Albert, D. 1993. Quantum mechanics and experience. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
Albert, D., and B. Loewer. 1988. Interpreting the many worlds interpretation. Synthese 77: 195–213.
Barrett, J. 1999. The quantum mechanics of minds and worlds. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Ben-Menahem, Y. 2006. Conventionalism: From Poincaré to Quine. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Bohm, D. 1952. A suggested interpretation of the quantum theory in terms of “hidden” variables, I and II. Physical Review 85: 166–193.
Cushing, J. 1994. Quantum mechanics: Historical contingency and the Copenhagen hegemony. Chicago: The University of Chicago Press.
DeWitt, B. 1971. The many-universes interpretation of quantum mechanics. In Foundations of quantum mechanics, ed. B. d’Espagnat. New York: Academic Press. Reprint in The many worlds of quantum mechanics, ed. B. DeWitt and N. Graham. Princeton University Press (1973).
Duhem, P. 1954. The aim and structure of physical theory. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
Duhem, P. 1991. German science: Some reflections on German science: German science and German virtues. Trans. John Lyon. La Salle: Open Court.
Durr, D., S. Goldstein, and N. Zanghi. 1993. A global equilibrium as the foundation for quantum randomness. Foundations of Physics 23: 721–738.
Everett, H. 1957. Relative state formulation of quantum mechanics. Reviews of Modern Physics 29: 454–462.
Fairweather, A. 2011. The epistemic value of good sense. Studies in the History and Philosophy of Science Part A 43(1): 139–146.
Friedman, M. 2001. Dynamics of reason. Stanford: CSLI Publications.
Ghirardi, G.C., A. Rimini, and T. Weber. 1986. Unified dynamics for microscopic and macroscopic systems. Physical Review 34: 470–491.
Hull, D.L. 1988. Science as a process: An evolutionary account of the social and conceptual development of science. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
Ivanova, M. 2010. Pierre Duhem’s good sense as a guide to theory choice. Studies in History and Philosophy of Science 41: 58–64.
Ivanova, M. 2011. ‘Good Sense’ in context: A response to Kidd. Studies in History and Philosophy of Science 42: 610–612.
Ivanova, M., and C. Paternotte. 2013. Theory choice, good sense and social consensus. Erkenntnis 78(5): 1109–1132.
Kitcher, P. 1993. The advancement of science: Science without legend, objectivity without illusions. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Kuhn, T. 1977. Objectivity, value judgment, and theory choice. In The essential tension, ed. T. Kuhn, 320–353. Chicago: The University of Chicago Press.
Ladyman, J., and D. Ross (with Spurrett, D., and J. Collier). 2007. Every thing must go: Metaphysics naturalised. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Leplin, J. 1997. A novel defense of scientific realism. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Lewis, D. 1973. Counterfactuals. Oxford: Basil Blackwell.
McMullin, E. 2009. The virtue of a perfect theory. In The Routledge companion to philosophy of science, ed. Martin Curd and Stathis Psillos. London: Routledge.
Nolan, D. 1997. Quantitative parsimony. British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 48: 329–343.
Psillos, S. 1999. Scientific realism – How science tracks truth. London: Routledge.
Putnam, H. 2005. A philosopher looks at quantum mechanics (again). British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 56: 615–634.
Strevens, M. 2003. The role of the priority rule in science. The Journal of Philosophy 100(2): 55–79.
Struyve, W., and H. Westman. 2006. A new Pilot-Wave model for quantum field theory. In Quantum mechanics: Are there quantum jumps? And on the present status of quantum mechanics, AIP conference proceedings, 844, eds. A. Bassi, D. Dürr, T. Weber, and N. Zanghì, 321–339. New York: American Institute of Physics.
Stump, D. 2007. Pierre Duhem’s virtue epistemology. Studies in History and Philosophy of Science 38: 149–159.
Stump, D. 2011. The scientist as impartial judge: Moral values in Duhem’s philosophy of science. New perspectives on Pierre Duhem’s The aim and structure of physical theory (book symposium), Metascience, vol. 20, 1–25. London: Routledge.
Swinburne, R. 1997. Simplicity as evidence of truth. Milwaukee: Marquette University Press.
Tumulka, R. 2006. A relativistic version of the Ghirardi–Rimini–Weber model. Journal of Statistical Physics 125: 821–840.
Van Fraassen, B.C. 1980. The scientific image. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Whewell, W. 1989. Theory of scientific method. Indianapolis: Hackett.
Worrall, J. 1989. Structural realism: The best of both worlds? Dialectica 43(1–2): 99–124.
Worrall, J. 1994. How to remain (reasonably) optimistic: Scientific realism and the “Luminiferous Ether”. In PSA 1994, vol. 1, ed. M. Forbes and D. Hull. East Lansing: Philosophy of Science Association.
Zagzebski, L. 2003. The search for the source of epistemic good. In Moral and epistemic virtues, ed. M. Brady and D. Pritchard, 13–27. Malden: Blackwell.