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Formal Implementation of Data Validation for Railway Safety-Related Systems with OVADO

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Software Engineering and Formal Methods (SEFM 2013)

Part of the book series: Lecture Notes in Computer Science ((LNPSE,volume 8368))

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Abstract

This paper describes the process of data validation for railway safety-critical computer-based systems formally implemented by Systerel as supplier of railway industry’s companies. More precisely, it describes the validation of data against the requirements it has to meet to ensure systems safety. International standards, especially CENELEC EN 50128, recommend the use of formal methods for designing the most critical safety-related systems. We use the OVADO formal tool to perform data validation. For that, we model data requirements by using the specification language of the B method, namely the B language, before using OVADO that automatically checks that data meet requirements. This tool integrates two independent components that must give the same results when they are applied on the same data, according to the principle of redundancy. An example of data validation for a CBTC system is also given.

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Notes

  1. 1.

    This is the European Committee for Electrotechnical Standardization, which is responsible for European standardization in the area of electrical engineering.

  2. 2.

    RAMS stands for Reliability, Availability, Maintainability and Safety.

  3. 3.

    This standard defines the notion of Software SIL inherited from that of IEC 61508 with a first level, SSIL 0, which denotes a non-safety-related software component.

  4. 4.

    For further information, please visit http://www.systerel.fr.

  5. 5.

    A useful summary of the syntax of the B language can be found at http://www.stups.uni-duesseldorf.de/ProB/index.php5/Summary_of_B_Syntax.

  6. 6.

    Further information about Lustre or model checking is available at http://www-verimag.imag.fr/Synchrone,30?lang=en.

  7. 7.

    Cuiusvis hominis est errare, nullius nisi insipientis in errore perseverare i.e. “Any man can make mistakes: nobody but a fool will persist in error (Cicero, Philippicae XII, ii, 5)”.

  8. 8.

    Let us quote an encountered real example of an indivisible requirement described in nineteen pages of a document. Its model has five hundred lines of predicates written in the B language.

  9. 9.

    A systematic proofreading method is described in chapter 17, “Rigorous Review”, of the book by Shaoyin Liu, “Formal Engineering for Industrial Software Development using the SOFL Method” [14].

  10. 10.

    The Régie Autonome des Transports Parisiens is the firm in charge of the public transports in Paris, France.

  11. 11.

    This acronym stands for Outil de VAlidation de DOnnées which means “Data Validation Tool” in French.

  12. 12.

    The ProB website is http://www.stups.uni-duesseldorf.de/ProB/

References

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Acknowledgment

The authors would like to thank their teammates involved in data validation both based in Aix-en-Provence and Paris. This paper summarizes their work. Their gratitude is also addressed to Mr. François Bustany, President of Systerel, for allowing the writing of this paper.

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Correspondence to Laurent Voisin .

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Abo, R., Voisin, L. (2014). Formal Implementation of Data Validation for Railway Safety-Related Systems with OVADO. In: Counsell, S., Núñez, M. (eds) Software Engineering and Formal Methods. SEFM 2013. Lecture Notes in Computer Science(), vol 8368. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-05032-4_17

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-05032-4_17

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