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Corporate Responsibility and Compliance Programs in Switzerland

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Preventing Corporate Corruption
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Abstract

This chapter analyzes the criminal law mechanism that has been developed in Switzerland in order to encourage companies to develop compliance programs and prevent corruption. It highlights how the introduction of criminal corporate liability has established a direct link between criminal sanctions and the obligation to introduce preventive measures which may take the form of anticorruption compliance programs. The chapter illustrates the historical development of the Swiss anticorruption legal framework, commencing from the original provisions of the Swiss Criminal Code of 1937, under which the bribery of a public official was already considered a federal offense, and arriving at the amendments introduced in 2005, which made innovations in the system in order to comply with the obligations under the Council of Europe Criminal Law Convention on Corruption 1999. Finally, the chapter sets out a general evaluation of the impact of corruption in Switzerland and illustrates the issues recently arising from the landmark Alstom case.

I would like to express my gratitude to my assistants Hadrien Mangeat and Lorenzo Palestini, for their much-appreciated help in drafting this chapter. Last update of source: 31 Jan 2013.

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Notes

  1. 1.

    An English translation of the SCC is provided by the Swiss Federal Administration. However, it is not an official version of the legal text, and hence has no legal force. In Switzerland, all legislative acts have three official versions deemed equally authoritative: German, French, and Italian. See “Swiss Criminal Code,” The Federal Authorities of the Swiss Confederation, http://www.admin.ch/ch/e/rs/311_0/index.html, accessed 31 Jan 2013.

  2. 2.

    Article 74a of the Federal Act of 20 Mar 1981 on International Mutual Assistance in Criminal Matters allows the restitution of assets before confiscation. See “Mutual Assistance Act (IMAC),” the Federal Authorities of the Swiss Confederation, http://www.admin.ch/ch/e/rs/c351_1.html, accessed 31 Jan 2013. This provision was interpreted broadly by the Swiss Federal Tribunal in the case of the funds of the Abacha family, allowing the reversal of the burden of proof (Article 72 SCC) regarding the illicit source of the assets on the grounds that the Abacha clan was a criminal organization (see Arrêt du Tribunal fédéral (ATF) 131 II 169); accessible online at http://www.bger.ch/fr/index.htm). More recently, the Federal Act of 1 October 2010 on the Restitution of Assets of Politically Exposed Persons obtained by Unlawful Means was introduced as a subsidiary measure to allow the freezing, forfeiture, and restitution of the assets of politically exposed persons when the victim country is a failing state unable to cooperate in the procedure of international assistance in criminal matters. See “Restitution of Illicit Assets Act (RIAA),” the Federal Authorities of the Swiss Confederation, http://www.admin.ch/ch/e/rs/c196_1.html, accessed 31 Jan 2013. On this topic, see Pieth (2008); Cassani (2009); and Cassani (2010).

  3. 3.

    For further information, see “Illicit assets of politically exposed persons (PEPs),” Federal Department of Foreign Affairs, http://www.eda.admin.ch/eda/en/home/topics/finec/poexp.html, accessed 31 Jan 2013.

  4. 4.

    For a more extensive analysis of the strengths and shortcomings of Swiss law, see the GRECO Evaluation Report on Switzerland on Incriminations (ETS 173 and 191, GPC 2), Strasbourg, 17–21 Oct 2011. See “Evaluation Report on Switzerland on Incriminations (ETS 173 and 191, GPC 2),” Council of Europe, http://www.coe.int/t/dghl/monitoring/greco/evaluations/round3/GrecoEval3 %282011 %294_Switzerland_One_EN.pdf, accessed 31 Jan 2013; see also Cassani (2011, p. 33).

  5. 5.

    The 2005 amendment was a consequence of the ratification of the Council of Europe Criminal Law Convention on Corruption of 1999. However, active bribery in the private sector became an offense as early as 1943.

  6. 6.

    The federal administration has recently published a draft bill proposing, among other amendments, to replace the current provision in the Federal Act on Unfair Competition by offenses punishing the bribery of private agents in the SCC (Article 322octies and 322novies). The requirement of a complaint by the injured party would be dropped; see “Rapport explicatif concernant la modification du code pénal et du code pénal militaire (Dispositions pénales incriminant la corruption),” http://www.ejpd.admin.ch/content/dam/data/kriminalitaet/gesetzgebung/korruptionsstrafrecht/vorentw-f.pdf, accessed 15 May 2013.

  7. 7.

    See “Corruption Perception Index,” Transparency International, http://cpi.transparency.org/cpi2012/, accessed 31 Jan 2013.

  8. 8.

    See “Bribe Payers Index,” Transparency International, http://bpi.transparency.org/bpi2011/, accessed 31 Jan 2013.

  9. 9.

    Information provided by the Federal Office of Statistics. The statistics pertaining to recent years must be read with caution, as the convictions are only taken into account when they enter into force. This may take several years.

  10. 10.

    There are some cases where the offense of mismanagement of funds (Article 158 SCC; “gestion déloyale,” “ungetreue Geschäftsbesorgung,” “amministrazione infedele”) was applied to high-level employees who had betrayed the economic interests vested in them because they were bribed.

  11. 11.

    ATF 96 IV 155.

  12. 12.

    ATF 122 IV 103.

  13. 13.

    Under Swiss law, dolus eventualis is a form of intention and not of negligence. It is given whenever the perpetrator identifies the risk that the offense may be committed and accepts this eventuality.

  14. 14.

    The Superior Tribunal of Solothurn handed down a preliminary decision on 17 April 2012. See “05.11.2012 Strafkammer,” Kanton Solothurn, http://www.so.ch/gerichte/obergericht/praxis/05112012-strafkammer.html, accessed 31 Jan 2013.

  15. 15.

    See note 1, above.

  16. 16.

    The broadest view on criminal liability in a group of companies is taken by Heiniger Matthias, Der Konzern im Unternehmensstrafrecht gemäss Article 102 StGB, Stämpfli Verlag, Bern 2011 (in toto and N 461 ff.).

  17. 17.

    ATF 137 IV 79.

  18. 18.

    Press release of the Office of the Attorney General of 22 November 2011. See “Criminal proceedings against Alstom entities are brought to a close,” Federal Administration, http://www.news.admin.ch/message/index.html?lang = fr&msg-id = 42300, accessed 31 Jan 2013.

  19. 19.

    The original order in German was briefly published by the Swiss Attorney General’s Office in its web page but is no longer publicly accessible. For an English translation see “Summary punishment order, Article 352 Swiss Code of Criminal Procedure,” World Bank Group and the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (StAR), http://star.worldbank.org/corruption-cases/sites/corruption-cases/files/Alstom_Summary_Punishment_Order_Nov_22_2011.pdf, accessed 31 Jan 2013.

  20. 20.

    Press release of the Office of the Attorney General of 22 November 2011, see note 19.

References

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Cassani, U. (2014). Corporate Responsibility and Compliance Programs in Switzerland. In: Manacorda, S., Centonze, F., Forti, G. (eds) Preventing Corporate Corruption. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-04480-4_24

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