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Revisiting the Lisbon Treaty’s Constitutional Design of EU External Relations

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The EU after Lisbon

Abstract

The Lisbon Treaty is the outcome of a long gestation process that started with extraordinary ambitions but was stunned by political constraints. Instilling coherence in EU external action has been one of the major and most visible goals of this reform. In order to do so, the drafters of the Treaty attempted to integrate the different parts of EU external action. Their effort was only partly successful, allowing for an improved coherence, effectiveness and continuity in EU external action if the EU institutions and the Member States manage to garner the political will. However, the current text of the Treaties carries a largely untapped potential for non-negligible improvements in the exercise of Union action abroad. It is this potential that the intellectual exercise at hand attempts to reveal when revisiting the constitutional design of the Lisbon Treaty. At the same time, the political constraints both in the process that led to Lisbon and in the implementation of the new text of the Treaties since December 2009 are analyzed.

Thomas Ramopoulos currently works as an official in the European Commission. His contribution to this chapter was made prior to joining the Commission. The views expressed herein are strictly personal.

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Notes

  1. 1.

    It has been rightly observed that States, even the most powerful ones, more often than not fail to deliver a foreign policy that is coherent, effective and characterized by continuity: Craig (2010), p. 423.

  2. 2.

    Gauttier (2004), p. 24. However, it should be noted that the principle of coherence is instrumental in achieving concerted external action by the EU and its Member States in non-CFSP policies also. Still, problems in this regard are far less pronounced than when there is a CFSP component in external action.

  3. 3.

    Single European Act (OJ 1987 L 169/1), preamble fifth recital, Articles 30(2)(d) and 30(5).

  4. 4.

    Gauttier (2004), p. 25.

  5. 5.

    See inter alia Neuwahl (1994), Tietje (1997), Schmalz (1998), Duke (1999), Wessel (2000), and Hillion (2008).

  6. 6.

    Rede von Joschka Fischer über die Finalität der europäischen Integration, Berlin, 12 May 2000, http://www.cvce.eu (accessed 20 August 2013).

  7. 7.

    Declaration on the Future of the Union, OJ 2001 C 80/85.

  8. 8.

    European Council, Laeken Declaration on the Future of the European Union, SN 300/1/01 REV 1, 14–15 December 2001.

  9. 9.

    Ibid.

  10. 10.

    Security Council Resolution 1267 (1999) of 15 October 1999 on the situation in Afghanistan, UN Doc. S/RES/1267 (1999).

  11. 11.

    A number of cases have been brought before the European Court of Justice touching on this issue since then. See inter alia CFI, Case T-315/01 Yassin Abdullah Kadi v Council of the European Union and Commission of the European Communities [2005] ECR II-3649; ECJ, Joined Cases C-402/05 P and C-415/05 P Yassin Abdullah Kadi and Al Barakaat International Foundation v Council of the European Union and Commission of the European Communities [2008] ECR I-6351; ECJ, Joined Cases C-584/10 P, C-593/10 P and C-595/10 P Commission, Council, United Kingdom v Yassin Abdullah Kadi, Judgment of the Court [2013] nyr.

  12. 12.

    Cremona (2003).

  13. 13.

    Thym (2004), p. 7.

  14. 14.

    See Kokott and Rüth (2003), p. 1326. As discussed below, the provisions on CFSP were eventually separated from the rest of the provisions on the EU external action in the Lisbon architecture.

  15. 15.

    The European Convention, Final report of Working Group VII on External Action, Brussels, CONV 459/02, 16 December 2002, 2.

  16. 16.

    Ibid., 13.

  17. 17.

    Thym (2004), p. 6.

  18. 18.

    Ibid.

  19. 19.

    Council of the European Union, IGC 2007 Mandate, Brussels, 11218/07, 26 June 2007, Annex, 2. See also European Council, Presidency Conclusions—Annex on ‘EU Declaration on Globalisation,’ 14 December 2007.

  20. 20.

    This has also been the case with economic and monetary policy in the euro area, as the failure to use the provisions of Article 138 TFEU indicates. However, it may be that the ongoing sovereign debt crisis in the euro area will prompt Member States to act in accordance with the said article.

  21. 21.

    Final report of Working Group VII on External Action, supra n. 15, 12.

  22. 22.

    Priollaud and Siritzky (2008) and Kokott (2012).

  23. 23.

    See The European Convention, Final report of Working Group III on Legal Personality, CONV 305/02, 1 October 2002. See also Kuijper et al. (2013), p. 1.

  24. 24.

    House of Commons, Foreign Affairs Committee (2008) Foreign Affairs Policy Aspects of the Lisbon Treaty, Third Report of Session 2007–2008, London, 16 January 2008; House of Commons, Defence Committee, The Future of NATO and European Defence (Ninth Report of Session 2007–2008), London, March 2008.

  25. 25.

    Piris (2010), p. 77.

  26. 26.

    On the academic debate regarding the nature of the EU competence in CFSP see De Baere (2008), pp. 110–112.

  27. 27.

    Rosas and Armati (2010), pp. 19–20.

  28. 28.

    Cremona (2008), p. 65. The areas of research, technological development and space [Article 4(3) TFEU] and development cooperation and humanitarian aid [Article 4(4) TFEU] also frustrate any attempt to place them definitely in one of the existing categories of competence in the Treaties. They are somewhere between shared and supporting competences. Piris calls them ‘complementary competences’ (Piris 2010, p. 77), whereas De Baere prefers the term ‘parallel competences’ (De Baere 2008, p. 112).

  29. 29.

    Lenaerts and Corthaut (2006), pp. 289–291.

  30. 30.

    De Baere (2008), pp. 201–213.

  31. 31.

    Dashwood (2004–2005), pp. 37–38. Van Elsuwege is also reluctant to recognize the application of primacy and direct effect in CFSP due to the lack of jurisdiction of the ECJ. See Van Elsuwege (2010), pp. 989–991.

  32. 32.

    Cremona (2008), pp. 63–67.

  33. 33.

    See also Article 205 TFEU, which refers back to Articles 21 and 22 TEU, and Article 222 TFEU.

  34. 34.

    On the legal status of these external objectives and relevant case law see Larik (2011), p. 27, arguing that these objectives ‘can be ranked among norms of constitutional value.’ For analyses of the new provisions see Priollaud and Siritzky (2008), pp. 34–36 and 108–110; Pechstein (2012); Regelsberger and Kugelmann (2012a).

  35. 35.

    Regelsberger and Kugelmann (2012b).

  36. 36.

    See ECJ, Case C-91/05 Commission v Council [2008] ECR I-3651.

  37. 37.

    Ibid., para 58.

  38. 38.

    See among others Cremona (2008), p. 46.

  39. 39.

    See Cremona (2008), pp. 42–46; Dashwood (2008), pp. 99–103; Van Elsuwege (2010), pp. 1001–1012; Eeckhout (2011), pp. 167–171, 180–186; Craig (2010), pp. 415–417.

  40. 40.

    The abbreviation HR/VP is used throughout the text when referring to the totality of the functions of this post. Otherwise we use HR or VP for the functions pertaining to the High Representative or Vice-President of the Commission respectively.

  41. 41.

    See also Articles 21(3) second subpara and 26(2) second subpara TEU.

  42. 42.

    See also Article 27(1) TEU.

  43. 43.

    See among others Joint Communication ‘A Partnership for Democracy and Shared Prosperity with the Southern Mediterranean,’ COM (2011) 200, 8 March 2011; Joint Communication ‘A New response to a changing Neighbourhood,’ COM (2011) 303, 25 May 2011; Joint Communication ‘Global Europe: A New Approach to financing EU external action,’ COM (2011) 865, 7 December 2011; Joint Communication ‘Human rights and Democracy at the Heart of EU external action—Towards a more Effective Approach,’ COM (2011) 886, 12 December 2011; Joint Proposal for a Council Decision on the accession of the European Union to the Treaty of Amity and Cooperation in Southeast Asia, JOIN (2012) 1, 16 February 2012; Joint Proposal for a Council Regulation concerning restrictive measures against Iran and repealing Regulation (EU) No. 961/2010, JOIN (2012) 2, 17 February 2012.

  44. 44.

    Council Decision of 26 July 2010 establishing the organisation and functioning of the European External Action Service (2010/427/EU), OJ 2010 L 201/30, preamble recital 1 and Article 1(2).

  45. 45.

    Ibid., Article 1(4).

  46. 46.

    Ibid., Articles 2 and 3. See more in Chap. 10 by Gatti, in this volume.

  47. 47.

    See also ECJ, Case C-131/03 P Reynolds Tobacco and Others v Commission [2006] ECR I-7795, para 94.

  48. 48.

    Rosas and Armati (2010), pp. 200–201.

  49. 49.

    Council Decision of 26 July 2010 establishing the organisation and functioning of the European External Action Service, supra n. 45, Article 5.

  50. 50.

    Ibid., Article 5(3).

  51. 51.

    See Ramopoulos and Odermatt (2013), pp. 22, 31.

  52. 52.

    See ECJ, Case C-246/07 Commission v Sweden [2010] ECR I-3317, paras 71–73 where the Court of Justice reiterated its well-established case law on the general applicability of the principle of sincere cooperation and the requirement of unity in EU external action.

  53. 53.

    Interestingly, this clause has been expanded in the course of time. The Maastricht Treaty’s Article J.1(4) TEU provided: ‘The Member States shall support the Union’s external and security policy actively and unreservedly in a spirit of loyalty and mutual solidarity. They shall refrain from any action which is contrary to the interests of the Union or likely to impair its effectiveness as a cohesive force in international relations.’ The Amsterdam Treaty added in between these two sentences: ‘The Member States shall work together to enhance and develop their mutual political solidarity.’ [New Article J.1(2), renumbered into Article 11 TEU]. The Lisbon Treaty preserved all of this in Article 24(3) TEU but added to the first sentence that the Member States ‘shall comply with the Union’s action in this area.’ See also Chap. 5 by Casolari, in this volume.

  54. 54.

    See Mögele (2012). Also Kuijper et al. (2013), pp. 69–104.

  55. 55.

    With the exception of where the Treaty provides who the negotiator must be. This is the case of Article 207(3) TFEU regarding agreements on common commercial policy, which foresees that the Commission will be the negotiator in such instances.

  56. 56.

    Eeckhout (2011), p. 196.

  57. 57.

    See also Dashwood et al. (2010), pp. 905–907.

  58. 58.

    Van Elsuwege (2010), p. 988.

  59. 59.

    Missiroli (2010); Hillion (2008), pp. 10–36. See also House of Lords, European Union Committee, Report: The EU’s External Action Service, March 2013, para 19.

  60. 60.

    See Wouters et al. (2013a), pp. 32–33; House of Lords, European Union Committee, Report: The EU’s External Action Service, supra n. 60, paras 20–23; European Parliament, 2013 Review of the organisation and functioning of the EEAS, European Parliament recommendation to the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy and Vice President of the European Commission, to the Council and to the Commission of 13 June 2013 on the 2013 review of the organisation and the functioning of the EEAS [2012/2253(INI)], A7-0147/2013, 13 June 2013, para 2; Speech delivered by High Representative Catherine Ashton at Forum Nueva Economia, 13 June 2013, A 316/13, at www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cms_data/docs/pressdata/EN/foraff/137458.pdf (accessed 20 August 2013).

  61. 61.

    Missiroli (2010), pp. 427–452. See also Rettman (2012).

  62. 62.

    European Union, Statement by EU High Representative Catherine Ashton on EEAS Review, supra n. 61.

  63. 63.

    Christiansen (2012), pp. 228–247. See also House of Lords, European Union Committee, Report: The EU’s External Action Service, supra n. 60, paras 118–121. See already for this possibility, Wouters (2004).

  64. 64.

    See Wouters et al. (2013a), p. 28; Bendiek and Kramer (2010). See also House of Lords, European Union Committee, Report: The EU’s External Action Service, supra n. 60, para 18.

  65. 65.

    European Security Strategy: A Secure Europe in a Better World, 12 December 2003; Report on the Implementation of the European Security Strategy: Providing Security in a Changing World, S407/08, 11 December 2008. See also Lehne (2011), p. 11, arguing in favor of ‘a new strategic concept’ that will offer the EEAS ‘a coherent conceptual framework and a sense of strategic direction.’

  66. 66.

    European Parliament, Report on the Annual Report from the Council to the European Parliament on the Common Foreign and Security Policy [12562/2011—2012/2050(INI)], 29 August 2012, para 8; The Future of Europe Group, Final Report of the Future of Europe Group of the Foreign Ministers of Austria, Belgium, Denmark, France, Italy, Germany, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Poland, Portugal and Spain, 17 September 2012, at www.auswaertiges-amt.de/cae/servlet/contentblob/626322/publicationFile/171798/120918-Abschlussbericht-Zukunftsgruppe.pdf (accessed 20 August 2013). See also Coelmont (2012) and Biscop (2012).

  67. 67.

    European Global Strategy, Towards a European Global Strategy: Securing European Influence in a Changing World, 28 May 2013. See also Coelmont (2013).

  68. 68.

    See EU High Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy and Vice President of the European Commission, Europe and the World, SPEECH/10/378, 8 July 2010.

  69. 69.

    See Wouters et al. (2013a), pp. 25–28; Hemra et al. (2011), p. 1.

  70. 70.

    See Shapovalova (2013); Echagüe and Mikail (2013). See also Chap. 11 by Comelli, in this volume.

  71. 71.

    See Wouters et al. (2013a), p. 28; European Parliament, Report on the Annual Report from the Council to the European Parliament on the Common Foreign and Security Policy, supra n. 67, paras 29–30. See also Hemra et al. (2011), p. 20; Renard (2011).

  72. 72.

    European Union, Statement by EU High Representative Catherine Ashton on EEAS Review, supra n. 61.

  73. 73.

    European Parliament, Report on the Annual Report from the Council to the European Parliament on the Common Foreign and Security Policy, supra n. 67, paras 4–7, 22, and 26; The Future of Europe Group, Final Report of the Future of Europe Group of the Foreign Ministers of Austria, Belgium, Denmark, France, Italy, Germany, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Poland, Portugal and Spain, supra n. 67.

  74. 74.

    European Security Strategy: A Secure Europe in a Better World, supra n. 66, 13.

  75. 75.

    See Wouters et al. (2013a), pp. 28–29.

  76. 76.

    Non-Paper on the European External Action Service, Joint letter from the Foreign Ministers of Belgium, Estonia, Finland, France, Germany, Italy, Latvia, Lithuania, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Poland and Sweden, 8 December 2011, http://www.ies.be/files/documents/JMCdepository/EEAS,%20Non-paper%20on%20Cooperation.pdf (accessed 20 August 2013).

  77. 77.

    Wouters et al. (2013a), pp. 37–39. See also Balfour and Raik (2013).

  78. 78.

    See Balfour and Ojanen (2013), pp. 25–29.

  79. 79.

    European Parliament, supra n. 61, para. 4.

  80. 80.

    Non-Paper on the European External Action Service, supra n. 77; European External Action Service, Report by the High Representative to the European Parliament, the Council and the Commission, 22 December 2011, points 13–15.

  81. 81.

    See Wouters et al. (2013a), p. 32; European Parliament, 2013 review of the organisation and functioning of the EEAS, supra n. 61, para 4; House of Lords, European Union Committee, Report: The EU’s External Action Service, supra n. 60, para 24.

  82. 82.

    See Wouters et al. (2013a), p. 32. Also Blockmans (2012).

  83. 83.

    European Parliament, 2013 review of the organisation and functioning of the EEAS, supra n. 61, para 4; House of Lords, European Union Committee, Report: The EU’s External Action Service, supra n. 60, para 4; Speech delivered by High Representative Catherine Ashton at Forum Nueva Economia, supra n. 61.

  84. 84.

    See Corthaut and Van Eeckhoutte (2012), p. 155 where the authors suggest that ‘[t]he entry into force of the Lisbon Treaty triggered something close to a civil war between the institutions concerned in the field of EU external representation.’

  85. 85.

    The Polish Institute of International Affairs, The EU external representation in the area of shared competences, January 2012, 7. See also Foreign & Commonwealth Office, Review of the Balance of Competences between the United Kingdom and the European Union: Foreign Policy, 22 July 2013, 40, https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/227437/2901086_Foreign_Policy_acc.pdf (accessed 27 August 2013).

  86. 86.

    ECJ, Case C-246/07 Commission v Sweden, supra n. 53. See also Eeckhout (2011), pp. 241–255; Hillion (2010). Cf. also in this regard the always relevant analysis of Ehlermann (1983), pp. 4–9.

  87. 87.

    For literature examining the status and representation arrangements of the EU in different international organisations in accordance with the founding instrument of each organisation, see Emerson et al. (2011) and Hoffmeister (2007).

  88. 88.

    Vogel (2011) and Borger (2011).

  89. 89.

    European External Action Service, Report by the High Representative to the European Parliament, the Council and the Commission, supra n. 81, point 17.

  90. 90.

    Council of the European Union. ‘EU Statements in Multilateral Organisations—General Arrangements,’ doc. 15901/11, 24 October 2011. For a commentary see Flaesch-Mougin (2013).

  91. 91.

    Ibid.

  92. 92.

    Statement by the Commission to be entered into the minutes of the Council session endorsing the General Arrangements, Council of the European Union. ‘EU Statements in Multilateral Organisations—General Arrangements,’ supra n. 91.

  93. 93.

    See further Ramopoulos and Odermatt (2013), pp. 27–28.

  94. 94.

    Wouters et al. (2013a), p. 80.

  95. 95.

    For details of the debacle see Corthaut and Van Eeckhoutte (2012), pp. 145–170; De Baere (2011). Similar disagreements were observed with regard to the negotiation of the Arms Trade Treaty, see Foreign & Commonwealth Office 2013, 38–39.

  96. 96.

    Council Decision on the participation of the Union in negotiations on a legally binding instrument on mercury further to Decision 25/5 of the Governing Council of the United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP), doc. 16632/10, 6 December 2010.

  97. 97.

    For further analysis see Wouters et al. (2013b).

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Authors and Affiliations

  1. Leuven Centre for Global Governance Studies, Institute for International Law – KU Leuven, House de Dorlodot, Deberiotstraat 34, 3000, Leuven, Belgium

    Jan Wouters & Thomas Ramopoulos

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  1. Jan Wouters
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  2. Thomas Ramopoulos
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Correspondence to Jan Wouters or Thomas Ramopoulos .

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  1. Department of Legal Studies, Alma Mater Studiorum - University of Bologna, Bologna, Italy

    Lucia Serena Rossi

  2. Department of Legal Studies, Alma Mater Studiorum - University of Bologna, Bologna, Italy

    Federico Casolari

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Wouters, J., Ramopoulos, T. (2014). Revisiting the Lisbon Treaty’s Constitutional Design of EU External Relations. In: Rossi, L., Casolari, F. (eds) The EU after Lisbon. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-04591-7_9

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