DRECON: DPA Resistant Encryption by Construction

  • Suvadeep Hajra
  • Chester Rebeiro
  • Shivam Bhasin
  • Gaurav Bajaj
  • Sahil Sharma
  • Sylvain Guilley
  • Debdeep Mukhopadhyay
Part of the Lecture Notes in Computer Science book series (LNCS, volume 8469)


Side-channel attacks are considered as one of the biggest threats against modern crypto-systems. This motivates the design of ciphers which are naturally resistant against side-channel attacks. The present paper proposes a scheme called DRECON to construct a block cipher with innate protection against differential power attacks (DPA). The scheme is motivated by tweakable block ciphers and is shown to be secure against first-order DPA using information theoretic metrics. DRECON is shown to be less expensive than masking and re-keying countermeasures from the implementation perspective and can be efficiently realized in both hardware and software platforms. On FPGAs especially, DRECON can optimally utilize the abundant block RAMs available and therefore have minimal overheads. We estimate the cost overhead of DRECON in micro-controllers and FPGAs, two common targets for cryptographic applications. Finally we demonstrate practical side-channel resistance of a DRECON implementation on a Xilinx Virtex-5 FPGA (SASEBO GII board).


Clock Cycle Block Cipher Information Leakage Collision Attack Leakage Function 
These keywords were added by machine and not by the authors. This process is experimental and the keywords may be updated as the learning algorithm improves.


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Copyright information

© Springer International Publishing Switzerland 2014

Authors and Affiliations

  • Suvadeep Hajra
    • 1
  • Chester Rebeiro
    • 1
  • Shivam Bhasin
    • 2
  • Gaurav Bajaj
    • 1
  • Sahil Sharma
    • 1
  • Sylvain Guilley
    • 2
    • 3
  • Debdeep Mukhopadhyay
    • 1
  1. 1.Dept. of Computer Science and EngineeringIndian Institute of Technology KharagpurIndia
  2. 2.Institut MINES-TELECOM, TELECOM ParisTech, Department COMELECParis Cedex 13France
  3. 3.Secure-IC S.A.S.RennesFrance

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