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The Normativity of Evaluative Concepts

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Mind, Values, and Metaphysics

Abstract

It is generally accepted that there are two kinds of normative concepts: evaluative concepts, such as good, and deontic concepts, such as ought. The question that is raised by this distinction is how it is possible to claim that evaluative concepts are normative. Given that deontic concepts appear to be at the heart of normativity, the bigger the gap between evaluative and deontic concepts, the lesser it appears plausible to say that evaluative concepts are normative. After having presented the main differences between evaluative and deontic concepts, and shown that there is more than a superficial difference between the two kinds, the chapter turns to the question of the normativity of evaluative concepts. It will become clear that, even if these concepts have different functions, there are a great many ties between evaluative concepts, on one hand, and the concepts of ought and of reason, on the other.

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Notes

  1. 1.

    This is what Wedgwood (2009) maintains.

  2. 2.

    For the distinction between these three kinds of normativity, see Väyrynen (2010).

  3. 3.

    Smith (2005, p. 11), for example, counts reason as a deontic concept.

  4. 4.

    A more complete list includes gratuitous and optional (McNamara 2006).

  5. 5.

    Many of these concepts are called ‘thick’ evaluative concepts, in contrast to ‘thin’ evaluative concepts (Williams 1985). Thick concepts are characterised by the fact that they include a purely descriptive element. For example, the attribution of the term ‘courageous’, implies an attribution of the capacity to stand up to danger, or more generally to difficulties. On the basis of this distinction, one can say that, contrary to deontic concepts, evaluative concepts can be thick (Mulligan 1998, pp. 164–165).

  6. 6.

    This is what Wallace (2010) fails to recognise.

  7. 7.

    As Wedgwood recalls, Sidgwick ironically talks of the ‘political ought’ to designate this kind of ought. Mark Schroeder (2011) qualifies this notion of evaluative ought and distinguishes it from what he calls the deliberative ought.

  8. 8.

    As I have already remarked, Mark Schroeder talks of ‘evaluative ought’.

  9. 9.

    Mark Schroeder (2011) defends a similar thesis. Schroeder, who, contrary to Geach, argues that there are two kinds of oughts, deliberative oughts, relative to what is to do, and evaluative oughts, relative to what ought to be, claims that deliberative oughts reflect a relation between an agent and an action. In our example, the term ‘ought’ would reflect a relation between Sophie and the action of singing.

  10. 10.

    This is the test proposed by Ogien and Tappolet (2009, p. 56).

  11. 11.

    This would explain why it seems that deontic judgements imply the possibility of holding someone responsible (Smith 2005).

  12. 12.

    Cuneo distinguishes between what he calls ‘responsibility norms’ and ‘propriety norms’, which apply not only to voluntary actions, but also to things that are beyond our direct voluntary control (2007, p. 82).

  13. 13.

    This is a point that has recently been added to the list in Ogien and Tappolet (2009).

  14. 14.

    See Ogien and Tappolet (2009, pp. 121–122), for an argument along the same lines, based on the idea that evaluative considerations give us reasons to act.

  15. 15.

    It is Moore (1966)who argues: ‘Every one does in fact understand the question “Is this good?” When he thinks of it, his state of mind is different from what it would be, were he asked “Is this pleasant, or desired, or approved?” It has a distinct meaning for him, even though he may not recognise in what respect it is distinct. Whenever he thinks of “intrinsic value”, or “intrinsic worth”, or says that a thing “ought to exist”, he has before his mind the unique object—the unique property of things—that I mean by “good”.’ (1903, Sect. 13, 68) See also Mulligan (1989), for the claim that to judge something good implies that that thing should be. Mulligan suggests that the unity of the normative domain is due to the fact that ought to do, like good, implies ought to be.

  16. 16.

    In certain uses of the term, the equivalence is clearly false. Something can be amusing, even if from a moral point of view one ought not be amused (D’Arms and Jacobson 2000; Rabinowicz and Rønnow-Rasmussen 2004).

  17. 17.

    Also see Tappolet (2011), for the claim that, if it is true that one ought to feel such and such a reaction in response to something, it is because we want to have correct reactions in response to things, where correct is not a normative concept.

  18. 18.

    For a version of the claim that privileges the concept of ought ( ought-first), Broome (2004, p. 24 and 39). According to Broome, this equivalence is not analytic, but is implied by the fact that the reason for doing something is an explanation of why one ought to do that thing.

  19. 19.

    Wedgwood suggests that the case is roughly comparable to the relation between possible and necessary.

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Acknowledgments

My deepest gratitude is to Kevin Mulligan, for introducing me to a great many philosophical distinctions, among which that between the evaluative and the deontic, when he supervised my PhD thesis. The first version of this chapter has been written for the 2010 Hughes Leblanc Conferences featuring Kevin Mulligan, and organised by Denis Fisette, whom I wish to thank. I also would like to thank Daniel Laurier, Jonas Olson, Francén Ragnar and Claude Panaccio for their questions and comments. A French version of the chapter has appeared in Philosophiques (2011, 38(1):157–76). Many thanks to Chloë Fitzgerald for the English translation. My work for this chapter was supported by research grants from the FQRSC and the SSHRC, which I gratefully acknowledge.

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  1. Université de Montréal, Montréal, Canada

    Christine Tappolet

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Correspondence to Christine Tappolet .

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  1. Institute for Cognitive Sciences, Bron Cedex, France

    Anne Reboul

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Tappolet, C. (2014). The Normativity of Evaluative Concepts. In: Reboul, A. (eds) Mind, Values, and Metaphysics. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-05146-8_3

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