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Reconstructing (Phenomenal) Consciousness

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Abstract

In this chapter, I shall discuss Block’s distinction between phenomenal consciousness and access consciousness. I will argue that although Block’s proposal has the merit of accounting for some important distinctive phenomena, it should nonetheless be given up, in favor of a single, graded notion of consciousness. There is only one consciousness, which one can possess in different degrees.

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Notes

  1. 1.

    Recently, Simone Gozzano (2009, p. 10) has argued for the opposite view: “Conscious” denotes first a property of a mental state. However, his main reason for this thesis is that saying of someone (a person, or an animal, or, maybe, a robot) that he is conscious does not make any clear sense, and that this way of speaking is actually elliptical—there is a specific, though unexpressed, mental state that we have in mind when we attribute consciousness to someone. I agree on the point that to say that someone is conscious is quite vague; but this does not undermine the fact that what we mean by saying that a mental state is conscious is that the subject is conscious (of something) when he is in that mental state. The vagueness of “conscious” is one thing, the core sense of “conscious” is another. It seems to me that what Gozzano’s argument shows is that when we are speaking theoretically (when we are theorizing about consciousness), we do better to talk about conscious (or unconscious) mental states.

  2. 2.

    As Peter Carruthers’ example points out, “mental states are access conscious when they are accessible to, or are having an impact upon, other systems within the agent (e.g., belief-forming systems, or planning systems, or higher-order thought systems, or linguistic reporting systems—it is obvious that access consciousness comes in a wide range of different varieties depending on which “other systems” are specified)” (Carruthers 2005, p. 13). Please note that Carruthers does not jump (at least, not explicitly) to the conclusion that subpersonal states of vision-for-action are A-conscious.

  3. 3.

    Here too, Block would suggest that only a “super-neglect” syndrome, rather than real neglect, is what we need in order to talk of A-consciousness. Indeed, subjects affected by neglect also need a cue to provide the appropriate answers to the experimenter.

  4. 4.

    Reports are inaccurate probably because of the limits of working memory: Subjects saw some letters but they forgot them. Although the data are compatible both with this explanation and with the denial that subjects were conscious of the stimuli, the former is better. Indeed, if one endorses the latter explanation, it is hard to escape the consequence that there is no consciousness in every circumstance in which there is no memory.

  5. 5.

    I prefer “bare,” since “0-consciousness” could give the misleading idea that it is possible to fix exactly a minimal point of consciousness.

  6. 6.

    Neisser points to an interesting link between these states and the notion of unconscious in psychoanalysis.

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Acknowledgments

To Kevin, tireless organizer of philosophical research, tremendously generous supporter of young people, delightful host, brilliant philosopher (in random order). With herzlichen Dank, for the great sympathy and encouragement he has given me. I hope he will forgive me for dedicating to him this chapter, which seems not to be much concerned with his philosophical work; but I am comforted by the fact that his philosophical interests are enormously comprehensive. Greetings!

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  1. University of Bergamo, Via Pignolo 123, 24121, Bergamo, Italy

    Alfredo Paternoster

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  1. Alfredo Paternoster
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Correspondence to Alfredo Paternoster .

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  1. Institute for Cognitive Sciences, Bron Cedex, France

    Anne Reboul

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Paternoster, A. (2014). Reconstructing (Phenomenal) Consciousness. In: Reboul, A. (eds) Mind, Values, and Metaphysics. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-05146-8_17

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