The ability of groups to self-govern their common pool resources is well documented (Ostrom, 1990). Whether common pool resources are fish stocks or freshwater or forest products, success of self-governance relates to the ability of appropriators to develop trust relationships, monitor and enforce agreements, and communicate among each other.
- Common Pool Resources
- Develop Trust Relationships
- Relative Resource Scarcity
- Resource Size
- Maine Lobster Fishery
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This work is supported by a grant from the National Science Foundation (SES-0748632). The authors thank two anonymous reviewers for helpful comments.
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Janssen, M.A., Ostrom, E. (2014). Vulnerability of Social Norms to Incomplete Information. In: Xenitidou, M., Edmonds, B. (eds) The Complexity of Social Norms. Computational Social Sciences. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-05308-0_9
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