Information Revelation Strategies in Abstract Argument Frameworks Using Graph Based Reasoning

  • Madalina Croitoru
  • Nir Oren
Conference paper
Part of the Lecture Notes in Computer Science book series (LNCS, volume 8323)


The exchange of arguments between agents can enable the achievement of otherwise impossible goals, for example through persuading others to act in a certain way. In such a situation, the persuading argument can be seen to have a positive utility. However, arguments can also have a negative utility — uttering the argument could reveal sensitive information, or prevent the information from being used as a bargaining chip in the future. Previous work on arguing with confidential information suggested that a simple tree based search be used to identify which arguments an agent should utter in order to maximise their utility. In this paper, we analyse the problem of which arguments an agent should reveal in more detail. Our framework is constructed on top of a bipolar argument structure, from which we instantiate bonds — subsets of arguments that lead to some specific conclusions. While the general problem of identifying the maximal utility arguments is NP-complete, we give a polynomial time algorithm for identifying the maximum utility bond in situations where bond utilities are additive.


Polynomial Time Algorithm Argument Framework Positive Utility Negative Utility Bargaining Chip 
These keywords were added by machine and not by the authors. This process is experimental and the keywords may be updated as the learning algorithm improves.


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Copyright information

© Springer International Publishing Switzerland 2014

Authors and Affiliations

  • Madalina Croitoru
    • 1
  • Nir Oren
    • 2
  1. 1.University of Montpellier 2France
  2. 2.University of AberdeenUK

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