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The Long and Disputed Judicial Reform Process in Serbia: Legacies of the Past and Predominant National Actors

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Democracy and Judicial Reforms in South-East Europe

Part of the book series: Contributions to Political Science ((CPS))

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Abstract

This chapter describes political relations between the EU and Serbia from 2000 to 2012. It then focuses on the judicial reforms launched in 2001 in the context of the Stabilization and Association Process. After highlighting the main stages of the Serbian path towards achieving the status of candidate country, while also mentioning the main political developments, the chapter focuses on the process of judicial reform.

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Notes

  1. 1.

    Two rounds of interviews were carried out. In the first round, held in Brussels (June 2006), two EC functionaries working on judicial reforms in the Balkan countries, a legal advisor of the EC (DG Enlargement) working on the CARDS Regional Programme, and a political advisor at the Stability Pact for Southern Europe were interviewed. In the second round, held in Belgrade (October 2006), the President of the Judges Association of Serbia, the former President of the Judges Association of Serbia, the Advisor of the President of the Supreme Court of Serbia, the President of the Center on Democratic and Liberal Studies, the Head of the EU Law Harmonization Department within the Serbian European Integration Office, and a member of the Center for Non-Violent Resistance were interviewed.

  2. 2.

    This view was confirmed in many interviews held in Belgrade. See Footnote 1.

  3. 3.

    The referendum held in May 2006 established the definitive split between the two countries.

  4. 4.

    See the Parties and Elections in Europe Database online at http://www.parties-and-elections.eu/serbia.html

  5. 5.

    G17 Plus is a liberal-conservative Serbian party. Its original core consisted of a group of 17 experts (economists, historians, and political scientists) constituted as an NGO in 1997. The organization officially became a political party in 2002, and was initially led by Miroljub Labus (Barlovac 2012).

  6. 6.

    Source: Parties and Elections in Europe Database online at http://www.parties-and-elections.eu/serbia.html

  7. 7.

    Some of the members created a new party named the Serbian National Party which was more government-oriented and had a less extremist agenda.

  8. 8.

    In June 2012, he stated on Montenegrin television that “there was no genocide in Srebrenica. In Srebrenica, grave war crimes were committed by some Serbs who should be found, prosecuted and punished.”(BBC News 2012).

  9. 9.

    The country was proclaimed in 1943 and named Democratic Federal Yugoslavia. In 1946, it became the Federal People’s Republic of Yugoslavia and in 1963 the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (SFRY). In 1991 it was then renamed Federal Republic of Yugoslavia.

  10. 10.

    The local elections of 1996 saw the democratic opposition win in 36 municipalities, Belgrade included. Milošević did not recognise this victory and called for new elections. His action provoked strong reactions from civil society. The protests stopped only when Milošević was forced to recognise the opposition’s victory in the early months of 1997 (Marčeta 2010a).

  11. 11.

    On 6 October 2000 Koštunica, during his first official speech, declared that he was willing to create an ad interim government. This lasted until December, when official elections took place and Djindjić was nominated prime minister of a majority government in which all the parties of the DOS coalition participated.

  12. 12.

    Interview with a Serbian expert, Political Advisor at the Stability Pact for Southern Europe, June 2006, Brussels.

  13. 13.

    See Chap. 1 for definition of the term.

  14. 14.

    In the case the candidatures proposed by the HCJ would be rejected by the National Assembly, it had to reconsider them and only in case of a second negative assessment to propose some new ones.

  15. 15.

    As Hiber (2005) and the OSCE report state (2003), at the end of the various disputes regarding institution of the CSM, the Superior Serbian Court maintained the main power over the choice of the CSM’s members. The judges of the Superior Court are nominated directly by the National Assembly.

  16. 16.

    Several articles in daily newspapers and almost all the reports of humanitarian agencies highlighted that during the state of emergency, the Serbian government explicitly violated the human rights of its citizens. In the days following the murder of Djindjić a particularly serious case was registered: the Parliament dismissed 35 judges without receiving permission from the Superior Court, which was formally necessary. As a consequence, the President of the Superior Court resigned.

  17. 17.

    According to Mendelski (2010), 76 million EUR were provided by the EU between 2001 and 2008.

  18. 18.

    An advertisement for the appointment of judges was published in the Official Gazette of the Republic of Serbia n. 52/09 of 15 July 2009.

  19. 19.

    Letter of 27 April 2010, sent by J. M. Barroso, President of the European Commission, to Dragana Boljevic, President of the Judges’ Association of Serbia, Vito Monetti, President of Magistrats Européens pour la démocratie et les libertés and Goran Ilic, President of the Prosecutor Association of Serbia, available at http://www.coe.int/t/dghl/cooperation/ccje/cooperation/LetterCCJE_serbie.pdf

  20. 20.

    This information was confirmed by the interviews held in Belgrade with the JAS members.

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Dallara, C. (2014). The Long and Disputed Judicial Reform Process in Serbia: Legacies of the Past and Predominant National Actors. In: Democracy and Judicial Reforms in South-East Europe. Contributions to Political Science. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-04420-0_4

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