Abstract
In the sciences, simplicity and unity are often held to be regulative ideals. In the following, I would like to make a case for a wider appreciation of the merits of complexity and pluralism. The reason is that a focus on simplicity and formal elegance may lead researchers astray as simple models may fail to faithfully grasp the diversity of nature and of human society. A complex model can sometimes provide a more fruitful framework. To illustrate this point, we will discuss examples from economics and from the neurosciences.
It seems equally important to clarify what I do not intend. I do not wish to argue against reductionism. I do not see any good reason why biological or economic phenomena could not, in principle, be reduced to, say, processes in quantum electrodynamics. But, of course, all scientific disciplines have their specific perspectives, and that includes particular levels of explanation. Complexity may arise when, for the investigation of a particular phenomenon, complementary perspectives and various levels of explanation need to be used, and, particularly, when inter-level causal connections come into play.
This is a preview of subscription content, log in via an institution to check access.
Access this chapter
Tax calculation will be finalised at checkout
Purchases are for personal use only
Notes
- 1.
The connotation of “plain”, i.e. “simple” is intentional: Complexity in models – though mathematically sophisticated – is simpler than in reality. Simplexity would be a better name but it is already in use.
- 2.
Also “complexism” is already in use (as is “complexicism”). However, it is used in a somewhat strange way. I would be inclined to redefine the notion for the present purposes.
- 3.
The entry “causality” is by far the largest in the subject index of Esfeld’s (2012).
- 4.
Of course, if the abstraction is sufficiently weak, then we end up without any sensible notion of causality as well. Everything that appears in such a world-view is merely chaos, a wild mess. In the “Ursuppe” (primeval soup) of universal interaction it is impossible to discern any properties or relations. No individual causal dependencies can be isolated.
- 5.
Instructive as this is, it did not prevent the authors of the recent edition of the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders (DSM-5) from searching for a classification based purely on biological factors concerning the genetics of psychic disorders. Ironically, David Kupfer, the coordinator of DSM-revision, is fellow faculty with Sandra Mitchell.
- 6.
Therefore, Milton Friedman’s opinion, not to be concerned with the adequacy of models as long as they yield acceptable prognoses, is all but self-evident.
- 7.
This means that every synaptic connection of every neuron in C. elegans’ nervous system has been identified.
- 8.
“Everything should be made as simple as possible, but not simpler.” It is not entirely clear, however, whether Einstein expressed himself precisely in that way. The closest reliable quotation is perhaps this: “It can scarcely be denied that the supreme goal of all theory is to make the irreducible basic elements as simple and as few as possible without having to surrender the adequate representation of a single datum of experience.” (From “On the Method of Theoretical Physics,” the Herbert Spencer Lecture, Oxford, June 10, 1933.)
- 9.
“Simulation” refers to the process of constructing, using, and justifying a model that involves analytically intractable mathematics (Winsberg 2003, p. 105). At this stage, there is no established terminology, not to mention even clearly defined content for the new procedure.
- 10.
As defined above.
- 11.
Many thanks to Alan Fahy for improving the English and for the jazz metaphor, to Niels Dechow and to the members of my PhD course for debating the economic topics, and to Sebastian Urchs, Ireneusz Kojder and Felix Hasler for consultation about brains.
References
Anderson, P.W. 1972. More is different. Science 177: 393–396.
Coates, J. 1996. The claims of common sense. Moore, Wittgenstein, Keynes, and the social sciences. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Coates, J. 2012. The hour between dog and wolf. Risk-taking, gut feelings and the biology of boom and bust. London: Fourth Estate.
De Vreese, L. 2006. Causal pluralism and scientific knowledge: An underexposed problem. Philosophica 77: 125–150.
Dowe, P. 2000. Physical causation. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Esfeld, M. 2012. Philosophie der Physik. Berlin: Suhrkamp Verlag.
Hagmann, P. 2005. From diffusion MRI to brain connectomics. Thesis, EPFL Lausanne.
Hitchcock, C. 2003. Of humean bondage. The British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 54(1): 1–25.
Keynes, J.M. 1921. A treatise on probability. Collected writings, vol. 8. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990.
Keynes, J.M. 1936. General theory of employment, interest, and money. Collected writings, vol. 7. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1978.
Ladyman, J., J. Lambert, and K. Wiesner. 2011. What is a complex system? Pittsburgh PhilSci Archive.
Lipton, P. 2005. The truth about science. Philosophical Transactions of the Royal Society B 30: 1259–1269.
Mitchell, S.D. 2008. Taming causal complexity. In Philosophical issues in psychiatry: Explanation, phenomenology, and nosology, ed. K.S. Kendler and J. Parnas, 125–131. Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press.
Mitchell, S.D. 2009a. Unsimple truths. Science, complexity, and policy. Chicago: Chicago University Press.
Mitchell, M. 2009b. Complexity: A guided tour. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Murphy, D. 2008. Levels of explanation in psychiatry. In Philosophical issues in psychiatry: Explanation, phenomenology, and nosology, ed. K.S. Kendler and J. Parnas, 99–124. Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press.
Persson, J. 2007. Mechanism-as-activity and the threat of polygenic effects. Pittsburgh PhilSci Archive.
Price, H. 2001. Causation in the special sciences: The case for pragmatism. In Stochastic causality, ed. M.C. Galavotti et al., 103–120. Stanford: CSLI Publications.
Price, H. 2007. Causal perspectivalism. In Causation, physics, and the constitution of reality: Russell’s republic revisited, ed. H. Price and R. Corry, 250–292. Oxford: Clarendon Press.
Psillos, S. 2010. Causal pluralism. In Worldviews, science and us. Studies of analytical metaphysics, ed. R. Vanderbeeken and B. D’Hooghe, 131–151. Hackensack: World Scientific.
Seung, S. 2012. Connectome. How the brain’s wiring makes us who we are. Boston: Houghton Mifflin Harcourt.
Urchs, M. 2001. Causal braids. On weakly transitive causality. In Current issues in causation, ed. M. Ledwig and W. Spohn, 151–162. Paderborn: Mentis.
Winsberg, E. 2003. Simulated experiments: Methodology for a virtual world. Philosophy of Science 70: 105–125.
Author information
Authors and Affiliations
Corresponding author
Editor information
Editors and Affiliations
Rights and permissions
Copyright information
© 2014 Springer International Publishing Switzerland
About this chapter
Cite this chapter
Urchs, M. (2014). Just Complexity. In: Galavotti, M., Dieks, D., Gonzalez, W., Hartmann, S., Uebel, T., Weber, M. (eds) New Directions in the Philosophy of Science. The Philosophy of Science in a European Perspective, vol 5. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-04382-1_14
Download citation
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-04382-1_14
Published:
Publisher Name: Springer, Cham
Print ISBN: 978-3-319-04381-4
Online ISBN: 978-3-319-04382-1
eBook Packages: Humanities, Social Sciences and LawPhilosophy and Religion (R0)