This concluding chapter provides a summary of the findings from this book. After showing that a fuzzy maximal set exists, a fuzzy aggregation rule was shown to exist which satisfies all five Arrowian conditions including nondictatorship. Although the Gibbard-Satterthwaite Theorem has considered individual fuzzy preferences, this book shows that both individuals and groups can choose alternatives to varying degrees resulting in a social choice that can be both strategy proof and non-dictatorial.Under strict fuzzy preferences, the Median Voter Theorem is shown to hold; however, this is not found under weak fuzzy preferences.
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