Non-proliferation of Adverse Technologies

Abstract

In order to control the most powerful military technology, the atomic bomb, 190 states have signed the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) treaty to date. Other treaties try to reduce the number of nuclear warheads and the amount of technology transfer to rogue states in general. So far transfer restrictions have worked well. Every company has to develop its own position in this critical situation. Modern technology is ever more powerful and cannot be kept secret. The threat for companies and for society being taken by surprise is increasing.

Challenging the integrity of the non-proliferation regime is a matter which can affect international peace and security.

Mohamed ElBaradei, Egyptian diplomat and Nobel Peace Prize winner 2005

The Economist: Nuclear security: Threat multiplier

Dangerous complacency about nuclear terrorism

© The Economist Newspaper Limited, London (Mar 31st 2012)

NUCLEAR mayhem can come from rogue states or badly run power stations. That fact escapes nobody in South Korea, just a mountain range away from rocket-mad North Korea, and with Japan’s stricken Fukushima Dai-ichi plant across the sea. But it was a third threat—terrorism—that brought leaders from 53 countries to a summit in Seoul on March 26th-27th. It marked the halfway point in Barack Obama’s four-year initiative to secure and reduce the world’s scattered stocks of bomb-usable plutonium and highly enriched uranium (HEU). Though attendance was strong, the momentum shows worrying signs of slowing.

This is partly because the terrorist threat has waned since the killing of Osama bin Laden. That disrupted al-Qaeda, which under his leadership sought to obtain nuclear materials. A crackdown on black markets has been a big success. In the 1990s seizures were frequent and measured in kilos. The latest have mostly involved mere grams (see chart).

Now the easy targets have been reached. In the past two years, eight countries have disposed of some 480kg of HEU. Ukraine and Mexico have given up all their stocks. Kazakhstan has sealed away 13 tonnes of HEU and weapons-grade plutonium. A few countries have converted research reactors away from HEU. Belgium, France and the Netherlands have cut the amount they make for medical isotopes.

But the summit in Seoul called only for further voluntary reductions by the end of 2013. That is a weak commitment: the International Panel on Fissile Material estimates world stocks of HEU at 1,300 tonnes, plus 450 tonnes of separated plutonium. Although most of this is held by America and Russia (which counts as safe), the rest is scattered throughout more than 30 countries, some of it—according to Matthew Bunn of Harvard’s Kennedy School—overseen only by night watchmen behind chain-link fences. Nobody named names at the summit, but a study this year by the Washington-based Nuclear Threat Initiative and the Economist Intelligence Unit (our sister company) said China, India and Japan scored poorly on security, and Uzbekistan and Vietnam did worst.

Vulnerabilities to terrorism remain. The Fukushima accident made it dramatically clear that nuclear power stations, if they can be knocked out by natural disasters, can also be hit by man-made assault.

The main hurdle to progress is sovereignty. Pakistan rejects almost any outside interference with its nuclear stockpiles, which are increasing (and, in outsiders’ view, poorly guarded). Other countries resent being told what to do. In Seoul America and Russia did little more than repeat their 2010 commitment to dispose of 68 tonnes of weapons-grade plutonium. They may need to lead more by example if they want others to follow.