Abstract
A sad fact of life is that disturbingly often we cannot act in the ways that would fully bring about the goals we find desirable [1]. In these cases which are all too familiar we may want to identify the second-best way to act and choose the second-best option. However, identifying the second-best options can be complicated. The option that may seem to be the second-best before further investigation need not actually be the second-best [2]. Our intuition and common sense may mislead us when we try to identify the best feasible way to approximate our goals. A strategy which in certain respects resembles the action we originally had in mind may actually lead us quite far from the ideal goal – much further away than some alternative strategy that looks quite different from the original one. This holds both in private and public spheres, and the problem of the second best is no less common in political decision-making than it is in our personal lives. When an ideal concerning social justice is found to be unrealizable, the second-best option has to be considered.
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References
I would like to thank Kaisa Herne, Eerik Lagerspetz, Andrew Mason, Hannu Nurmi, Saul Smilansky, Laura Valentini, Jukka Varelius, and Lars Vinx for their helpful comments. I would also like to thank Dave Estlund for valuable discussion.
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Ibid.
Goodin: Political Ideals and Political Practice, 54.
Margalit: Ideals and Second Bests, 79. Here is another example from Margalit. “The Catholic Church believes that being a nun is the ideal life. It is the life of perfection for women. The Catholic Church also believes that the sacrifice entailed in giving up sexuality and motherhood is such that most women cannot attain the ideal of becoming nuns. The second best for a woman is not to become a nun with a lax attitude toward the prohibition of sexuality, but instead to become a mother.” Margalit: On Compromise and Rotten Compromises, 116.
Cf. Margalit: Ideals and Second Bests, 79.
Margalit: On Compromise and Rotten Compromises, 5–6, 115–117.
Margalit: Ideals and Second Bests, 77.
Ibid.
Ibid. The tacit assumption is the “approximation assumption” in Margalit’s vocabulary.
Margalit: Ideals and Second Bests, 89.
Ibid. Margalit writes that the crucial point “is that when there are obstacles in the way of attaining a certain ideal we had better pause to consider whether the approximation assumption holds with respect to that ideal. And if we find that it does not, then we ought to consider whether there is not perhaps a different strategy that will ultimately lead us closer to the ideal than would the single-minded idealistic strategy”.
Margalit: Ideals and Second Bests, 80.
Brennan, Pettit: The Feasibility Issue, 261.
Ibid.
Ibid.
Ibid.
Ibid.
Ibid.
Ibid.
Ibid. For a discussion, see e.g. Mishan, E.J.: Second Thoughts on Second Best, Oxford Economic Papers ns 14, 205–217 (1962); Coram, B.T.: Second Best Theories and Implications for Institutional Design. In: Goodin, R.E. (ed.) The Theory of Institutional Design, pp. 90–102. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge (1998), see esp. 93.
Goodin: Political Ideals and Political Practice, 52, fn. 43.
Ibid., 52.
In Goodin’s words, the properties lack “the requisite independence” from one another. Goodin: Political Ideals and Political Practice, 54.
Brennan and Pettit (The Feasibility Issue, 261) seem to assume that the “intuitively closest alternative to the first-best” option is (usually or even always) the option whose outward appearance resembles the best option.
Margalit: Ideals and Second Bests, 80.
Brennan, Pettit: The Feasibility Issue, 261.
Cf. Cohen, G.A.: The Pareto Argument for Inequality. Social Philosophy and Policy 12, 160–185 (1995), esp. 172. For a discussion, see e.g. Shaw, P.: The Pareto Argument and Inequality. The Philosophical Quarterly 49, 353–368 (1999); Lægaard, S.: Feasibility and Stability in Normative Political Philosophy: The Case of Liberal Nationalism. Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 9, 399–416 (2006). For a problem of over-demandingness, see e.g. Murphy, L.B.: Moral Demands in Nonideal Theory, ch. 2. Oxford University Press, Oxford (2000).
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Margalit: Ideals and Second Bests, 77.
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Goodin points out that second-best problems arise also when the descriptions are cast “in terms of bedrock underlying values”. Goodin: Political Ideals and Political Practice, 53, fn. 45.
The justification of ultimate convictions cannot be their further objectives.
Cf. Hamlin, A., Stamplowska, J.: Theory, Ideal Theory and the Theory of Ideals. Political Studies Review 10, 48–62 (2012), esp. 60.
Cf. Howard-Snyder, F.: ’Cannot’ Implies ‘Not Ought’. Philosophical Studies 130, 233–246 (2006), esp. 237.
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Räikkä, J. (2014). How to Find the Second-Best Option?. In: Social Justice in Practice. Studies in Applied Philosophy, Epistemology and Rational Ethics, vol 14. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-04633-4_3
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