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Evolution of Cooperation

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Algorithms and Dynamical Models for Communities and Reputation in Social Networks

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Abstract

The evolution of cooperation is a long-standing problem that has baffled biologists and sociologists alike. The problem is that not cooperating often allows for a higher immediate benefit, so why should cooperation take place? Nonetheless, we often observe cooperative behaviour, especially so in humans. One of the theories is that people use a reputational mechanism for cooperation, known as indirect reciprocity. Using a mapping of cooperating as positive links and defection as negative links, we will show that our previously introduced model for social balance leads to cooperative behaviour, unlike earlier models. This suggests that even though social balance allows cooperation to endure, it comes with a downside that any population is likely to split into two antagonistic groups.

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Authors and Affiliations

  1. KITLV, Leiden, The Netherlands

    Vincent Traag

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  1. Vincent Traag
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Correspondence to Vincent Traag .

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© 2014 Springer International Publishing Switzerland

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Traag, V. (2014). Evolution of Cooperation. In: Algorithms and Dynamical Models for Communities and Reputation in Social Networks. Springer Theses. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-06391-1_9

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