Abstract
Olivecrona maintains that courts necessarily create law when deciding a case. The reason, he explains, is that judges must evaluate issues of fact or law in order to decide a case, and that evaluations are not objective. Although he is not explicit about it, he appears to reason that if courts have to evaluate issues of fact or law in order to decide a case, and if evaluations are not objective, so that there is no uniquely correct way to evaluate, then the existence or content of law, or both, will depend on evaluations none of which is more correct than the other; and this means that there will be no law for the court to apply prior to the evaluation. And if courts cannot apply pre-existing law, they have to create new law. I am not convinced by Olivecrona’s line of argument, however. The problem is that Olivecrona uses the term “evaluation” in a broad enough sense to cover not only evaluations, including moral evaluations, but also considerations that are not evaluations at all, and that therefore his claim that judges must evaluate issues of law or fact in order to decide a case is false. I also consider and reject the possibility that Olivecrona has in mind not evaluations, but rather conventions, and that therefore he is really saying that the existence of legal norms and legal relations is a matter of convention, as distinguished from brute facts of nature. But this interpretation of Olivecrona’s reasoning is quite problematic, because the judgment that a certain operative fact is at hand is not always a conventional judgment and because conventional judgments, unlike moral judgments, are, or at least can be, objective in the sense of constructivist objectivity.
Access this chapter
Tax calculation will be finalised at checkout
Purchases are for personal use only
Notes
- 1.
According to the error theory, all (positive) moral judgments are objectively false.
- 2.
I discuss judicial law-making in light of the separation of powers doctrine elsewhere. See Spaak (2007, pp. 270–4).
- 3.
Olivecrona’s stance in this regard is both similar to and different from that of Kelsen (1960, p. 347), who holds that every act of judicial decision-making is both an act of law application and an act of judicial law-making.
- 4.
For example, the well-known (and controversial) American case United Steelworkers v. Weber, 443 U.S. 193 (1979) is interesting in this regard. See especially the dissenting opinion by (then) Chief Justice Burger at 216–9. I discuss this case in Spaak (2007, pp. 195–200).
- 5.
Dworkin (1978, pp. 84–5) appears to prefer this analysis.
- 6.
- 7.
- 8.
Karl Olivecrona’s letter of 18 June 1969 to Professor Torstein Eckhoff (emphasis added), translated into English by Robert Carroll. I would like to thank Thomas Mautner for kindly providing me with a transcription of this letter.
- 9.
I would like to thank Jan Österberg for suggesting this way of understanding Olivecrona’s line of argument.
- 10.
Here Dworkin speaks of the “preinterpretive stage.”
- 11.
I would like to thank Thomas Mautner for suggesting this possibility.
References
Articles
Harman, Gilbert. 1975. Moral relativism defended. Philosophical Review 85:3–22.
Harman, Gilbert. 1996. Moral relativism. In Moral relativism and moral objectivity, eds. Gilbert Harman and Thomson Judith Jarvis, 3–64. London: Blackwell.
Hart, H. L. A. 1983. Lon L. Fuller: The morality of law. In Essays in jurisprudence and philosophy, ed. Hart, 343–364. (Originally published in Harvard Law Review 1965).
Hartley, Trevor C. 1996. The European Court, judicial objectivity and the constitution of the European Union. Law Quarterly Review 112:95–109.
Kuhn, Thomas S. 1977. Objectivity, value judgment, and theory choice. In The essential tension, ed. Thomas S. Kuhn, 320–339. Chicago: The University of Chicago Press.
Raz, Joseph. 1979. Legal positivism and the sources of law. In The authority of law, ed. Joseph Raz, 37–52. Oxford: Clarendon Press.
Raz, Joseph. 1986. Dworkin: A new link in the chain. California Law Review 74:1103–1119.
Spaak, Torben. 2004. Legal positivism and the objectivity of law. In Analisi e diritto, eds. Paolo Commanducci and Riccardo Guastini, 253–267. Turin: Giapichelli.
Books
Dworkin, R. M. 1978. Taking rights seriously. 2nd ed. London: Duckworth.
Dworkin, Ronald. 1986. Lawʼs empire. Harvard: The Belknap Press.
Frändberg, Åke. 1973. Om analog användning av rättsnormer (on Analogical Application of Legal Norms). Stockholm: Norstedts.
Hume, David. 1969. In A treatise on human nature (reprinted), ed. Ernest C. Mossner. London: Penguin Books. (Originally published 1739).
Kelsen, Hans. 1960. Reine Rechtslehre (the Pure Theory of Law). 2nd ed. Vienna: Österreichische Staatsdruckerei.
Kelsen, Hans. 1992. Introduction to the problems of legal theory. Trans. Bonnie Litschewski Paulson and Stanley L. Paulson. Oxford: Oxford University Press. (Originally published 1934 in German under the title Reine Rechtslehre by Österreichishe Staatsdruckeri, Vienna).
Kelsen, Hans. 1999. General theory of law and state. Trans. Anders Wedberg. Union, New Jersey: The lawbook exchange. (Originally published 1945 by the Harvard University Press, Cambridge, Mass).
Olivecrona, Karl. 1971. Law as fact. 2nd ed. London: Stevens & Sons.
Spaak, Torben. 2007. Guidance and constraint: The action-guiding capacity of theories of legal reasoning. Uppsala: Iustus förlag.
von Wright, Georg Henrik. 1963. The varieties of goodness. London: Routledge & Kegan Paul.
Waluchow, W. J. 1994. Inclusive legal positivism. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Author information
Authors and Affiliations
Corresponding author
Rights and permissions
Copyright information
© 2014 Springer International Publishing Switzerland
About this chapter
Cite this chapter
Spaak, T. (2014). Judicial Law-Making. In: A Critical Appraisal of Karl Olivecrona's Legal Philosophy. Law and Philosophy Library, vol 108. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-06167-2_11
Download citation
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-06167-2_11
Published:
Publisher Name: Springer, Cham
Print ISBN: 978-3-319-06166-5
Online ISBN: 978-3-319-06167-2
eBook Packages: Humanities, Social Sciences and LawLaw and Criminology (R0)