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Detecting Intentional Packet Drops on the Internet via TCP/IP Side Channels

Conference paper
Part of the Lecture Notes in Computer Science book series (LNCS, volume 8362)

Abstract

We describe a method for remotely detecting intentional packet drops on the Internet via side channel inferences. That is, given two arbitrary IP addresses on the Internet that meet some simple requirements, our proposed technique can discover packet drops (e.g., due to censorship) between the two remote machines, as well as infer in which direction the packet drops are occurring. The only major requirements for our approach are a client with a global IP Identifier (IPID) and a target server with an open port. We require no special access to the client or server. Our method is robust to noise because we apply intervention analysis based on an autoregressive-moving-average (ARMA) model. In a measurement study using our method featuring clients from multiple continents, we observed that, of all measured client connections to Tor directory servers that were censored, 98% of those were from China, and only 0.63% of measured client connections from China to Tor directory servers were not censored. This is congruent with current understandings about global Internet censorship, leading us to conclude that our method is effective.

Keywords

Packet Loss Packet Loss Rate Packet Drop Packet Reordering USENIX Association 
These keywords were added by machine and not by the authors. This process is experimental and the keywords may be updated as the learning algorithm improves.

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Copyright information

© Springer International Publishing Switzerland 2014

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.Department of Computer ScienceUniversity of New MexicoUSA

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