Preserving Receiver-Location Privacy in Wireless Sensor Networks

  • Javier Lopez
  • Ruben Rios
  • Jorge Cuellar
Part of the Lecture Notes in Computer Science book series (LNCS, volume 8434)


Wireless sensor networks (WSNs) are exposed to many different types of attacks. Among these, the most devastating attack is to compromise or destroy the base station since all communications are addressed exclusively to it. Moreover, this feature can be exploited by a passive adversary to determine the location of this critical device. This receiver-location privacy problem can be reduced by hindering traffic analysis but the adversary may still obtain location information by capturing a subset of sensor nodes in the field. This paper addresses, for the first time, these two problems together in a single solution


Wireless sensor networks location privacy traffic analysis node capture 


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Copyright information

© Springer International Publishing Switzerland 2014

Authors and Affiliations

  • Javier Lopez
    • 1
  • Ruben Rios
    • 1
  • Jorge Cuellar
    • 2
  1. 1.Network, Information and Computer Security (NICS) LabUniversidad of MálagaSpain
  2. 2.Siemens AGMunichGermany

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