birds and animals in the same way that it may own other natural resources such as land, oil, or timber. But, as . . . the doctrine is not completely obsolete. It manifests the State’s special interest in regulating and preserving wildlife for the benefit of its citizens.” 436 U.S. 371, 392 (1978).

  72. 72.

    And, in fact, “absent federal-state conflict, it continues to endure today, as virtually all states claim ownership of wildlife in trust for their citizens.” Blumm and Ritchie 2005a, p. 676.

  73. 73.

    National Research Council (1999), p. 43.

  74. 74.

    Turnipseed et al. (2009), p. 1.

  75. 75.

    Id. p. 8.

  76. 76.

    See, e.g., Martin v. Lessee of Waddell, 41 U.S. 367, 416 (1842); Arnold v. Mundy, 6 N.J.L. 1, 71, 78 (Sup. Ct. 1821); Shively v. Bowlby, 152 U.S. 1, 57 (1894).

  77. 77.

    Idaho v. Coeur D’Alene Tribe, 521 U.S. 285 (1997).

  78. 78.

    Id.

  79. 79.

    Id. p. 286.

  80. 80.

    Id.

  81. 81.

    But see Lynch (2007), arguing that unlike state waters, the EEZ has traditionally been treated as a global commons and thus should be treated as res nullius.

  82. 82.

    48 Fed. Reg. 10,605 (March 14, 1983).

  83. 83.

    16 U.S.C. § 1801(b)(1).

  84. 84.

    See Turnipseed et al. (2009), pp. 34–40.

  85. 85.

    National Research Council (1999), p. 42.

  86. 86.

    Shively v. Bowlby, 152 U.S. at 57.

  87. 87.

    United States v. California, 332 U.S. 19, 40 (1947).

  88. 88.

    In Re Steuart Transportation Co., 495 F. Supp. 38, 40 (E.D. Va. 1980) (emphasis added).

  89. 89.

    United States v. 1.58 Acres of Land, 523 F. Supp. 120, 124 (D. Mass. 1981).

  90. 90.

    United States v. Ross, No. CR. 11-30101-MAM, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 146285, at *5-6 (D.S.D. Oct. 10, 2012) (footnotes omitted). See also United States v. Burlington N. R.R. Co., 710 F. Supp. 1286, 1287 (D. Neb. 1989) (“In view of this trust position, and its accompanying obligations, it appears that the United States . . . can maintain an action to recover for damages to its public lands and the natural resources on them, which in this action would encompass the destroyed wildlife.”).

  91. 91.

    PPL Mont., LLC v. Montana, 132 S. Ct. 1215, 1225 (2012).

  92. 92.

    Id.

  93. 93.

    Id. at 1228.

  94. 94.

    Id. at 1234.

  95. 95.

    Id. at 1235.

  96. 96.

    See, e.g., Alec L. v. Jackson, 863 F. Supp. 2d 11, 15 (D.D.C. 2012), aff'd, 561 Fed. Appx. 7 (D.C. Cir. 2014). The courts found that the plaintiffs could not invoke federal subject matter jurisdiction for a claim against Defendant EPA for failing to reduce greenhouse gases in violation of the Public Trust Doctrine, as it was foreclosed by the PPL decision, which determined that it was a state law doctrine.

  97. 97.

    Id.

  98. 98.

    Accord Adler (2013), p. 1706 n. 14. As law professor Adler remarks “In PPL Montana, the Supreme Court reiterated earlier holdings that federal law controls the navigability for title test for purposes of the equal footing doctrine, but that state law governs the scope of the public trust doctrine within individual states.”

  99. 99.

    Since the U.S. Supreme Court’s Erie R.R. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64, 78 (1938) decision, it has been accepted that federal common law must be derived from a federal source of positive law, such as the Constitution or a statute. Chase at pp. 113, 138, 162 (2010). The PPL decision terminates the argument that the doctrine has a basis in the U.S. Constitution’s Equal Footing Doctrine, as some say that the Illinois Central decision should be interpreted. See, e.g., id. pp. 140–142 (arguing that that the Illinois Central Court’s articulation of the Public Trust Doctrine was derived from the U.S. Constitution’s Equal Footing Doctrine).

  100. 100.

    Am. Elec. Power Co. v. Connecticut, 131 S. Ct. 2527, 2537 (2011).

  101. 101.

    Id.

  102. 102.

    Pac. Coast Fed’n of Fishermen’s Ass’n v. Locke, No. C 10-04790 CRB, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 86662, at *52 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 5, 2011).

  103. 103.

    Ill. v. City of Milwaukee, 406 U.S. 91, 102–103 (1972).

  104. 104.

    City of Milwaukee v. Ill., (Milwaukee II) 451 U.S. 304, 318–319, 23 (1981).

  105. 105.

    Am. Elec. Power Co. v. Connecticut, 131 S. Ct. 2527, 2538 (2011) (citing City of Milwaukee v. Ill., 451 U.S. at 324). For a discussion of the interplay between the two City of Milwaukee cases and the American Electric decision, see Winters (2011), p. 382.

  106. 106.

    See Babcock (2007), pp. 60–61, who argues that federal laws involving the management of fish would not displace application of the common law to fish farming. See also, Turnipseed et al. (2009), pp. 48–49, which argues that at, with the EEZ, virtually all of the key prerequisites laid out by the Supreme Court in Texas Indus., Inc. v. Radcliff Materials, Inc., 451 U.S. 630, 640 (1981) exist for when federal courts can create federal common law, except that Congress did not give this power expressly to the courts. See also Michigan v. U.S. Army Corps of Eng’rs, 667 F.3d 765, 769–771 (7th Cir. 2011) (denying that states would likely succeed on their common law nuisance claims against the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, but assessing a greater likelihood than the District Court did because federal common law can apply where there is an overriding federal interest in the need for a uniform rule of decision, and nuisance law would cover the non-native species that were will migrating into Lake Michigan, even though they were not traditional pollutants.) See United States v. Rainbow Family, 695 F. Supp. 314, 327 (E.D. Tex. 1988) (allowing the federal government to pursue an injunction as a remedy for a common law nuisance claim in lieu of the applicability of its federal permitting scheme).

  107. 107.

    See 50 C.F.R. § 660.25(h)(2)(ii) (2013).

  108. 108.

    Klass (2006), p. 699, citing Delgado (1991), pp. 1212–1218.

  109. 109.

    Ryan (2001), p. 493, citing Lazarus (1986), p. 696.

  110. 110.

    Klass (2006), p. 700, citing Lazarus (1986), pp. 656–715.

  111. 111.

    Id. citing Huffman (1989), pp. 565–568, Smith and Sweeney (2006), pp. 322–341, Thompson Jr. (1990), p. 1449. See also Stevens v. City of Cannon Beach, 510 U.S. 1207, 1212 (1994) (Scalia, J., dissenting).

  112. 112.

    Ryan (2001), p. 492.

  113. 113.

    Id.

  114. 114.

    See, e.g., Turnipseed et al. (2009), pp. 34–40.

  115. 115.

    Id.

References

  • Adler RW (2013) The ancient mariner of constitutional law: the historical, yet declining role of navigability. Wash Univ Law Rev 90(14):1643–1706

    Google Scholar 

  • Babcock HM (2007) Grotius, ocean fish ranching, and the public trust doctrine: ride ‘Em Charlie Tuna’. Stan Environ Law J 26(5):60–61

    Google Scholar 

  • Baer SD (1988) The Public Trust Doctrine – a tool to make federal administrative agencies increase protection of public land and its resources. Boston Coll Environ Aff Law Rev 15:385–433

    Google Scholar 

  • Bevis KD (2005) Stopping the silver bullet: how recreational fishermen can use the Public Trust Doctrine to prevent the creation of marine reserves. Sea Environ Law J 13:171

    Google Scholar 

  • Black’s Law Dictionary 1232, 1286 (9th ed. 2009)

    Google Scholar 

  • Block-Lieb S (1993) Fishing in Muddy Waters: clarifying the common pool analogy as applied to the standard for commencement of a bankruptcy case. Am Univ Law Rev 42:337–373

    Google Scholar 

  • Blumm MC, Guthrie RD (2012) Internationalizing the Public Trust Doctrine: natural law and constitutional and statutory approaches to fulfilling the Saxion vision. UC Davis Law Rev 45:741, 745, 748, 765, 769, 780

    Google Scholar 

  • Blumm MC, Ritchie L (2005a) The pioneer spirit and the Public Trust: The American Rule of capture and state ownership of wildlife. Environ Law 35:673, 675–679

    Google Scholar 

  • Blumm MC, Ritchie L (2005b) Lucas’s unlikely legacy: the rise of background principles as categorical takings defenses. Harv Environ Law Rev 29:321, 341

    Google Scholar 

  • Bromley DW (1991) Environment and economy: property rights and public policy 22:30

    Google Scholar 

  • Buck SJ (1998) A global commons, an introduction, vol 3–4. Island Press, Washington, DC, p 75

    Google Scholar 

  • Buckland WW (1963) A text-book of roman law from Augustus to Justinian, 3rd edn. p 182

    Google Scholar 

  • Chase CS (2010) The Illinois central Public Trust Doctrine and federal common law: an unconventional view. Hastings W -NW J Environ Law Policy 16:113, 138, 140–142, 162

    Google Scholar 

  • Christie DR (2004) Marine reserves, the Public Trust Doctrine and intergenerational equity. J Land Use Environ Law 19:427–434

    Google Scholar 

  • Delgado R (1991) Our better natures: a revisionist view of Joseph Sax’s Public Trust theory of environmental protection, and some dark thoughts on the possibility of law reform. Vand Law Rev 44:1209, 1212–1218

    Google Scholar 

  • Demsetz H (1967) Toward a theory of property rights. Am Econ Rev 57:347–354

    Google Scholar 

  • Deveney P (1976) Title, Jus Publicum, and the Public Trust: an historical analysis. Sea Grant Law J 1:13, 17, 29

    Google Scholar 

  • Duncan M (2002) Essay: reconceiving the bundle of sticks: land as a community-based resource. Environ Law 32(1):773–807

    Google Scholar 

  • Eichenberg T, Vestal B (1992) Improving the legal framework for marine aquaculture: the role of water quality laws and the Public Trust Doctrine. Terr Sea J 2:339–347

    Google Scholar 

  • Fenn PT Jr (1926) The origin of the right of fishery in territorial waters, vol 47. Harvard University Press, Cambridge, pp 52–53

    Google Scholar 

  • Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations (2012) The State of World Fisheries And Aquaculture 11, 13, 53. Available at http://www.fao.org/docrep/016/i2727e/i2727e.pdf (last visited April 10, 2014)

  • Gorina-Ysern M (2004) World Ocean Public Trust: high seas fisheries after Grotius – towards a New Ocean Ethos? Golden Gate U Law Rev 34:645, 655, 665

    Google Scholar 

  • Hildreth RG (1993) The Public Trust Doctrine and coastal and ocean resources management. J Environ Law Litig 8:221–230

    Google Scholar 

  • Hirokawa KH (2010) Property as capture and care. Alb Law Rev 74:175–212

    Google Scholar 

  • Huffman JL (1989) A fish out of water: the Public Trust Doctrine in a constitutional democracy. Environ Law 527:565–568

    Google Scholar 

  • Justinian Institutes 2.1.12. Available at http://www.fordham.edu/halsall/basis/535institutes.asp#I.%20Divisions%20of%20Things (last visited April 23, 2014)

  • Justinian Institutes 2.1.2, Available at http://www.fordham.edu/halsall/basis/535institutes.asp#I.%20Divisions%20of%20Things (last visited April 23, 2014)

  • Klass AB (2006) Modern Public Trust Principles: recognizing rights and integrating standards. Notre Dame Law Rev 82:699–700

    Google Scholar 

  • Lazarus RJ (1986) Changing conceptions of property and sovereignty in natural resources: questioning the Public Trust Doctrine. Iowa Law Rev 71:631–634, 641–642, 654–715

    Google Scholar 

  • Lynch KJ (2007) Application of the Public Trust Doctrine to modern fishery management regimes. New York Univ Environ Law J 15:285, 296, 307–310

    Google Scholar 

  • Macinko S, Bromley DW (2004) Changing tides in ocean management: property and fisheries for the twenty-first century: seeking coherence from legal and economic doctrine. Vermont Law Rev 28:623, 625, 631–634, 650–654

    Google Scholar 

  • National Research Council, Sharing the Fish Towards a National Policy on Individual Fishing Quotas (1999) National Academic Press, 21–22, 39, 42, 43, 49

    Google Scholar 

  • Olson JM (1978–1979) Toward a public lands ethic: a crossroads in publicly owned natural resources law. Univ Det J Urban Law 56:739, 861–862

    Google Scholar 

  • Osherenko G (1995) Property rights and transformation in Russia: Institutional change in the far North. Eur Asia Stud 47:1077–1108

    Google Scholar 

  • Osherenko G (2006) New discourses on ocean governance: understanding property rights and the Public Trust. J Environ Law Litig. 21:317, 331–333, 362, 367, 369, 381

    Google Scholar 

  • Ostrom E (1990) Governing the commons: the evolution of Institutions for collective action. Cambridge University Press, 2–3, 9–10, 12–14, 21

    Google Scholar 

  • Rieser A (1997) The ecosystem approach: new departures for land and water: fisheries management: property rights and ecosystem management in U.S. fisheries: contracting for the commons? Ecol Law Q 24:813, 818–820

    Google Scholar 

  • Rieser A (1999) Prescriptions for the commons: environmental scholarship and the fishing quotas debate. Harv Environ Law Rev 23:393, 397, 399, 400, 402

    Google Scholar 

  • Ryan E (2001) Public Trust and Distrust: the theoretical implications of the Public Trust Doctrine for natural resource management. Environ Law 31:477

    Google Scholar 

  • Sax JL (1970) The Public Trust Doctrine in natural resources law: effective judicial intervention. Mich Law Rev 68:471, 477

    Google Scholar 

  • Scott Gordon H (1954) An economic theory of common property research. The fishery. J Polit Econ 64:130, 131, 133, 141

    Google Scholar 

  • Smith GP II, Sweeney MW (2006) The Public Trust Doctrine and natural law: emanations within a Penumbra. Boston Coll Environ Aff Law Rev 33:307, 322–341

    Google Scholar 

  • Sohm R (1907) The Institutes: a textbook of the history and system of roman private law (James C. Ledlie trans, 3rd edn), pp 303–304

    Google Scholar 

  • Thompson BH Jr (1990) Judicial takings. Va Law Rev 76:1449

    Google Scholar 

  • Thompson BH Jr (2000) Tragically difficult: the obstacles to governing the commons. Environ Law 30:241, 244

    Google Scholar 

  • Turnipseed M, Roady SE, Sagarin R, Crowder LB (2009) The Silver Anniversary of the United States’ exclusive economic zone: twenty-five years of ocean use and abuse, and the possibility of a blue water Public Trust Doctrine. Ecol Law Q 36:1, 5–8, 10–11, 18–19, 23, 34–40, 48–49, 55–57

    Google Scholar 

  • Weiss EB (1990) Our rights and obligations to future generations for the environment. Am J Int Law 84:198

    Google Scholar 

  • Wilder RJ (1992) The three mile territorial sea: its origins and implications for contemporary offshore federalism. Va J Int Law 32:681–689

    Google Scholar 

  • Wilkinson CF (1989) The headwaters of the Public Trust: some thoughts on the source and scope of the traditional doctrine. Environ Law 19:425, 428–430

    Google Scholar 

  • Winters P (2011) The erosion of federal common law: anticipatory delegation in American electric power company v. Connecticut. Buff Environ Law J 19:341–382

    Google Scholar 

  • Wise SM (1996) The legal thinghood of nonhuman animals. Boston Coll Environ Aff Law Rev 23:471, 503, 508

    Google Scholar 

  • World Comm’n on Env’t & Dev., Our Common Future 8 (1987), available at http://www.un-documents.net/our-common-future.pdf (last visited April 23, 2014)

  • 2 William Blackstone Commentaries *410-11. Available at http://avalon.law.yale.edu/18th_century/blackstone_bk2ch27.asp (last visited July 29, 2016)

Download references

Author information

Authors and Affiliations

  1. Food & Water Watch, Washington, DC, USA

    Zach Corrigan

Authors
  1. Zach Corrigan
    View author publications

    You can also search for this author in PubMed Google Scholar

Corresponding author

Correspondence to Zach Corrigan .

Editor information

Editors and Affiliations

  1. Food Law International, LLP, Boston, Massachusetts, USA

    Gabriela Steier

  2. Food Law International, LLP, Washington, DC, USA

    Kiran K. Patel

Rights and permissions

Reprints and permissions

Copyright information

© 2016 Springer International Publishing Switzerland

About this chapter

Cite this chapter

Corrigan, Z. (2016). Global and US Water Law and Sustainability: The Tragedy of the Commons and the Public Trust Doctrine. In: Steier, G., Patel, K. (eds) International Food Law and Policy. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-07542-6_34

Download citation

  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-07542-6_34

  • Published:

  • Publisher Name: Springer, Cham

  • Print ISBN: 978-3-319-07541-9

  • Online ISBN: 978-3-319-07542-6

  • eBook Packages: Law and CriminologyLaw and Criminology (R0)

Publish with us

Policies and ethics

Search

Navigation