Abstract
Ancient and late ancient theories of perception are often described by a generalisation according to which Aristotle held a passive theory whereas Plato, the Platonists and the Neoplatonists supposed perception to be something active. I shall argue that, despite this general difference, there are important points of convergence in the theories of Aristotle and his Neoplatonic commentators. First, the notion of activity is important for Aristotle’s theory as well. Perception not only is an activity (energeia) for Aristotle. It is a perfect activity, the perfection of which is the activity itself and is thus not dependent on an external product. Further, the reception of forms without matter is by no means an exhaustive description of perceptual cognition in Aristotle. The sensitive soul is also capable of memory, imagination, and non-universal generalisation Aristotle calls ‘experience’. Human beings who have reason also make perceptual judgments that, however, are not identified with perceptions in Aristotle’s theory.
While the Neoplatonic commentators on Aristotle’s De anima modified his theory in several ways and underlined the activity of the soul, I contend that they also maintained some of Aristotle’s core assumptions. By contrast to Aristotle, they identified perception with rational perceptual judgments. However, I argue that they still retained the assumption that there also is sensation of external objects but ascribed this to the sense organism rather than the sensitive soul. The point is rather clear in Pseudo-Simplicius and I also argue that it is likely that Philoponus maintained a similar view.
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Notes
- 1.
- 2.
On early modern discussions on selective attention, see Leijenhorst (2007).
- 3.
The latter commentary has in the manuscript tradition been attributed to Simplicius, but I join the scholarly consensus that the treatise was not written by Simplicius. Thus I shall call the author “Pseudo-Simplicius”. Its authenticity was for the first time doubted in the early seventeenth by Franciscus Piccolomini. Later, it has been attributed to Priscian of Lydia by Bossier and Steel (1972). Carlos Steel also defends the attribution, see Steel (1978). The authorship of Priscianus is also accepted by Perkams (2008, 2005). The arguments for the attribution are criticized by Hadot (1978), see esp. 196, and Blumenthal (1982), who first defended the attribution of the commentary to Simplicius but later joined the consensus that the commentary cannot have been written by Simplicius. I agree that Simplicius could not have been the author of the commentary but shall refrain from attributing the commentary to Priscianus, even though I have no arguments against this attribution. This essay is not a contribution to the discussion on the authorship of the commentary.
- 4.
A commentary on the third book of Aristotle’s De anima that is in some manuscripts attributed to a certain Stephanus from Alexandria and a somewhat later figure than Philoponus himself has been published in the Commentaria in Aristotelem Graeca after Philoponus’ commentary on books I and II. Its authorship is disputed. Philoponus’ own commentary on a section of book III on the intellect (De anima III 4–8) has been preserved in a 13th–century Latin translation and translated into English by Charlton in the series Ancient Commentators on Aristotle (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1991), but that section does not concern sense perception. Thus we only have a rather limited access to Philoponus’ overall conception of perceptual cognition.
- 5.
As the connection between ἐνέργεια (activity) and ἔργον (function, work) also indicates. I shall mainly translate Aristotle’s technical term ἐνέργεια as “activity” but shall use “actuality” when it is contrasted with a potentiality or something potential (as, for example, in T4 below). Another technical term Aristotle introduces for perfections or actualities, ἐντελέχεια, is not central in the terminology of the passage that I discuss in this essay.
- 6.
I am grateful to the participants of the ancient philosophy research seminar in Athens (November 2012) for a helpful discussion on this and several other points.
- 7.
In Aristotle’s case there is perhaps not so much difference between whether we use “sensation” or “perception” as the translation of the simple acts of perceiving the proper objects of the several senses (such as seeing colours, hearing sounds and so on), since perceptual judgments are not included in perception in this sense in Aristotle. However, Pseudo-Simplicius, following Iamblichus, points out that human perception has the same name as the perception of other animals merely homonymously (187.37 in de an. III 2, 425b12). This is why I shall use “perceptive” to translate the Greek αἰσθητικός in this text from Pseudo-Simplicius, whereas in relation to Aristotle “sensitive” is an equally possible translation. I am grateful to Pavlos Kalligas for a discussion on this point.
- 8.
I am grateful to Gösta Grönroos for reading a version of the manuscript and for discussion on this and several other points.
- 9.
καθόλου δὲ περὶ πάσης αἰσθήσεως δεῖ λαβεῖν ὅτι ἡ μὲν αἴσθησίς ἐστι τὸ δεκτικὸν τῶν αἰσθητῶν εἰδῶν ἄνευ τῆς ὕλης. All translations are mine unless otherwise indicated.
- 10.
τῆς δὲ κινήσεως δύο εἴδη, πλήθει μὲν ἄπειρον ἑκάτερον, δύναμιν δὲ τὸ μὲν ποιεῖν ἔχον, τὸ δὲ πάσχειν. ἐκ δὲ τῆς τούτων ὁμιλίας τε καὶ τρίψεως πρὸς ἄλληλα γίγνεται ἔκγονα πλήθει μὲν ἄπειρα, δίδυμα δέ, τὸ μὲν αἰσθητόν, τὸ δὲ αἴσθησις, ἀεὶ συνεκπίπτουσα καὶ γεννωμένη μετὰ τοῦ αἰσθητοῦ.
- 11.
ἀλλ’ οἱ πρότερον φυσιολόγοι τοῦτο οὐ καλῶς ἔλεγον, οὐθὲν οἰόμενοι οὔτε λευκὸν οὔτε μέλαν εἶναι ἄνευ ὄψεως, οὐδὲ χυμὸν ἄνευ γεύσεως. τῇ μὲν γὰρ ἔλεγον ὀρθῶς, τῇ δ’ οὐκ ὀρθῶς· διχῶς γὰρ λεγομένης τῆς αἰσθήσεως καὶ τοῦ αἰσθητοῦ, τῶν μὲν κατὰ δύναμιν τῶν δὲ κατ’ ἐνέργειαν, ἐπὶ τούτων μὲν συμβαίνει τὸ λεχθέν, ἐπὶ δὲ τῶν ἑτέρων οὐ συμβαίνει.
- 12.
For a recent analysis of the common perceptibles in Aristotle, see Gregoric (2007, pp. 194–199).
- 13.
- 14.
Also colours as powers to set in motion the transparent (i.e. illuminated) medium, air or water (De an. II 7, 418a31–b2).
- 15.
- 16.
ἐπεὶ δὲ μία μέν ἐστιν ἐνέργεια ἡ τοῦ αἰσθητοῦ καὶ τοῦ αἰσθητικοῦ, τὸ δ’ εἶναι ἕτερον, ἀνάγκη ἅμα φθείρεσθαι καὶ σώζεσθαι τὴν οὕτω λεγομένην ἀκοὴν καὶ ψόφον, καὶ χυμὸν δὴ καὶ γεῦσιν, καὶ τὰ ἄλλα ὁμοίως· τὰ δὲ κατὰ δύναμιν λεγόμενα οὐκ ἀνάγκη.
- 17.
“For as acting and being acted on are in that which is acted on but not in that which acts, in this way the actuality of the perceptible as well as that of the perceptive are in the perceptive”. (ὥσπερ γὰρ καὶ ἡ ποίησις καὶ ἡ πάθησις ἐν τῷ πάσχοντι ἀλλ’ οὐκ ἐν τῷ ποιοῦντι, οὕτω καὶ ἡ τοῦ αἰσθητοῦ ἐνέργεια καὶ ἡ τοῦ αἰσθητικοῦ ἐν τῷ αἰσθητικῷ.)
- 18.
Alexander’s commentary on Aristotle’s De anima has been lost.
- 19.
Philoponus’ critical discussions have been highlighted by Sorabji in several publications. See especially Sorabji (2010 [1987]).
- 20.
Consider, for example, 421.5–6 “these things were not well grasped by Aristotle” and Philoponus’ lengthy criticism of Aristotle’s argument that all senses must have a medium since otherwise an important similarity between them would be lacking (concluded in 433.15–434.5).
- 21.
For such striking rhetoric, see, e.g., Hoffmann (2010[1987]).
- 22.
For the point about mirrors, air, and water, see also ibid. 437.22–24.
- 23.
I.e., those materials that can receive the perceptible form without matter, in this case the visible form, so as to transmit or reflect it.
- 24.
ἀλλὰ δεῖ καὶ δυνάμεως τοιαύτης τῆς κρίνειν δυναμένης τὰ πάθη τὰ ὑπὸ τῶν αἰσθητῶν γινόμενα.
- 25.
ἥτις οὐκ ἐν παντὶ σώματί ἐστιν, ἀλλ’ ἐν τῷ φυσικῷ ὀργανικῷ, ὡς ἔδειξε, καὶ οὐδὲ τούτῳ παντί, ἀλλ’ ἐν τούτῳ τῷ μέρει αὐτοῦ τῷ διὰ τὴν ποιὰν συμμετρίαν τε καὶ εὐκρασίαν δέχεσθαι ταύτην τὴν δύναμιν δυναμένῳ (444.23–26). For the point about discerning, see also, e.g., 437.22–24: Mirrors and moulding wax differ from the senses/sense organs because they cannot discern the effect that occurs in them. (τὰ μὲν οὖν κάτοπτρα καὶ τὰ ἐκμαγεῖα διαφέρει τῆς αἰσθήσεως τῷ μὴ δύνασθαι κρίνειν τὸ πάθος τὸ ἐν αὐτοῖς γενόμενον.)
- 26.
See, e.g., Emilsson’s conclusions in Emilsson (1988, pp. 141–148). For ἀντιλαμβάνεσθαι in Pseudo-Simplicius, see, e.g., in de an. 187.31.
- 27.
Sorabji (1991).
- 28.
For the materialist interpretation, see Sorabji (1974, 1992, 2001); see also Everson (1997). For the immaterialist or spiritualist interpretations, see Burnyeat (1992, 2001, 2002); see also Johansen (1997). For more recent discussions of the whole dispute, which began from a footnote in Sorabji’s (1974) article (49n22) and which in Caston’s words “has grown beyond all bounds”, see Caston (2005), that contains rich footnotes for further references (see esp. 246nn3–4); for analyses that aims at a more balanced view, see Caston (2005) and Bolton (2005). Caston’s view to some extent resembles Modrak’s; see Modrak (1987) and others mentioned in Caston (2005), 247n7.
- 29.
Peter Lautner also argues in his recent article (2013), 379 and 398–399 that Philoponus’ theory does not support the spiritualist reading of Aristotle’s theory of perception.
- 30.
ὡς μὲν αἴσθησις ἀντιλαμβάνεται αὐτῶν καὶ γινώσκει αὐτά, ὡς μέντοι φυσικὸν σῶμα πάσχει ὑλικῶς ὑπ’ αὐτῶν.
- 31.
αἱ δὲ αἰσθήσεις οὐχ ὗλαι γίνονται τῶν αἰσθητῶν· οὐ γὰρ λευκαίνεται ἡ αἴσθησις οὐδὲ μελαίνεται οὐδὲ βαρύνεται ἢ ὀξύνεται, ἀλλ’ ὃ πολλάκις καὶ εἰρήκαμεν καὶ ἐροῦμεν, τὸ εἶδος ὑποδέχεται μόνον καὶ τὸν λόγον. διὸ καὶ εἰς κρίσιν καὶ εἰς ἀντίληψιν τελευτῶσιν· ὕλη γὰρ οὐδεμία δύναται κρίνειν τὸ ἐγγινόμενον εἶδος· ἀσύνετον γάρ τι καὶ ἄκριτον καὶ ἀναντίληπτον ἥ γε ὕλη (Themistius, in de an. 78.7–12).
- 32.
τὸ δὴ λέγειν ὀργίζεσθαι τὴν ψυχὴν ὅμοιον κἂν εἴ τις λέγοι τὴν ψυχὴν ὑφαίνειν ἢ οἰκοδομεῖν· βέλτιον γὰρ ἴσως μὴ λέγειν τὴν ψυχὴν ἐλεεῖν ἢ μανθάνειν ἢ διανοεῖσθαι, ἀλλὰ τὸν ἄνθρωπον τῇ ψυχῇ.
- 33.
For actual perception is a motion occurring through the body in which a sense (organ) is affected. An ensouled being can undergo all those changes that a soulless being does, but a soulless being is not capable of undergoing all those affections that the ensouled being does (for they do not change in accordance with the senses). And the soulless thing is not aware of being affected, whereas the ensouled being is aware of being affected. (My italics) ἡ γὰρ αἴσθησις ἡ κατ’ ἐνέργειαν κίνησίς ἐστι διὰ τοῦ σώματος, πασχούσης τι τῆς αἰσθήσεως. καθ’ ὅσα μὲν οὖν τὸ ἄψυχον ἀλλοιοῦται, καὶ τὸ ἔμψυχον, καθ’ ὅσα δὲ τὸ ἔμψυχον, οὐ κατὰ ταῦτα πάντα τὸ ἄψυχον (οὐ γὰρ ἀλλοιοῦται κατὰ τὰς αἰσθήσεις)· καὶ τὸ μὲν λανθάνει, τὸ δ’ οὐ λανθάνει πάσχον.
- 34.
ἰστέον δὲ ὅτι οὐδὲ τὸ ἁπτικὸν αἰσθητήριον ὑπὸ πάσης αἰσθήσεως ποιοῦται· οὐδὲ γὰρ ὅταν ἀντιλαμβάνηται βαρέος καὶ κούφου, γλίσχρου καὶ κραύρου, τραχέος καὶ λείου, τοιαύτη γίνεται ἡ σάρξ, ἀλλὰ μόνον γνωστικῶς τὰ εἴδη αὐτῶν δέχεται.
- 35.
For the hierarchy of the sense with respect to materiality in Philoponus, see in de an. 352.23–353.37; cf. also 416.18–24 and 413.6–12. In the last-mentioned context, Philoponus points out that even though sight is the swiftest of all senses, it does not always grasp its object accurately at first instance but may at first take, say, a circle to be a straight line and only from close up recognise it as a circle (413.12–16).
- 36.
“As a sense, it grasps and cognises them, whereas as a natural body, it is materially affected by them” (ὡς μὲν αἴσθησις ἀντιλαμβάνεται αὐτῶν καὶ γινώσκει αὐτά, ὡς μέντοι φυσικὸν σῶμα πάσχει ὑλικῶς ὑπ’ αὐτῶν, 433.3–4).
- 37.
For the expansions and contractions of the pneuma according to Philoponus, see also Lautner (2013), 391.
- 38.
This term probably refers to Plotinus’ view of light as an external activity of luminous bodies (Enn. IV.5.7, 33–34), implying that colours are also products of light in contact with matter (ibid., 37–38; for further references for colours as some sort of light in Plotinus and thus capable of affecting the internal light in the eyes, see Emilsson (1988, p. 53). I thank Pavlos Kalligas for a discussion on this point.
- 39.
δύο γὰρ πάθη πάσχει τὸ αἰσθητήριον, ἓν μὲν ὡς ἁπλῶς σῶμα, ἕτερον δὲ ὡς αἰσθητήριον. ὡς μὲν οὖν σῶμα ὑπὸ σώματος πάσχει, ὡς δὲ αἰσθητήριον ὑπὸ τῆς τῶν αἰσθητῶν ἐνεργείας· οἷον τὸ ὄμμα ὡς μὲν αἰσθητήριον πάσχει συγκρινόμενον ἢ διακρινόμενον ὑπὸ τῆς τῶν χρωμάτων ἐνεργείας, ὡς δὲ σῶμα πάσχει ὑπὸ πυρός, εἰ τύχοι, θερμαίνοντος.
- 40.
Cf. also Philoponus’ conclusion of his discussion on the organ of the sense of touch (433.39–434.5) in which he points out that it is not necessary to assume that in all cases the medium and the sense organ must be different and thus the sense of touch is not anomalous in this respect.
- 41.
οὐ γάρ ἐστιν ἐν τούτοις ἡ αἰσθητικὴ ψυχή, ἀλλὰ διὰ τούτων τὸ πάθος ἐπ’ ἐκεῖνο ἀναπέμπεται.
- 42.
It is important to note that Galen only affirms of the optic nerve that it contains pneuma and is uncertain about the other kinds of nerves: see PHP VII 4.1–3; p. 4484–24 De Lacy (V 611–612K): in the last-mentioned passage he gives two alternative options, one of which is the pneuma. Here as elsewhere I am grateful to Teun Tieleman for reading and commenting a draft of this article, especially on the point about Galen.
- 43.
I am grateful to Katerina Ierodiakonou for a discussion on this point. Galenic influence on Philoponus has been argued for by Todd (1984), 103–110 (see pp. 106–107 for the De anima commentary). Todd also raises the question of whether Philoponus was reading Galen himself or whether he was drawing on a tradition that had ”fashioned Galenic ideas into the doxographical form in which we encounter them in this commentary” (ibid., p. 105).
- 44.
When it comes to the question of what exactly in Philoponus derives from Galen, it is important to note that, on many issues (such as the question of whether all nerves contain pneuma and on the distinction between different kinds of pneuma) Galen himself is uncertain, whereas later Galenism tended to systematise his observations. See Debru (2008, p. 272) for further references.
- 45.
Philoponus gives a prominent role to the idea that pneuma is the soul’s primary instrument (common in Galen as well), and he also refers to Galen’s theory of the nerves and the brain as the origin of nerves. Further, his discussion of the relation between our bodily constitution (or mixture) bears resemblance to some of Galen’s formulations, even though Philoponus is explicit that the soul’s capacities are prior to the bodily mixtures. By contrast, Galen at least once points out that the effective movements (παθητικαὶ κινήσεις) are always consequent upon (ἑπόμενον) the dispositions of the body (PHP IV 767 = SM 2, 32, 1) thus suggesting, at least verbally, that the bodily mixtures are prior to the effective movement (cf. also Galen’s formulations according to which the affective movements are products of the temperaments of the body; PHP V 464 = CMG 4, 1, 2, p. 322, 3–4; 322, 13). Philoponus’ opposition to Galen on this point has also been noted by Todd (1984, p. 110), who refers to Philoponus’ discussion of reason’s freedom to oppose “the dictates of the body” (with reference to Philoponus 52.1–4 and 4–13) and to the “creative reasons” (δημιουργικοὶ λόγοι) that engender the forms of the πάθη of the soul in “a suitable blend of the elements” (52.13–21).
- 46.
The Neoplatonic discussion of the pneuma as the vehicle (ὄχηεμα) of soul has been discussed in Stéphane Toulouse’s dissertation (2001). According to Toulouse (2001, p. 523), Philoponus accepted this doctrine at first but criticises it in his On the eternity of the world against Proclus (Contra Proclum).
- 47.
τὸ μὲν γὰρ κυρίως αἰσθητήριον τὸ πνεῦμά ἐστι.
- 48.
In the passage in which Philoponus acknowledges that flesh is also the medium for touch, he also, puzzlingly, goes on to say (418.22-23)that “in the case of touch, flesh is rather a medium than the organ because it is more connected with matter and more earthen” (ἐπὶ δὲ τῆς ἁφῆς ἡ σὰρξ μᾶλλον μεταξὺ ἢ αἰσθητήριον διὰ τὸ προσυλότερον καὶ γεωδέστερον) Charlton translates: “flesh is rather a sense organ than a medium because it is more connected with matter and earthen”, which seems to contradict the text and he gives no note on the point.
- 49.
The notion of a contributory cause also appears in Plato’s Timaeus, where he characterises the material as restricting to what extent the forms as paradigms can be realized in the natural world as contributory causes (46c–d, 47e–48a, 68e–69a).
- 50.
Galen, by contrast, states that the soul should be identified with the mixture (κρᾶσις) of the temperaments of the bodily elements (PHP IV 783 = SM 2, 45, 4).
- 51.
In Plato’s discussions on perception κρίσις means “judgment”, in Aristotle “discernment” without rational judgment. The fact that Philoponus ascribes κρίσις to the organs here makes me infer that he means discernment rather than judgment.
- 52.
καὶ οὕτως ὑπ’ αὐτῶν τοῦ αἰσθητηρίου παθόντος ἡ κρίσις ἐπὶ τὴν αἴσθησιν διαβαίνει.
- 53.
This of course presupposes that one understands Aristotle’s theory in a non-literal way, as I have mentioned in the introductory section that I do.
- 54.
The term “concept” can be misleading but it is difficult to come up with an alternative. The λόγοι that are projected are internal to the soul and recollected. Therefore, they are instantiations of the real structuring principles of reality, the intelligible forms. However, they are also important structuring elements of human cognition and thus bear some resemblance to concepts even though differing from mere concepts. Because of being instantiations of intelligible forms in the human soul, the λόγοι thus convey some genuine knowledge about the structure of the world.
- 55.
- 56.
Especially Steel (1978), Perkams (2008) and Lautner in several articles e.g. (2004). See also Rappe (2000, pp. 54–56), who also discusses under the name of Philoponus the commentary on book III published after Philoponus on books I–II in the Commentaria in Aristotelem Graeca which some manuscripts refer to Stephanus’ lectures but the authorship of which is disputed. Rappe articulates her point by using the notion of self, which is relevant for my discussion only on the point of self-reflexivity below.
- 57.
Steel’s translation from Sorabji (2004, p. 40) modified. Τῷ αἰσθητικῷ δηλαδή, ὅτι ὑπάρχειν δεῖ τὸ αἰσθητὸν ἄτομον ὂν καὶ ἔξωθεν, καὶ οὐ μόνον εἶναι ἀλλὰ καὶ παρεῖναι τῷ αἰσθητικῷ, ἵνα καὶ δράσῃ τι εἰς τὸ αἰσθητήριον καὶ ἐπὶ τῷ τούτου πάθει ἡ αἰσθητικὴ ψυχὴ προβαλλομένη τοὺς ἐν αὐτῇ τῶν αἰσθητῶν κοινοὺς λόγους οἰκείως τῷ πάθει γνωρίσῃ τὸ αἰσθητὸν κατ’ οἰκείαν ἐνέργειαν, κατὰ τὸ τοῦ αἰσθητοῦ στᾶσα εἶδος.
- 58.
ἀλλὰ δῆλον ὡς καὶ τὸ αἰσθητὸν τελειοῦται καὶ εἰς ἐνέργειαν καθίσταται ὑπὸ τῆς αἰσθητικῆς ψυχῆς, αὐτῆς καὶ τὸ τοῦ αἰσθητοῦ προβαλλούσης εἶδος ἀφ’ ἑαυτῆς μέν, ἀλλὰ πρὸς τὴν προβολὴν ἐγειρομένης ἐκ τῆς ἐγγενομένης τῷ αἰσθητηρίῳ κινήσεως ὑπὸ τοῦ αἰσθητοῦ, διὰ τὸ μήτε παντελῶς εἶναι χωριστὴν σωμάτων τὴν αἰσθητικὴν ζωήν, μήτε πρὸς τὸ αἰσθητὸν ἀμέσως, ἀλλὰ πρὸς τὸ ἐν τῷ αἰσθητηρίῳ ζωτικὸν πάθος ἢ παθητικὸν ἐνέργημα τὸν οἰκεῖον προβάλλειν λόγον. For a rather similar analysis, see Pseudo-Simplicius’ comments (in de an. 165.31–166.34) on Aristotle’s De anima II 12, 424a17 that is quoted above as T1.
- 59.
Cf. 188.2–3: “The whole [soul] is not stirred by itself … but it is activated by being somehow moved by the perceptible object”. οὐδὲ ἀφ’ ἑαυτῆς τὸ ὅλον ἐγειρομένη … ἐνεργεῖ δὲ ὑπὸ τοῦ αἰσθητοῦ πως κινουμένη.
- 60.
See also παθητικὴ ἐνέργεια in 166.14 ad Aristotle, De an. 424a17.
- 61.
Plato also distinguished perception from beliefs, but was less optimistic of how much the perceptual faculty can do without reason and belief, whereas later Platonists such as Alcinous tended to ascribe to Plato the view according to which even perceptions of colours involve opinionative reason (δοξαστικὸς λόγος) see the texts translated in Sorabji (2004, pp. 33–37). For Plato’s account, see Remes's contribution to this volume.
- 62.
The passage is also discussed in Gerson (2005, pp. 147–152). For the point that self-reflexivity is impossible for or in a body, see also Philoponus (14.29–38, 161.31–162.27, 292.5–13) and Pseudo-Philoponus (466.12–467.12) mentioned in Gerson (2005), 150n80. However, as Lautner has argued (2004) συναίσθησις also implies an elementary self-awareness to non-human animals as an imitation of the genuine reversal (ἐπιστροφή) that is only possible to reason and involves a higher cognitive achievement and also a more truthful form of self-awareness.
- 63.
- 64.
καὶ δείκνυται διὰ τοῦδε καὶ μέχρι τῆς αἰσθήσεως ἡμῶν τὸ λογικὸν διῆκον, εἴ γε καὶ αἴσθησις ἡ ἀνθρωπεία ἑαυτῆς ἀντιληπτική. … λογικὴ οὖν ἡμῶν ἡ αἴσθησις. Cf. also 290.6–8.
- 65.
Namely συναίσθησις. For a discussion, see Lautner (2004, p. 165).
- 66.
According to Pseudo-Simplicius, human beings also have perceptual awareness (συναίσθησις) of themselves as body-soul compounds; see in de an. 7.20–22 on the opening of Aristotle’s De anima (402a3).
- 67.
For a discussion of this difficult passage and for more references, see, e.g., Tuominen (2010).
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Tuominen, M. (2014). On Activity and Passivity in Perception: Aristotle, Philoponus, and Pseudo-Simplicius. In: Silva, J., Yrjönsuuri, M. (eds) Active Perception in the History of Philosophy. Studies in the History of Philosophy of Mind, vol 14. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-04361-6_4
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