Abstract
In this chapter, the theoretical background and concepts are outlined. Since this book is essentially about how we (should) think about a particular object, such as the Armenian Genocide, it requires a specific theory of knowledge to develop theses of what can be thought and known to begin with. The epistemological theory that should provide this framework for the present purposes is constructionism. In a next step, the question can be specified as how we, in the present, should think about a past event. Departing from a generally constructionist background, this chapter thus presents further thoughts on our perspective of the past and the histories we write about it, and how they relate to our present social and political lives. More specifically, the phenomena of identity and guilt are assumed to be of pivotal interest in this regard. Finally, since the entire debate revolves around the question whether this past event amounts to an occurrence of genocide, the concept of genocide is also presented and discussed, demonstrating that the difficulties we encounter when trying to classify specific cases may also be due to the difficulties to grasp the phenomenon of genocide in a concise and universally accepted definition.
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Notes
- 1.
For a general overview of interpretive paradigms see for instance Richter (2002), for an introduction to constructionism as I try to understand it here, see Glasersfeld (1997a, b). A term often used synonymously with constructionism is constructivism. Anderson (1999: 57) suggests a differentiation between these two: while they agree about the constructed nature of our socially relevant reality, constructivism situates the constructing processes in the cognitive and organic individual, whereas constructionism locates them in social relations. Understanding the terminology this way and recalling my propensity to methodological individualism, I tend to subscribe more to the constructivist position. However, since I believe this is not a well-established distinction, as useful as it may be, and since I prefer the term constructionism simply for aesthetic reasons, I hope it will be acceptable if I do not follow her in this respect. I hope this still falls under the protection of academic freedom….
- 2.
- 3.
Lueger (2000: 36) differentiates between “Realität” as the world of the physical objects, and “Wirklichkeit” as the world as we experience it, the world as it is represented in our heads. “Realität ist immer Realitätsbeschreibung” (“reality is always describing reality”, my translation), as Richter (2002: 117) claimed.
- 4.
This is of course not to state that every particular sign unavoidably triggers a particular behavioral response. There is obviously more than one sign present in any situation, and there is the choice on the side of the agent which signs are the relevant ones and how to interpret them (in a wider sense, not only as a deliberate decision). But the crucial matter is that we can identify the object as a sign and know how to interpret it, and that this interpretation shapes how we think of that situation we are in.
- 5.
See Keller (1989): 121.
- 6.
Or symbol, if you prefer. Just as for the difference between constructivism and constructionism, (I hope) it is not necessary to distinguish between these two for the purposes of this study.
- 7.
As already emphasized by Alfred Schütz, see Miller (1998): 187. As Nichanian (1998: 262) put it: “»Meaning« does not wait in the heart of events in the moment when they take place. It can occur only as the result of an interpretation, that is, of a labor directed against other interpretations or the lack of interpretation.”
- 8.
For the concept and significance of “relevance” in constructing meaning, see Schütz (1960; 1972). The importance of relevance in classifying and establishing meaning may be quite tellingly illustrated by how quickly the relevant criteria may change for the classification of our fellow human beings. Just a couple of decades ago in Austria it was of paramount relevance of what skin color people were, or the shape of their noses etc., while today this does not seem to be acceptable anymore—at least officially....
- 9.
See for instance Hill (1995): 88.
- 10.
- 11.
And this is certainly not a call to disregard the situation itself. Depending on the specific cognizance which is of interest it may be important to learn for instance what situations are interpreted by the relevant agents in this particular way. In the end we have very little, if any, direct influence on how other people interpret the world, and at times an intervention into the situation may be more appropriate than into the relevant cognitive processes themselves—but certainly not always!
- 12.
- 13.
As Miller (1998: 187) mentions, for Alfred Schütz meaning is generated by (a) the sedimentation of past experiences, and (b) our intentionality toward the future.
- 14.
More accurately: “I am arriving” rather than “I arrived”, because obviously this concept is more of a process itself, rather than a product; it is constantly evolving and transforming, with the changes being more or less significant.
- 15.
See Richter (2002): 72.
- 16.
- 17.
Schütz (1972): 98 and 86. It should be noted that of course our concepts will never be literally identical, a certain amount of individuality and interpersonal deviation will always remain. They must merely be similar enough for us to be able to anticipate or at least retrospectively understand the other’s behavior based on our own interpretation of reality. That alone can already confirm that we have both deployed sufficiently similar interpretation and conception of the present. For more on this, see also Glasersfeld ((1997a, b)): 220ff.
- 18.
Dreßler (1999: 5): “Science, philological or comparative-historical, supplies interpretations of the »real world«. It is not about »discovery of truth«, about the aspiration of »veritably« depicting or capturing an extract of »reality«, but about describing phenomena which we encounter in this reality in a comprehensible manner and about integrating them into »reasonable« logical relationships. We thus construe »reasonable relationships« to individually comprehend extracts from the »real world« and make them comprehensible for others—but without claiming to capture »reality« in the sense of an absolute category” (my translation).
- 19.
Think for instance of the classical example that Inuit dispose of a large vocabulary with regard to different types of snow, whereas peoples inhabiting sand deserts possess a broader terminology to identify and distinguish different kinds of sand. This leads to a fascinating experience we sometimes come across, of learning to take a different perspective on some phenomena when we learn to get hold of them in another language. For more on this, see for instance Holocher (1996): 119ff; Keller (1989): 128f.
- 20.
Keller (1989: 126f): “Which properties we notice, perceive as properties, what we become aware of and how the world is structured, depends on language, the respective language. In that sense every language construes its own world. […] Differences, which are not accounted for in language, are most often overlooked during observation” (my translation). Alfred Korzybski dubbed this capability of language, i.e., this pre-structuring of our perceptions and knowledge by language, the “linguistische Unbewusste”, see Holocher (1996): 53. For more on this topic see also Berger and Luckmann (1986): 39ff; Schlieben-Lange (1991).
- 21.
The concept of “framing” is widely used in social sciences. To give at least one definition of a frame to account for its further usage in this work, I will offer the one found in Rein and Schön (1993: 146): “In our use of the term, framing is a way of selecting, organizing, interpreting, and making sense of a complex reality to provide guideposts for knowing, analyzing, persuading, and acting. A frame is a perspective from which an amorphous, ill-defined, problematic situation can be made sense of and acted on.”
- 22.
See also Matouschek et al. (1995): 212.
- 23.
- 24.
Concepts such as role, script, frame, or scheme, were most importantly elaborated by Erving Goffman. See for instance Goffmann (2002). See also Treibel (2004).
- 25.
What makes the constructionist approach so universal and for many of its critics so void and generic, is, as also Lederach (1995: 7–9) puts it, that meaning in this paradigm is involved in every social conflict, and not only in those which already at the surface level revolve around definition and classification.
- 26.
- 27.
Which sound pretty much like general differences between “scientific” and “everyday” knowledge, for instance with history following explicit methods, reflecting its own interests and assumptions, thus being conscious of its perspectivity, open to falsification, and more exact and complete than memory—at least by postulation. See for instance König (2008a, b): 16, 125ff.
- 28.
- 29.
Erll (2005): 85.
- 30.
With pre-existing not in the sense of being there before birth, or being a primordial given which is pre-defined by some external entity, or being immune to change, but instead simply meaning that there exist some concepts which we already bring with us into any present situation.
- 31.
Arenhövel (2000: 11): “rather, history emerges only through a social construction of narrating, documenting and interpreting” (my translation). See also for instance Bruner (1998): 52; Erll (2005): 7; König (2008a, b): 14f; Polkinghorne (1998): 24f. This suggested characteristic of the very nature of memory may contribute also to the explanation of “Deckerinnerungen” [screen memories, Erll (2005): 47; Assmann (2006a): 261) or “Scheinerinnerungen” (mock memories, Erll (2005): 85], i.e., thoughts we have and which we experience as memories, without there being any corresponding past events.
- 32.
See Glaser (1999): 59.
- 33.
Akçam (2004): 248f.
- 34.
The approach of understanding past events by present theories was called “Präsentismus” (presentism) by Wagner (1998: 70). Obviously many theories which attempt to explain human behavior and social processes by their very nature already presume universal application. I am definitely not in the position to reject these assumptions, here I just wanted to indicate that this is not only very ambitious but also far from being self-evident and in many instances sustainable only by considering the underlying assumptions a priori immune to verification and falsification.
- 35.
Erll (2005): 119.
- 36.
Quoted in Blustein (2008): 68.
- 37.
- 38.
See also Blustein (2008): 178.
- 39.
- 40.
See for instance, for German and other contributions König et al. (1998); Landkammer et al. (2006); Frei et al. (2000); Bock and Wolfrum (1999); Elster (2004); Knigge and Frei (2000); König (2008a, b); König et al. (2008a); Schneider and Jochum (1999); Smith and Margalit (1997); Arenhövel (2000); Flacke (1998); Schwan (1997a); Wodak et al. (1990, 1994, 1998).
- 41.
See also Erll (2005): 27.
- 42.
For a more detailed account and examination on this see Volkan (1999): 85–95.
- 43.
In that sense, also our system of justice rests on a “historical” rationale: criminals being punished and victims being compensated not because of their current situation but based upon historical events (mitigated notably by other considerations about the present). It would be interesting to consider the relationship between the very concepts of justice and history: the retrospective paradigm inherent in justice, how far back in time justice extends, and the like. Unfortunately, questions as these are way beyond the scope of my capabilities, and, fortunately, of this work.
- 44.
- 45.
Anderson (2006).
- 46.
Even though other authors conceptualize collective and personal identity as different entities within an individual, I would rather consider them as part of one and the same element of an individual’s personality (I understand also Akçam (2004: 41) this way, suggesting to consider national identity as an “integral part” of individual identity). In this very personality, various elements may compete or even contradict each other, but eventually it is the sum of all the identifications which makes up what a person considers to be her true self. This understanding is in my opinion compatible with Margalit’s (1997: 202) assertion that a collective identity may threaten or enrich someone’s personal identity—even though he may have derived his proposition from a very different concept, and intended it in a very different way.
- 47.
See also Özkırımlı (2000): 144f.
- 48.
Hacking (2002): 27ff.
- 49.
This hopefully complies largely with the notions uttered in Volkan (1999): 34–38. See also Blustein (2008): 121; Giesen (1999); Hall (1996); Wagner (1998): 45. A harsh critique of the “Plastikwort” (plastic word) “collective identity” can be found in Niethammer (1995), who argues for its total renunciation. However, in my understanding he arrives at this critique because he himself considers it to be a constructed phenomenon, and then criticizes its essentialist pretensions. If this understanding is accurate, then I think it is not in conflict with my suggestions here, and I would also argue that it is still useful to retain the notion of collective identity: not as an essentialist entity, but to describe some specific and socially relevant cognitive content of human minds.
- 50.
See also Özkırımlı (2000): 222.
- 51.
It may be that this sensitivity and suspiciousness about collective reproaches is only partly based in actual allegations of collective guilt by the victorious powers after World War II. According to Rotherspieler (1982: 86) there are no official documents which explicitly raise such collective guilt accusations against the German people, yet allegations are inherent in many collective punishments which were discussed against Germany. Nevertheless, to my perception it has become a convenient strategy in Austrian discourse to fend off any kinds of admonitions by inflating them until they become porous, easy to see through, and hence easy to refute altogether.
- 52.
Rommelspacher (2002): 50f.
- 53.
For a brief history see for instance Rotherspieler (1982): 20–26.
- 54.
Quoted in Akçam (2004): 192.
- 55.
- 56.
Quoted in Akçam (2006): 217f.
- 57.
BGH St. 2, 194ff, quoted in Rotherspieler (1982: 254): “By guilt’s judgment of unworthiness, the perpetrator is accused of unlawful conduct although he [sic] could have acted lawfully, could have opted for lawful conduct. The inner core of the accusation inherent in guilt is that man is designed toward free, responsible, ethical self-determination and therefore capable of deciding in favor of law and against tort, of orienting his conduct following the norms of legal imperative, and of avoiding the legally prohibited” (my translation). According to Schlink (2007: 11), guilt presupposes that a person is capable (a) to appreciate rightful conduct, and (b) to act according to this appreciation.
- 58.
See also Barkan (2004): 313f. With regard to the previous distinction between essentialist and constructionist conceptions of collective identity, I believe accusations of collective guilt could be raised in both scenarios: on the one side interhuman bonds seem factual, real, and therefore more compelling in an essentialist account, yet on the other side a constructionist approach could allow for the idea that an individual willingly opted to join a group responsible for an immoral act.
- 59.
See Rotherspieler (1982): 21. The same has been suggested more recently when Rensmann (2004: 170) claimed there was no collective guilt in a moral or legal sense, but only a feeling of collective guilt. Note that there may also be different understandings of collective guilt, as for instance mentioned by Jeffrey Blustein (2008: 126–128), who understands genuine collective guilt as some particular guilt being ascribed to virtually all individual members of a group. However, as Blustein himself noted, there remain some further issues, for instance that the ascription of guilt to a person assumes that this person remains the same over time—yet how can this be presumed for a collectivity? I shall not adopt this model of collective guilt mentioned by Blustein, but rather use the vague but more widely resonating understanding of Jung and Rensmann.
- 60.
- 61.
Jaspers (1946: 19): “There is no such thing as a people as a whole. As a matter of fact, all boundaries, which we create to determine it, are intersected. Language, citizenship, culture, shared fates—none of these coincide, they intersect. People and state do not fall in one, nor do language and shared fate and culture. A people cannot be turned into an individual being. A people cannot perish heroically, cannot be a criminal, cannot act morally or immorally, only the individual within it can. A people as a whole cannot be guilty or innocent, neither in a criminal sense, nor in a political one (here the citizens of a state are liable), nor in a moral one” (my translation).
- 62.
Quoted in Moses (2010): 22.
- 63.
Jaspers (1946): 10–16.
- 64.
Quoted in Akçam (2006): 218.
- 65.
See for instance discussions in Rotherspieler (1982): 256–261.
- 66.
This also seems to concur with the concept of „Kollektivhaftung“as developed by Rotherspieler (1982: 19). He discriminates “Kollektivhaftung” (collective liability) from „Kollektivschuld“ (collective guilt), and understands it as the collectivity’s obligation to compensate victims for the wrongs committed by its rulers.
- 67.
Jaspers (1946): 10–20.
- 68.
- 69.
This is rather obvious in a democratic regime where politicians obtain power by popular vote. However, support also involves elements like paying taxes or simply being a citizen of that political community, since also sheer population figures are often powerful tools in political struggles.
- 70.
Apparently from a more socialist perspective it could be objected how any inherited prerogative or material advantage could be considered just, but that is not the issue of this paper. Here I shall confine myself to our predominant capitalist ethics, which is already complicated enough for me.
- 71.
To give another stupid example—if a woman stole a ring and gave it to her girlfriend, would we not expect the girlfriend to hand back the ring? But if the woman killed a neighbor to take possession of her house, and later on her daughter inherited that house, would we expect the daughter to return the house? Of course all the various dilemmas of historical justice and reconciliation would need to be taken into account here (e.g., can a past wrong be simply rectified without committing another wrong in the present?), but at least the principal question of responsibility remains the same.
- 72.
Gross (2000): 170f.
- 73.
As Lickel et al. (2004: 50f) conclude in their empirical study on collective guilt and collective shame, intergroup conflicts may be attenuated if group members clearly distance themselves from wrongdoers within their own group, since this reduces the chances that collective guilt is attributed to them.
- 74.
Schwan (1997a): 50f.
- 75.
And just as another straying thought: maybe the failure to consistently exercise this basic responsibility lies at heart of any allegation about hypocrisy.
- 76.
Blustein (2008): 148.
- 77.
To give another historical reference: according to Rotherspieler (1982: 101) the importance of keeping collective and personal guilt clearly separate, particularly in the conscience of the German people, also led US Secretary of War Henry L. Stimson and Secretary of State Cordell Hull to oppose policies of collective punishment in the aftermath of World War II.
- 78.
Giordano (1987).
- 79.
I think it is worthwhile recalling a peculiar observation mentioned also by McGarty and Bliuc (2004: 114): that it is as common to feel proud as it is rejected to feel responsible for things one has not personally done.
- 80.
Also the “political guilt” of Jaspers in my opinion may be better understood as a responsibility, or, in hindsight, as a liability. See also Barkan (2002: 341) who follows historian Ali Mazrui in his assertion that guilt is not transmitted, but rights and responsibilities are.
- 81.
This also seems to match with Bloxham’s (2005: 18) assertion that moral and historical responsibility for the massacres of the Armenians extends to the great powers and their conduct at that time, while the criminal responsibility lies with the Ottoman government.
- 82.
Auron (2003a): 137.
- 83.
- 84.
- 85.
- 86.
See Polkinghorne (1998): 24–26.
- 87.
See Polkinghorne (1998): 18, 24–26. It should be noted that the entire terminology I am deploying here is of course not sanctioned. Other authors such as Thomas Kaplan (1993) use for instance the term “plot” to denote a story with causal relations, and Stanley Cohen (2001) seems to use a very similar model, albeit focused on justifying and denying responsibility, under the label of “accounts” rather than “narratives”.
- 88.
This somehow resembles the argument that the genre of a particular narrative (or a plot) plays a pivotal role in its eventual meaning. In other words, not only the “hard facts” determine the meaning of a story, but obviously also its narrative mode, such as romance, comedy, tragedy, or satire. See for instance Bruner (1998): 65–67; Gergen (1998): 177–180; Straub (1998a, b, c): 105–112; Erll (2005): 146. There is nothing I could add to this, yet I have to confess that I am a bit cautious of overrating the importance of genre. Not only because genre to me seems already a very high level of abstraction, possibly disregarding the multiple meanings available within one story, but also because any actual story may indeed use elements from various genres. Eventually, I would think that we also identify the genre of a story by the meaning(s) it comprises—which leaves us with the chicken-egg conundrum (or more appropriately: a circular causal chain).
- 89.
By the way, in my understanding this is also a core belief of discourse analysis.
- 90.
- 91.
I think that this also applies for scientific concepts: even if they are ultimately expressed (conceptualized) in abstract definitions, they are founded in real world events which were narrated before we came to think about such a definition. Wodak et al. (1990: 258) mentioned that narratives provide examples to prove, justify, and rationalize prejudice—I would think that the sample applies mutatis mutandis to academic idealtypes.
- 92.
My explications cover mostly historical knowledge passed on to us, i.e. concerning events we have not personally witnessed, since this is essentially what is relevant for this issue I am working on. It may be, even though I am not sure, that the role of narratives is different with regard to the memory of personally witnessed events. Yet I personally tend to believe that narratives are also important for what we remember of our personal lives (see also Assmann (2006a): 128–134). Anyway, pursuing a constructionist paradigm, I am less interested in the content of history/memory, the facts and truths, than in their meaning. And with regard to meaning I believe narratives are equally relevant for personal or second-hand memories.
- 93.
And is it not curious that we ascribe “age” to a community? As if human communities just like individuals had a beginning, a date of birth, and could therefore be of differing ages. As if the members of that group had not been born to some parents themselves, as if there could be a missing link somewhere in time, a gap without progenitors, just because we today think that group had not existed back then, but mine had, or as if that group had changed meanwhile while mine had remained static. And this age is even presented as an achievement, a source of collective pride. Here age itself becomes an accomplishment, next to or sometimes even more cherished than the achievements we are currently struggling for. And most interestingly this past accomplishment is appropriated by myself and experienced as my own.
- 94.
Liebsch (1995): 264.
- 95.
For this last point, see König et al. (2008): 18, 382.
- 96.
See for instance Erll (2005: 179) who argues that identity and alterity are established by narratives. For the importance of alterity, an other, to establish identity, see for instance Niethammer’s (2000: 251f) interpretation of Freud. See also McIver (2003); Akerlof and Shiller (2009) who dedicate their entire book to the importance of stories for macroeconomics.
- 97.
Zimmerli and Landkammer (2006): 266.
- 98.
For instance, by tracing the “roots” of Austria back to 996, by virtue of a document with the analogue name Ostarrîchi.
- 99.
See, also for the quoted “fictive genealogy”, Akçam (2004): 244–249.
- 100.
There are of course some caveats to the simplifications I am asserting here, and therefore a few qualifications are imperative: apparently there is not a single narrative for any particular group, nor do the multiple existing narratives always amount to such a Manichaean portrayal of them and us. More accurately, a large amount of narratives tell of switching relational status from friend to foe (or vice versa): just recall the paramount importance of stories about treason. Furthermore, of course our stories about today sometimes, when they allow for a bit more complexity, do acknowledge that the boundaries between groups and hence the groups themselves were different at previous times. However, the main point is that these narratives, especially where used for political ends, tend to render simplified pictures of the past, and are ultimately more expressions of present thinking than past events anyway.
- 101.
Following the definition of myths in Erll (2005: 116): “Mythos ist eine Geschichte, die man sich erzählt, um sich über sich selbst und die Welt zu orientieren, eine Wahrheit höherer Ordnung, die nicht einfach nur stimmt, sondern darüber hinaus auch normative Ansprüche stellt und formative Kraft besitzt“(„Myth is a history which we recount to gain orientation about oneself and the world, it is a truth of an higher order which is not just true but also makes normative claims and possesses normative force“, my translation). Similarly in Assmann (2006a: 39f), and I think it also coincides with Blustein (2008: 179–203). A narrower definition is given by König et al. (2008: 385), who claims myths would encompass episodes which date back to ancient times. Nevertheless, also for him myths essentially serve purposes of identity formation.
- 102.
See König et al. (2008: 112f) who is following Friedrich Wilhelm Graf in claiming these characteristics for collective memory. I dared to pass these qualities on to the concept of narrative/myth instead.
- 103.
- 104.
- 105.
For instance König et al. (2008): 64.
- 106.
According to Erll (2005: 153), Stanley Fish actually coined the term in 1980 in order to describe communities which emerged out of a shared interpretation of a written text.
- 107.
Quoted in König et al. (2008: 383f): “You could say a group of people constitutes a nation when these people are connected by reciprocal empathy, which exists between them but not between any others. […] Such a feeling of national affiliation can have emerged for various reasons. […] A shared political history is the strongest force in this direction: the possession of a national history and the resulting communality of memories: collective feelings of pride and shame, of joy and pain, which connect to these past events” (my translation).
- 108.
Quoted in François and Schulze (1998: 17): “A nation is a soul, a spiritual principle. Two things, which actually are but one, characterize this spiritual principle. One of them belongs to the past, the other to the present. One is the shared possession of a rich heritage of memories, the other the present consensus, the desire for a shared life” (my translation). For more on Renan, see for instance König et al. (2008): 383f.
- 109.
- 110.
- 111.
- 112.
See Erll (2005): 44.
- 113.
Wagner (1998: 69f): “Reference to a shared history cannot explain the existence and solidity of collectively shared beliefs, because strictly speaking there is no »shared history« but always a plurality of experiences which differ from each other. The incantation of »shared history«, for instance in theories of national identity, is an approach which always takes place in the present—as a specific representation of the past, designed with regard to the creation of communalities. This approach may »work« in the sense that the notion of togetherness and proximity is created among different people in the present. However, it is not the past shaped as »shared history« which produces this effect, but the present interaction between those who propose to view the past as something shared, and those who let themselves be convinced and adopt this representation for their orientation in their social world” (my translation).
- 114.
Özyürek (2007a): 2. See also König et al. (2008): 624. For Hahn (1996: 164), the Shoah as a pars pro toto for the cruelties committed by the Nazis served as the foundation for a fundamental consensus, facilitating community as well as providing a basis from which moral conflicts could be tackled. A quite illustrative example of current politics is an article by Maen Rashid Areikat, chief representative of the Palestinian Liberation Organization to the US, published on December 28, 2011, in the Washington Post. Presumably in order to back the at this time intensively promoted aspirations for a Palestinian state, he wishes to present to the American audience “what the Palestinians, as a people, are all about”—which he does by an excursion in history, going back as far as 10,000 B.C. to the town of Jericho, which in turn is the foundation of a political myth to support the Palestinian identity and its deep roots to its historic homeland.
- 115.
See the various articles in Branscombe and Doosje (2004a, b). However, I think it would be inappropriate to describe any given identity as per se positive or negative—it depends very much on the context, for it is the context which may alter the meaning of a particular identity. For instance, a victim identity may be experienced as something utterly negative, not so much because of the past experience itself but because it may convey a sense of helplessness, dependency, weakness—in relation to the perpetrator, whose identity may express agency, power, autonomy. On the other hand, the same victim identity may also imply positive features, for instance when it is associated with a high moral status, a claim for attention and recognition (see also Sect. 4.5)—again in relation to the perpetrator with an identity potentially of brutality, selfishness, of being anti-social.
- 116.
For the nexus between narrative and moral identity, see Gergen (1998): 201.
- 117.
Chaumont (2001: 175) notes that the German synonym for genocide, “Völkermord”, was already used to describe massacres in World War I. The term “Genozid” by contrast was a literal translation of the English neologism “genocide”, and thus newly introduced with Lemkin’s work.
- 118.
For the full text see also Sect. 7.2: Appendix B.
- 119.
See http://www.treaties.un.org/Pages/ViewDetails.aspx?src=UNTSONLINE&tabid=2&mtdsg_no=IV-1&chapter=4&lang=en#Participants, accessed on June 9, 2013.
- 120.
Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (December 9, 1948): article 2.
- 121.
- 122.
I guess this alludes also to the very interesting question how we can summarize a tremendous series of events into one single episode. I have no idea about the philosophical dimensions of this question, but in my head it brings a few bells to ring the tune of narratives discussed above.
- 123.
For more on the history of the UNGC see Schabas (2000); Kuper (1981); Fein (1993). With special respect to the exclusion of these political groups see Van Schaack (1997); Chalk and Jonassohn (1998): 295. However, it should also be added that some countries, among them the Soviet Union, wanted to follow Lemkin’s initial suggestion to explicitly include also forms of “cultural genocide”, such as restrictions to use a particular language, religion, literature and other cultural institutions. This, too, did not assemble sufficient support among other UN member states. See Schabas (2000); Kuper (1981): 30f.
- 124.
- 125.
Fein (1993): 11. A strong advocant is for instance Van Schaack (1997). As the delegation from Ecuador explained during the drafting process, one fear was that “if the convention did not extend its protection to political groups, those who committed the crime of genocide might use the pretext of the political opinions of a racial or religious group to persecute and destroy it, without becoming liable to international sanctions” (quoted in Schabas (2000): 138).
And Frank Chalk and Kurt Jonassohn (1998: 295–300) pointed out that the United Nations Convention on the Status of Refugees acknowledges persons who are persecuted because they belong to a political group as refugees. Hence, people fleeing persecution for this reason to another country are protected by the United Nations by granting them refugee status, while those who remain in the country and are killed for the very same reason are not protected by the UNGC. However, I believe this critique must be alleviated since the UNGC is not the only device in international law to inhibit politically motivated prosecution, thinking for instance of human rights. Anyway, there seems to be some inconsistency, overlap and gap, in international law which groups should be protected from what offenses. For instance, the offense of “crime against humanity”, as defined in the Statute of the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (2007, article 3) prohibits acts “against any civilian population on national, political, ethnic, racial or religious grounds”. Note that these categories are congruent with those in the UNGC, except that political motives are included. By contrast, article 2 of the same statute, which defines the crime of genocide, adheres to the definition in the UNGC, thereby excluding political groups again.
- 126.
Bauer (1999): 34f. Apparently this seems to imply that in Bauer’s understanding national and ethnic groups are not defined by cultural features but by hereditary ones instead, which I believe is not at all self-evident either.
- 127.
Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide 1948: Article 4.
- 128.
Schabas (2000): for instance 62f.
- 129.
Fein (1993): 17f.
- 130.
- 131.
Chalk and Jonassohn (1990): 23.
- 132.
Chalk and Jonassohn (1990): 23–26.
- 133.
Fein (1993): 13.
- 134.
Quoted in Fein (1993): 13.
- 135.
Melson (1992): 26.
- 136.
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Schrodt, N. (2014). Theoretical Considerations. In: Modern Turkey and the Armenian Genocide. Contributions to Political Science. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-04927-4_2
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