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How Does the Market Value Management Practices of Japanese Firms? Using Management Practice Survey Data

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Abstract

This paper examines the extent to which firm’s management practices are valued in the marketplace using the data of interview survey. First, we divide a firm’s market value into its tangible and intangible assets, and further decompose the intangible asset value into the components attributable to advertising, to R&D, and to management practices. We find that the component attributable to management practices is much smaller than the components attributable to R&D or to advertising. We also find that among various management practices, human resource management has a significantly positive impact on Tobin’s q. Some of organizational management variables, however, have significantly negative impacts on Tobin’s q, contrary to the findings of Bloom and Van Reenen (Quarterly Journal of Economics 122:1341–1408, 2007; Journal of Economic Perspectives 24:203–224, 2010) and Bloom et al. (Academy of Management Perspectives 26:12–33, 2012), to which we referred when we conducted interview survey. Then, we further explore the organizational management practice variables to understand why they do not have significantly positive impacts on Tobin’s q. The finer analysis finds that many characteristics of management practices, which are supposed to increase market value of the firms, actually have no significant impact or a negative impact on Tobin’s q. The results suggest that information sharing and coordination within a unit or a team increase the value, while disclosing information and coordinating across units decrease the value. The results also suggest that quick decision making has different impacts on firm’s market value depending upon the contexts. Speedy decision making increases the value in case of new business development, while consultation with the people concerned increases firm’s market value in case of closing the existing business. The different results of this study from the existing ones may suggest that good management practices are different among countries.

This paper is a revised version of the RIETI discussion paper (Kawakami and Asaba 2013), which was originally presented at the Workshop on Intangibles, Innovation Policy and Economic Growth. This study is conducted as a part of the Project “Research on Intangible assets in Japan” in Japanon s c RIETI. We thank Prof. Masahisa Fujita (RIETI), Prof. Kaoru Hosono (Gakushuin University), the participants of the workshop, and the member of the project for helpful comments. This study is partly supported by a Grant-in-Aid for Scientific Research from the Ministry of Education, Culture, Sports, Science and Technology (No. 22223004).

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Notes

  1. 1.

    As to computerized information, Brynjolfsson and Hitt (1995), for example, examined the relationship between IT investment and productivity. Many management scholars have examined the impact of innovative property or technological capability on firm performance (Argyres 1996; Helfat 1994, 1997; Henderson and Cockburn 1994).

  2. 2.

    Human and organizational capital has been studied not in economics but in the field of management.

  3. 3.

    Miyagawa et al. (2012) is an exception. They evaluate economic competence using the data on labor costs and expense of organizational reform.

  4. 4.

    We asked the research firms to conduct the interviews. Examining the results of the pilot interviews, we discuss with them on how to interview and score the answers.

  5. 5.

    The number of the firms we interviewed is 277 for the first interview and 130 for the second interview. Among them, we found two duplicates and three unavailable firm observations, and consequently, we use 402 firm observations.

  6. 6.

    Miyagawa et al. (2010) describe the scoring system of this interview survey in more detail.

  7. 7.

    Other than financial-market based estimation, Simon and Sullivan (1993) pointed out five techniques to measure brand equity: estimation based on the conditions of acquisition and divestment, based on the price premium commanded by a product, based on the brand name’s influence on customer evaluation, based on brand replacement cost, and based on a brand-earnings multiplier.

  8. 8.

    In general, the market value of the firm can be considered a function of the tangible and intangible asset value, and can be represented as MV = G(V t, V i ). If any interaction between the tangible assets and the intangible assets is expressed by the interaction term between V t and V i , the market value can be represented as MV = V t + V i + V t * V i. Then, we obtain q = (MV/V t ) = 1 + ((1 + V t )/V t ) * V i . While the coefficient of V i is different from that in the model without considering the interaction effect into account, we can estimate the impact of various factors on the intangible asset value of the firm in the same regression. Moreover, when we decompose the three kinds of the intangible asset values using the coefficient estimated by the model with the interaction, the calculated intangible assets value is not V i /V t , but ((1 + V t )/V t ) * V i .

  9. 9.

    The depreciation rate of building is 0.047, structure is 0.0564, machinery is 0.09489, ship is 0.1470, vehicle is 0.1470 and tool is 0.08838.

  10. 10.

    As to the questions and sub-questions of organizational capital, see Appendix.

  11. 11.

    For this question, there are no negative responses to the first sub-question (score is 2). As a result, the dummy variables in model (13-1) are Score3_D and Score4_D, and that in either model of (13-2) or (13-3) is Score4_D only, but in model (13-3), the observations with score 1 are dropped, while in model (13-2), they are not dropped.

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Correspondence to Shigeru Asaba .

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Appendix: Questions Related to Organizational Management Practices

Appendix: Questions Related to Organizational Management Practices

Implementation of organizational goals (setting target levels)

  1. 2.

    Are the settings for the individual or sectional target levels simply given to you from the division or section above you? Or are they given to you while considering the opinions of your division or section?

  2. 3.

    Are the target levels appropriately set as non-binding challenges?

  3. 4.

    Are target levels checked to ensure there is fairness between divisions or sections?

Implementation of organizational goals (permeation of goals)

  1. 2.

    Do all employees know the goals?

  2. 3.

    If goals exist on various levels (such as company-wide, divisional, and sectional goals), do all employees understand the level of priority of the goals?

  3. 4.

    Do all the employees accept the target levels and are they motivated to reach the levels?

Implementation of organizational goals (degree to which goals are achieved, checks on performance)

  1. 2.

    Are checks made to see how far goals have been achieved?

  2. 3.

    Are the checks made regularly?

  3. 4.

    In addition to the checks as a formal system, do employees make the checks voluntarily?

Implementation of organizational goals (permeation of degree to which goals are achieved, and results of checks on performance)

  1. 2.

    Are the results of such checks made openly available within your division?

  2. 3.

    Are the results of such checks made openly within not only your division but also between relevant divisions?

  3. 4.

    Are adjustments made to ensure that the degree to which goals have been achieved at different divisions is fairly compared?

Implementation of organizational goals (results of checks—handling when goals have not been achieved)

  1. 2.

    Is a meeting consisting of managerial staff and employees promptly held as soon as it is known that the goals were not achieved?

  2. 3.

    After investigation, are points to revise spread throughout the division, and are measures for handling the failure to achieve the goals promptly implemented?

  3. 4.

    Are problematic issues and countermeasures made throughout the relevant divisions, and if necessary, other divisions?

Implementation of organizational goals (results of checks—handling when goals have been achieved)

  1. 2.

    When goals are achieved are investigations made so that those goals renewed on a continuous basis or so that higher goals are set?

  2. 3.

    How long is it between the setting of higher goals and the operation/implementation of those goals?

  3. 4.

    Are these measures institutionalized on a company-wide level?

Decision making speed (ground work in case of starting a new business)

When you start a new business with other departments, how long do you spend ground work? Answer the ratio of the time for ground work within 100 % (from the beginning of the project to the start of the business).

  1. 1.

    Over 60 %

  2. 2.

    40–59 %

  3. 3.

    20–39 %

  4. 4.

    Under 19 %

Decision making speed (ground work in case of closing an existing business)

When you close an existing business, how long do you spend ground work? Answer the ratio of the time for ground work within 100 % (from the beginning of the project to the closing of the business).

  1. 1.

    Over 60 %

  2. 2.

    40–59 %

  3. 3.

    20–39 %

  4. 4.

    Under 19 %

*The number of each sub-question is the score you get when you answer “Yes” to the sub-question.

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Kawakami, A., Asaba, S. (2015). How Does the Market Value Management Practices of Japanese Firms? Using Management Practice Survey Data. In: Bounfour, A., Miyagawa, T. (eds) Intangibles, Market Failure and Innovation Performance. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-07533-4_8

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