Abstract
This chapter focuses on the phenomenology of individuation. While departing from ontological and epistemological remarks, it is argued that a proper phenomenological determination of the individual requires the analysis of the individuation processes. Despite the priority granted to temporality in making individuation possible, it is shown that such a process shall be more adequately considered as grounded on the intertwining of spatiality and temporality. The essential feature of temporality that grounds individuation is irreversibility. It is argued that this feature also impinges upon our experience of spatial individuals. Besides acknowledging how the spatio-temporal intertwining makes the individuation of perceptual things possible, in the final section of the chapter a discussion of how such processes relate to the constitution of subjectivity as individual is developed. These analyses emphasize the connection between the theory of sensibility and the phenomenology of subjective self-constitution; moreover, they shed new light on the fundamental dynamism of lived-experience.
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Notes
- 1.
Hua XVII, pp. 296–297/(Husserl 1969, pp. 291–292).
- 2.
- 3.
- 4.
Hua XIX/1, p. 114/(Husserl 2001b, p. 239).
- 5.
A similar position is still defended at paragraph 2 of Ideas I, where Husserl distinguishes the factualness of the individual from its “stock of essential predicables”. Hua III/1, pp. 12–13/(Husserl 1983, p. 7).
- 6.
As Rizzoli points out, this theory risks being not fully consistent with the claim that ideation does not result from empirical generalization. See Rizzoli (2008, pp. 58f.).
- 7.
Hua XIX/1, p. 114/(Husserl 2001b, pp. 239–240).
- 8.
Similar difficulties are implied by the notion of the act-matter in the Fifth Investigation. Grounding the intention toward something as something, the matter alone cannot explain how it is possible that we experience this individual object in its uniqueness. Cf. Rizzoli (2008, pp. 97f.).
- 9.
- 10.
Hua XIX/1, p. 64/(Husserl 2001b, p. 204).
- 11.
Hua XIX/2, p. 659/(Husserl 2001c, pp. 272–273).
- 12.
Hua XIX/1, p. 52/(Husserl 2001b, p. 197).
- 13.
Hua XIX/2, p. 563/(Husserl 2001c, p. 204).
- 14.
Hua XIX/1, p. 162/(Husserl 2001b, p. 271).
- 15.
On this aspect, see also Rizzoli (2008, pp. 223f.).
- 16.
This is the position held in the Logical Investigations. See Hua XIX/2, p. 679/(Husserl 2001c, p. 285).
- 17.
In this respect, see Lobo (2008). Focusing on the developments of the formal ontological account of the individual, Lobo considers the theory of spatio-temporal individuation as naïf. In my view, this assessment overlooks the potential of a transcendental inquiry into the phenomenon of individuation, namely an inquiry regarding the conditions for the experiential givenness of individuals as such. Accordingly, Lobo seems to consider spatio-temporality exclusively in objective terms (but then the question as to the phenomenological space and time remains open), and to neglect the transcendental relevance of the aesthetic constitution of the individual, which is based on the phenomenology of spatial and temporal experience.
- 18.
Hua XIX/1, pp. 272–274/(Husserl 2001c, pp. 28–29). More precisely, Husserl distinguishes the relative concretum (i.e., the object with respect to its abstract moments) from the absolute concretum (an object that is not abstract in any sense). However, since all independent content has some abstract parts, the two concepts eventually have the same extension.
- 19.
Hua III/1, pp. 30–31/(Husserl 1983, pp. 24–25).
- 20.
Hua III/1, pp. 31–33/(Husserl 1983, pp. 26–27).
- 21.
Hua III/1, p. 33/(Husserl 1983, p. 28).
- 22.
Hua III/1, pp. 34–35/(Husserl 1983, pp. 28–30); see also Hua XXXIII, p. 304.
- 23.
Hua III/1, p. 35/(Husserl 1983, p. 29).
- 24.
“Die individuelle Differenzierung eines sich individualisierenden Wesens (also ihr Auseinandergehen in eine Mannigfaltigkeit individueller Differenzen) differenziert “mit” (bedingt ein Auseinandergehen in Besonderungen) auch für die mitverflochtenen Wesen; und sind diese schon in niederster Weise differenziert, so gewinnen wir eine Vielheit von Individuen, und speziell: eine Vielheit von qualitätsidentischen (das ist, qualitativ von einer und derselben niedersten Differenz seienden) Individuen, die sich nur durch Lage unterscheiden. Jedes Individuum hat sein individuelles Wesen, und zu diesem gehört die individualisierende Lage. Verstehen wir unter “Wesen” das eidetisch Gemeinsame, so dürfen wir unter Wesen eines Individuums (und in diesem Sinne individuelles Wesen) nur verstehen eben das “Allgemeine”, Generische und Spezifische, nach allen seinen ebensolchen Komponenten. Dann ist die Lage (die individuelle Differenz der Extension) kein Wesensmoment.” D 8/28b–29a.
- 25.
This reading can be again translated in formal ontological terms, yet introducing a genetic consideration of formal ontology. This, I believe, is what Husserl does in a passage from his 1922/23 lecture course, Introduction to Philosophy [Einleitung in die Philosophie], where he claims that the apprehension of the individual as individual is more original than the apprehension of the concretum. The apprehension of the concretum, of the “what”, is the result of a constitutive synthesis that implies previous experiences, whereas this is not the case for the individual: “We contrast the concretum with the concrete individual, i.e., the individual that can be experienced independently. More precisely: the individual that comes to original experience in such a way that its experiential apprehension does not depend on some other’s preceding apprehension.” Hua XXXV, p. 216.
- 26.
“Unsere Untersuchung hat nun aber hier Klarheit geschaffen. Sie hat gezeigt, dass das Individuierende nicht etwas ist, das in uniformer Weise das konkrete Wesen angeht, sondern dass es eine eigentümliche Struktur der Individuen anzeigt, wonach das konkrete Wesen zerfällt in zwei Seiten, in ein Quale, das sich spezifisch und nur spezifisch differenziert, und eine Extension, über die sich das Quale ausdehnt und die sich nicht nur spezifisch, sondern individuell differenziert.” D 8/29b.
- 27.
Hua XVII, pp. 209f.; 396; 423/(Husserl 1969, pp. 202f.). As it is well known, in the 1929 Husserl distinguishes three layers of formal logic: (1) the pure theory of forms [reine Formenlehre]; (2) the logic of consequence, and (3) the logic of truth. Only the last one can be considered as formal ontology, since it establishes a reference to the object as something in general [etwas überhaupt].
- 28.
Hua XVII, pp. 211, 427/(Husserl 1969, p. 203).
- 29.
In the complementary text number VII (1926), Husserl argues for the modalization of the category of the individual as “possible” individual, and accordingly for the modalization of the logic of truth. The latter, thus, is no more presented as the science of the something in general but rather as the science of the possible something. Cf. Hua XVII, pp. 427–428. This, according to Lobo (2008), implies the modalization of the very notion of “form”.
- 30.
As it clearly emerges from the following quote, here Husserl does not have geometric space in his mind: “[…] geometry does not talk about any individually determined spatial and temporal points, but only, in general discourses, of possible and “certain” determined spatial and temporal points in general.” Hua XXXIII, p. 300.
- 31.
Hua X, p. 250/(Husserl 1991, p. 258).
- 32.
Hua X, p. 67/(Husserl 1991, p. 69).
- 33.
Hua X, pp. 63f./(Husserl 1991, p. 65f.).
- 34.
Hua X, p. 65/(Husserl 1991, p. 67).
- 35.
Hua X, p. 66/(Husserl 1991, p. 68).
- 36.
Hua X, pp. 67–68/(Husserl 1991, p. 70).
- 37.
E.g., Hua XXIV, p. 268/(Husserl 2008, p. 265). The translator choses “primitive impression” to translate Urimpression. In this text I adopt Brough’s translation of Urimpression as “primal impression”.
- 38.
E.g., Hua X, pp. 368f./(Husserl 1991, pp. 379f.).
- 39.
- 40.
As Lohmar (2010) argues, the basis of the understanding of the constitution of objective time is the co-operation of individuation and recollection. Partially formulated already in the 1904/05 lecture course, this idea is further developed in the Bernau Manuscripts. However, to attain a proper understanding of the constitution of objective time, an account of intersubjective constitution is also required. In his later C-Manuscripts, Husserl will provide such an intersubjective account of the constitution of the time of the world. In this respect, see also Rodemeyer (2006).
- 41.
Hua XVI, p. 342/(Husserl 1997, p. 298); D 8/41a.
- 42.
Hua XVI, p. 185/(Husserl 1997, pp. 155–156).
- 43.
Hua X, p. 251/(Husserl 1991, p. 259).
- 44.
Hua X, p. 252/(Husserl 1991, p. 260).
- 45.
KrV, B 224/A182f./(Kant 1998, p. 299).
- 46.
“Jedes Ding hat sein individuelles Wesen. Jedes ist als Räumliches in jedem Zeitpunkt “qualitativ” erfüllte Körperlichkeit. Jedes ist als Zeitliches verharrendes Substrat für eine Dauer, zu jedem gehört als Vorgang erfüllte Dauer. Es scheint, dass die konkrete Fülle (Raumfülle), und zwar eines jeden Moments der Dauer, in jeder Raumlage sein könnte, und dass ebenso die Zeitfülle “der Vorgang” in jeder Zeitlage sein könnte.” D 8/12a–b. See also D 8/28b–29a; 60b and Hua XXXIII, pp. 290, 304, 314, 296, 312.
- 47.
“Mit dem Wo und Wann erhält das Individuum keine Bestimmung dessen, was es im “spezifischen” “wesentlichen” Sinne ist. Das Raumding ist dasselbe in seinen Bewegungen und unverändert dasselbe, wenn es sich bloß bewegt. Es behält dann sein Wesen und ändert bloß die Lage: bloße kinesis ist keine alloiosis.” D 8/61a.
- 48.
“Tode ti der Sukzession, tode ti der Koexistenz. (1) notwendige Bedingung der Möglichkeit eines tode ti für ein Konkretum (die Möglichkeit seiner Individuation): Zeitlage. In der Koexistenz vervielfältigt sich die Zeitlage nicht; jede ist in der Koexistenz nur einmal da. Kein Wesen. (2) Notwendige Bedingung der Möglichkeit für die Individuation der Koexistenz: Raumlage. Jede Lage, jede absolut lagenmäßig bestimmte Figur ist nur einmal da; sie vervielfältigt sich nicht in der Sukzession, sie ergibt also kein Lagenwesen, das in der Sukzession das Bleibende wäre. Sie ist individuell bleibend. Bedingung der Möglichkeit der Individuation eines Konkretum wird zur Bedingung der Möglichkeit individueller Zeiterfüllung = 1) + 2).”(D 8/50a). Although less explicitly, Husserl makes a similar claim concerning the complementarity of space and time for individuation in simultaneousness and succession in manuscript D 18. See Husserl (1940, p. 28).
- 49.
In his 1950s and 1960s writings, Paci develops an original reading of Husserl’s thought, conjugating phenomenology and relationism, the latter being the philosophical approach he was developing in those years, notably in dialogue with Whitehead’s process philosophy. Concerning Whitehead’s legacy in Paci’s philosophy, see Vanzago (2006).
- 50.
For Paci (1951, p. 11, 1954, pp. 3f.), irreversibility is not assumed to explain physical phenomena, as it is the case for physics. It is rather an ontological category that applies to reality as such and derives from a critique (understood in the Kantian sense) of the category of relation.
- 51.
One might be tempted here to oppose Merleau-Ponty’s philosophy of “reversibility”, notably in The Visible and the Invisible (Merleau-Ponty 1964) to Paci’s principle of irreversibility. This opposition, however, is unfruitful as it risks neglecting, on a pure terminological basis, what is ultimately at stake for both philosophers, namely the relational dynamics of the world and of experience in their becoming. In this sense, Merleau-Ponty’s reversibility might be well read following Paci’s relational terms. And such a reading, which of course entails the irreversibility principle, is not inconsistent with Merleau-Ponty’s own position as testified, for instance, by the claim that reversibility, in principle, can never be complete, i.e., that there is no full coincidence between two phenomena or processes. An interpretation of Merleau-Ponty’s account of temporality inspired by Paci’s relationism has been proposed by Vanzago (2001).
- 52.
According to Richir (2006, pp. 134f.), Husserl has not been consistent enough in conceiving of the irreversibility of time. To reach such consistency, he would have had to go beyond the assumption of irreversibility as a Faktum and more radically think the co-belonging of present and death, or the “cadaverous” moment of the present. One could further pursue this line of though, and then one shall ask if death and this “cadaverous” moment of the present that is implied by irreversibility are something we can phenomenologically describe. A thorough discussion of this point goes beyond the scope of the present argument. Yet, the criticism deserved to be mentioned because it also hints at the relationship between irreversibility and the alienness of something that is given through its own withdrawal.
- 53.
“Ein sinnliches urgegenwärtigendes Bewusstsein des Inhalts A kann im Bewusstseinsfluss nur einmal auftreten – in seiner vollen Individualität – deren Korrelat das Individuum des Inhalts A ist. Es können um Bewusstseinsfluss viele sinnliche urgegenwärtigende Bewusstseine auftreten, die, außer dass sie urgegenwärtigend sind, auch den gleichen Inhalt A haben. Aber in jedem Moment des Flusses ist nur eines möglich. Zum Wesen des Urbewusstseinsflusses gehört diese Gesetzmäßigkeit, deren Korrelat das Gesetz ist, dass im Konstituierten ein Urgegenwartspunkt der phänomenologischen Zeit nicht doppelt mit völlig gleichem immanentem Gegenständlichen besetzt sein kann. Wir können auch sagen: Das Ich hat seinen Fluss. Dieser Fluss des Ich als sein Lebensstrom kann nicht verdoppelt gedacht werden, und man kann wohl überhaupt sagen, es kann nicht zwei völlig gleiche Lebensströme geben, nicht zwei Ich mit völlig gleichem Leben. Sie wären beide dann ein Ich. […] Der Lebensstrom des Ich hat seine absolute Individualität, die die Quelle aller konstituierten Individualitäten ist.” D 7/16a–b.
- 54.
See also Hua XIV, pp. 22–23.
- 55.
“Ein absolutes Konkretum, das eine Totalität ist: das Weltall. Hier fallen Individuum und Konkretum zusammen, […]. Eine Welt kann nur einmal sein; es kann nicht zwei koexistierende Welten geben. Ebenso die Totalität des Ego […]; in ihm individualisiert sich das konkrete Wesen, derart, dass sein konkretes Wesen zugleich Individuum ist.” D 8/2a.
- 56.
- 57.
- 58.
Hart (2009, pp. 411f.) suggests that this idea comes close to the Anselmian ontological argument concerning the existence of God: in the very essence, existence is also implied.
- 59.
See also Hua XIV, p. 14.
- 60.
As Jacobs (2010) shows, here is also the core of Husserl theory of personhood and personal identity. The latter is a dynamic process, accomplished through the subject constant appropriation of previous position-takings.
- 61.
“Individuality does not express itself in the passive doxa, in which a sensible datum stands there as being in the present or in the character of having been, e.g., in perception or in reproduction. Neither [does it express itself M.S.] in the passive play of appearances and presumptions, but rather in the active doxic contemplation and decision, in active thinking and all intellectual activities with their active position-takings of the Ego, which decides according to “reasons”.” Hua XIV, p. 20.
- 62.
This is particularly emphasized in Husserl’s later texts, notably the C-Manuscripts. However, in this regard these texts make explicit something that was already entailed in the previous analyses on temporal constitution. See, notably, Hua Mat VIII, pp. 90f., 102, 189, 203f., 352.
- 63.
“Now, insofar as the “inwards” or “proper essence” of an individual, everything of it that can be intuitively given and specified, can be eidetically grasped, we have to say that for no individual does its essence univocally and in full determination prescribe its future becoming, the future essential constituents, rationally and in eidetic necessity. And the question is whether it prescribes anything at all for a future in this respect.” Hua XIV, p. 14.
- 64.
E.g. Hua III/1, pp. 103f.
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Summa, M. (2014). Individuation, Irreversibility, and the Spatio-temporal Intertwining. In: Spatio-temporal Intertwining. Phaenomenologica, vol 213. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-06236-5_6
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