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Legislation by the Ordinary Statute Regions: Powers and Subjects

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Italian Regionalism: Between Unitary Traditions and Federal Processes

Part of the book series: Essays on Federalism and Regionalism ((SEFR,volume 1))

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Abstract

The paper examines prevailing doctrine and court rulings on regional legislation. First, it focuses on the issues and the difficulties of defining regional legislative and regulatory powers. Second, it analyses the laws and regulations enacted to assess the impact of the reforms on the way in which the Ordinary Regions concretely exercise their legislative and regulatory powers. Its purpose is to see whether, and if so to what extent, the concept of the Regions as political-legislative bodies pursued by the 1948 Constituent Assembly, and subsequently the 2001 constitutional reform, has been implemented.

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Notes

  1. 1.

    Serges (2006), pp. 3434–3435. See also the bibliography cited there.

  2. 2.

    “Legislative powers shall be vested in the State and the Regions in compliance with the Constitution and with the constraints deriving from EU legislation and international obligations. The State has exclusive legislative powers in the following matters: a) foreign policy and international relations of the State; relations between the State and the European Union; right of asylum and legal status of non EU citizens; b) immigration; c) relations between the Republic and religious denominations; d) defence and armed forces; State security; armaments, ammunition and explosives; e) the currency, savings protection and financial markets; fair competition; foreign exchange system; state taxation and accounting systems; equalisation of financial resources; f) state bodies and relevant electoral laws; state referenda; elections to the European Parliament; g) legal and administrative organisation of the State and of national public agencies; h) public order and security, with the exception of local administrative police; i) citizenship, civil status and register offices; j) and procedural law; civil and criminal law; administrative judicial system; k) determination of the basic level of benefits relating to civil and social entitlements to be guaranteed throughout the national territory; l) general provisions on education; m) social security; n) electoral legislation, governing bodies and fundamental functions of the Municipalities, Provinces and Metropolitan Cities; o) customs, protection of national borders and international prophylaxis; p) weights and measures; standard time; statistical and computerised co-ordination of data of state, regional and local administrations; works of the intellect; q) protection of the environment, the ecosystem and cultural heritage.” Other provisions of the Constitution vest the State with exclusive powers over other matters, in addition to the seventeen listed in Art. 117(2) Const., such as issuing the provisions governing “Rome as the Capital City”, and procedures for the exercise of the deputising powers provided by Art. 120 Const.

  3. 3.

    For the list of subjects, see note 13.

  4. 4.

    This power had originally been envisaged in Article 117 Const.. Caretti (2001a, p. 1224) advocated retaining this type of power, at least in cases in which it is hard to draw a boundary between the subjects and their distribution in terms of exclusive or concurrent powers.

  5. 5.

    Falcon (2001), p. 5 speaks of “cross-cutting powers”. D’Atena (2003), pp. 21ff. speaks of “non-subject-area matters” while Benelli (2006) speaks of “dematerialised subjects”.

  6. 6.

    There is a great deal of case-law on this subject. The landmark judgment here is No. 303/2003.

  7. 7.

    D’Atena (2010), p. 154. The original constitutional provisions of Article 118 (1) were based on the principle that, by and large, legislative functions tend to coincide with administrative functions.

  8. 8.

    Judgment No. 303/2003. Cf. also judgments 6/2004 and 385/2005.

  9. 9.

    On this criterion, which would appear to be “the post-reform reformulation of the national interest”; see Benelli and Bin (2009), p. 1210. See also the Constitutional Court judgments cited in note 40.

  10. 10.

    For a detailed analysis of loyal cooperation, see Mangiameli (2008).

  11. 11.

    Cf. judgments Nos. 88/2003 and 12/2004.

  12. 12.

    Cf. judgment No. 151/2005.

  13. 13.

    “Concurring legislation applies to the following subjects: international and EU relations of the Regions; foreign trade; job protection and safety; education, subject to the autonomy of educational institutions and with the exception of vocational education and training; professions; scientific and technological research and innovation support for productive sectors; healthcare; nutrition; sports; disaster relief; land-use planning; civil ports and airports; large transport and navigation networks; communications; national production, transport and distribution of energy; complementary and supplementary social security; harmonisation of public accounts and co-ordination of public finance and taxation system; enhancement of heritage and landscape, including the promotion and organisation of cultural activities; savings banks, rural banks, regional credit institutions; regional land and agricultural credit institutions.” The list also includes electoral law pursuant to Article 122(1) Const., and the rules governing the conferral of functions onto local authorities, in implementation of the subsidiarity principle provided by Art. 118(1) Const..

  14. 14.

    These powers related in particular to: “regulations governing Regional offices and administrative bodies; municipal districts; local urban and rural enforcement agencies; fairs and markets; public charities and health care facilities and hospitals; craft and professional training, and schooling; local authority museums and libraries; town planning; tourism and the hospitality industry; regional tramways and coaches; roads, aqueducts and public works of regional interest; lake navigation and ports; mineral and spa waters; quarries and peat bogs; hunting; fishing in inland waters; agriculture and forestry; handicrafts and small enterprises, and other matters indicated in constitutional laws”.

  15. 15.

    This function was envisaged in Article 17(1) of Act No. 281/1970, as subsequently amended and supplemented. It was explained that vesting the State with policy and coordination powers—which still remain in Act No. 59/1997—had been designed to give it reserved powers to safeguard the need to guarantee the unitary character of legislation, after transferring comprehensive bodies of subjects to the Regions. This function could be exercised both by legislation and by issuing administrative instruments. In the latter case, it was to be done by directives issued by the Council of Ministers, by CIPE (Interdepartmental Committee for Economic Policies), and by the President of the Council of Ministers acting jointly with the minister having competence over the matter.

  16. 16.

    On the complex issues of identifying the subject-areas and the de facto departure from the constitutional model, see Mangiameli (1992).

  17. 17.

    Despite some difficulties, the implicit principles thesis had governed the previous system of the distribution of powers between State and Regions. Art. 9 of Act No. 62/1953 as amended by Article 17 of Act No. 281/1970, provided that the Regions were to exercise their legislative powers in accordance with the provisions contained in the “fundamental principles specifically laid down in the law or that can be inferred from current legislation”.

  18. 18.

    Cf. judgment No. 282/2002.

  19. 19.

    Judgment No. 196/2003. In order to facilitate the identification of these principles, the State legislator had enacted provisions in Article 1 of Act No. 131/2003 (known as the La Loggia Act) enabling Legislative Decrees to be adopted to set down the core principles. In implementation of these delegated powers, in 2006 only three decrees were issued governing matters of concurrent competence: one on the “professions” (Legislative Decree No. 30), one on “the harmonisation of public accounts” (Legislative Decree No. 170) and one on “regional banks” (Legislative Decree No. 171).

  20. 20.

    D’Atena (2010), p. 140.

  21. 21.

    See judgment No. 359/1993. The Court subsequently confirmed this position in judgments Nos. 50/2005, 364/2006, 282/2009, and 278/2010.

  22. 22.

    Cf. judgment No. 271/1996.

  23. 23.

    Cf. judgment Nos. 6/2004 and 196/2004.

  24. 24.

    Caretti (2001a), p. 1226.

  25. 25.

    Tosi (2001), pp. 1237–1238.

  26. 26.

    Cf. in particular judgments Nos. 181/2006, 430/2007, 340/2009, and 16/2010.

  27. 27.

    Cf. judgment No. 200/2009.

  28. 28.

    Cf. judgment No. 303/2003.

  29. 29.

    According to D’Atena (2006), p. 515, considering this practice to be still valid infringes Art. 117(6) Const. which “by vesting the State with regulatory powers only over the subjects assigned to it, the State cannot intervene in concurrent subject areas by means of a non-legislative instrument”, thus limiting the legislative powers of the Regions.

  30. 30.

    Cf. judgment No. 329/2003.

  31. 31.

    Under Article 8(6) of Act No. 131/2003, Parliament expressly excluded the possibility of issuing policy and coordination instruments governing matters falling within the scope of the Regions’ concurrent and residual powers.

  32. 32.

    For a wide-ranging account of the criteria for interpreting the subjects, see Mangiameli (2002), and in particular pp. 107ff.

  33. 33.

    Cf. judgment No. 423/2004.

  34. 34.

    Cf. judgment No. 285/2005.

  35. 35.

    Precisely by calling on the concept of “subsidiarity” the Court “nationalised” these matters in judgments No. 3/2003 and No. 6/2004.

  36. 36.

    Torchia (2002), p. 344, considers residual legislative powers as “potentially indeterminate”, and Niro (2003), pp. 1855ff.

  37. 37.

    D’Atena (2010), p. 130.

  38. 38.

    Cf. judgment Nos. 6/2004 and 278/2010.

  39. 39.

    D’Atena (2006), p. 512.

  40. 40.

    The influence of the State legislator is now all the more pronounced as a result of the latest constitutional judgment which gives prevalence to the criterion for resolving conflicts of powers, almost invariably, in favour of the State. There are numerous examples of this. As far as the prevalence of the State is concerned, it is above all the “goal-oriented” matters that interfere with, and prevail over, the residual matters. Thus, “fair competition” can prevail over “local public transport” (judgments Nos. 29 and 80/2006) over “agriculture” and “commerce” (sent. n. 106/2006). The same applies to “protection of the environment and the ecosystem” which prevails over the residual matters “woodlands” and “forests” (judgment No. 105/2008) and “mineral and spa waters” (judgment No. 1/2010). However, there are also examples of prevalence in cases other than in the matter of cross-cutting powers. Kindergartens are a case in point, which according to the Regions fall within the scope of the residual subject-area of “social services”, and have been referred by the Constitutional Court to “education” arguing that this is the prevalent purpose of kindergartens (judgment No.370/2003). Moreover, in addition to the judgments regarding “the coordination of public finances” for which the reader is referred to Ronchetti elsewhere in this volume, see judgment No.278/2010 in which the Court ruled in the case put to it that, “local government” was prevalent with respect to “tourism”.

  41. 41.

    See Ronchetti, in this volume.

  42. 42.

    Another “enumerated” subject-area can be inferred from Art. 123 Const. vesting the Regions with reserved powers to regulate the administrative organisation of the local authorities. This provision states that these subjects are to be governed in the Statutes of the Regions, but only in regard to basic principles, thereby giving the Regional Legislative Assemblies the possibility of enacting more detailed provisions. Apart from the power to lay down principles governing the electoral system and cases of ineligibility and incompatibility of regional officials (Art. 122 Const.), the State has no other powers regarding the organisation and operation of the Regional authorities.

  43. 43.

    With regard to the Regions’ right to legislate on “local police”, see judgment No. 167/2010. In respect of “vocational training” see judgments Nos. 9/2004 and 175/2005.

  44. 44.

    Judgment No. 370/2003.

  45. 45.

    Judgment No. 255/2004.

  46. 46.

    However, provision for these was previously made in the original Article 117 (2) Const.

  47. 47.

    Judgments Nos. 12/2004, 116/2006, 339/2007.

  48. 48.

    Judgments Nos. 14/2004, 49/2006.

  49. 49.

    Judgments Nos. 162/2005, 167/2007.

  50. 50.

    Judgments Nos. 225/2005, 80/2006, 452/2007.

  51. 51.

    Judgments Nos. 197/2003, 107/2005, 90 and 214/2006, 344/2007, 95/2008, 13/2009 and 79/2009.

  52. 52.

    Judgments Nos. 1/2004, 199/2006, 165/2007, 247/2010.

  53. 53.

    Judgment No. 332/2006.

  54. 54.

    Judgments Nos. 213/2006, 339/2007, 233/2009.

  55. 55.

    Judgments Nos. 287/2004, 427/2005, 118/2006, 50/2008 and 168/2008.

  56. 56.

    Judgments Nos. 244/2005, 27/2010 and 236/2010.

  57. 57.

    Judgments Nos. 274/2003, 380/2004, 233/2006, 40/2007.

  58. 58.

    Judgments Nos. 94/2007 and 121/2010.

  59. 59.

    Torchia (2002), p. 354.

  60. 60.

    Cf. by way of example, judgment No. 307/2009.

  61. 61.

    Onida (1991), p. 5.

  62. 62.

    Tarli Barbieri (2000), p. 640.

  63. 63.

    This seems to take up the provisions of the last paragraph of the previous Article 117 Const. which provided that the Regions might be given purely supplementary lawmaking powers or powers to issue measures for the implementation of national laws.

  64. 64.

    See De Siervo (2001), p. 159.

  65. 65.

    For a reconstruction of the debate and of the practical consequences of misinterpreting the constitutional reforms, see Arabia (2005a), pp. 500ff.

  66. 66.

    Many Regional Statutes, however, proportionately reallocate the powers of the Executive, giving reserved powers over regulations “delegated” to it by the State to the Regional Council in respect of the matters falling within its legislative power.

  67. 67.

    The opinion of the Statute guarantee body (see Viceconte, elsewhere in this book) is also required by the Emilia Romagna Statute in the cases provided by law, and by the Lazio Statute, in relation to the regulations removing subjects from the area of statute law. Moreover, the Puglia Regional Statute provides the possibility for the Regional Executive to refer cases to the “Council of State” (Supreme Administrative Court) for a judgment.

  68. 68.

    Cf. more specifically, Desideri (2005), pp. 479ff. and Arabia (2005a) pp. 500ff.; Arabia (2005b), pp. 105ff. For comments and annual statistics following the seventh Parliament referred to in the rest of this paper, see Desideri (2007), pp. 231ff. and Arabia (2007), pp. 258ff.; Desideri (2008), pp. 357ff. and Arabia (2008), pp. 391 ff.; Desideri (2009), pp. 7ff. and Arabia (2009), pp. 25ff.; Desideri (2010), pp. 28ff. and Arabia (2010), pp. 50ff. See also, Arabia and Desideri (2010), pp.17ff. For more details, see, lastly, Desideri (2011), pp. 451ff. and Arabia (2011a), pp. 467ff.

  69. 69.

    It should be borne in mind that this latter statistic would exceed the figure for the eighth Parliamentary term if also the laws enacted (for which the data is not yet available) since May 2000 were to be included (the period falling within the life of the Parliament).

  70. 70.

    To take a few examples from the eighth Parliament, Toscana enacted 261 laws compared with 93 in Campania, or 12.4 and 4.4 %, respectively, of total enactments. This confirms what had happened in the seventh Parliament when Toscana produced the largest number of enactments with 243 laws (11.9 %) and Campania the fewest with 112 laws (5.4 %). During the eighth Parliament, apart from the two Regions whose output exceeded 10 % (in addition to Toscana with 12.4 % and Liguria with 10.7 %), most of the Regions are between 7 and 9 % (Puglia, Basilicata, Calabria, Piemonte, Lombardia, Veneto), followed by a group reporting between 5 and 7 % (Marche, Umbria, Lazio and Emilia Romagna). As already mentioned, Campania fell below the 5 % mark with 4.4 %.

  71. 71.

    This was set in motion by Act No. 59/1997 and continued with the decrees for its implementation (particularly Legislative Decree No. 112/1998 transferring the State’s functions and administrative powers to the Regions and the local authorities).

  72. 72.

    The fact that fewer laws were recorded in 2005 and 2010 can also be explained by the fact that these were years falling between one Parliament and the next, hence with a smaller number of Parliamentary sessions.

  73. 73.

    In the former case, several subjects will be governed by one single enactment, that is to say covering the organic sectors identified by the aforementioned Legislative Decree (Abruzzo, Basilicata, Calabria, Emilia-Romagna, Lazio, regulations Lombardia, Marche, Molise, Piemonte, Umbria and Veneto); in the latter case, the law will cover a variety of sectoral activities covering the subjects devolved onto the Regions (Liguria, Puglia and Toscana).

  74. 74.

    Examining the individual Regions, one can see that the output of “maintenance enactments” ranged from 19.7 to 36.4 %, revealing the wide diversity between the different Regions’ policies and law-making techniques.

  75. 75.

    This was the case, for example, of Toscana, Liguria, Molise, Umbria, Marche, Piemonte and Veneto in this case of laws, and Piemonte for the regulations. In some cases (Emilia-Romagna) the statutory thinning-out process was conducted by linking “statutory cleansing” to various enactments, and particularly when the Regions implemented Legislative Decree No. 112/1998.

  76. 76.

    Lombardia the Marche are cases in point.

  77. 77.

    Molise, Basilicata and Veneto, for example.

  78. 78.

    See Arabia (2011b), p. 89.

  79. 79.

    There are obviously considerable differences between one Region and another. They range from Regions like Lombardia, which reduced its Statute book to 416 laws after having repealed 1,698 of the 2,114 Regional laws, to such Regions as Abruzzo which only repealed 365 of its 3,240 laws, leaving 2,875 in force (many of which were probably useless and never enforced). Other important statistics refer to Toscana, with 857 of its original 2,914 laws, Liguria with 958 of its original 1,793 laws, and Piemonte with 974 of the original corpus of 2,086 laws.

  80. 80.

    This clearly highlights a number of limitations of the statistics referred to here. For they only consider the laws (and regulations) without taking account of all the other regional activities that are implemented under other types of instruments, such as plans, programmes, resolutions and agreements. It should also be borne in mind, particularly in respect of the data on the classifications by macro-sectors and subjects, that many areas of intervention by the Regions are governed by the budget laws (which often contain numerous provisions making systemic changes and introducing organisational measures) and partly through the multi-sectoral laws viewed as a whole, rather than the governance of the individual subjects they cover.

  81. 81.

    During the eighth Parliamentary term within the “economic development and productive activities” macro-sector, “agriculture and forestry” took the lion’s share with 26.3 % of the laws enacted. These, taken together with “hunting, fisheries and fish farming” (totalling 17.7 %) show that the area that could be roughly defined as rural development accounts for 44.0 % of the whole of the macro-sector.

  82. 82.

    In the eighth Parliamentary term, in the “personal and community services” macro-sector the largest number of laws enacted referred to “health care” with 31.8 %. Moreover, the number of laws enacted annually in this subject area has remained essentially unchanged (38 in 2006 and 39 in 2009).

  83. 83.

    In the eighth Parliament, 30.6 % of the laws enacted referred to this subject area.

  84. 84.

    During the eighth Parliament, this subject-area accounted for 23.3 % of the total laws enacted in the “personal and community services” macro-sectors. For more details regarding the development of the sector, see the paper by Napolitano elsewhere in this book.

  85. 85.

    This is the subject for which most laws were passed (38.9 %) during the eighth regional parliament in the macro-sector “territory, environment and infrastructure”.

  86. 86.

    In this case there is certainly a prevalence of demands and pressure from the Regions and communities which the Regional government is responsible. Furthermore, the figures show that it is not possible to give the State exclusive powers over this subject-area in a rigid fashion, and confirms the need for a “cross-cutting” approach previously suggested by the Constitutional Court, particularly in its earliest judgments. However, the Court has recently been interpreting the “cross-cutting” nature of the subject-area by restoring wide-ranging powers to Central Government. See Desideri (2011), p. 464.

  87. 87.

    During the eighth Parliament the percentage of enactments governing these subjects were, respectively, 1.2, 0.9 and 0.6 %.

  88. 88.

    Take, for example, the figures for the eighth Parliamentary term: 4.1 % for “supporting innovation in production sectors”, 2.7 % for “roads”, 2.3 % for “performing arts”, 1.0 % for “civil protection”, and 0.4 % for “complementary and supplementary pensions”.

  89. 89.

    Accounting, respectively, for 4.1 and 2.8 % of the total enactments.

  90. 90.

    Accounting for 14.1 % of the total enactments.

  91. 91.

    See Sect. 1.2.

  92. 92.

    This calculation does not include the “Regional finances” macro-sector and the multi-sectoral laws because, in neither instance is it possible to attribute these laws, being of a composite nature, to either residual or concurrent powers.

  93. 93.

    Here again, this excludes the regulations governing the “Regional finances” macro-sector, and multi-sectoral regulations.

  94. 94.

    Caretti (2001b), p. 62. However, see also D’Atena (2002), who voiced fears and doubts regarding the use of regulations in the absence of adequate statutory provisions because they might interfere with the institutional balances, particularly during the transition.

  95. 95.

    The Puglia Region is a good example of this: in the space of 33 years (from 1972 to the end of the seventh Parliament) it issued 149 regulations, while in the eighth Parliament alone it issued 129.

  96. 96.

    This figure is bound to rise, albeit only slightly, by including the regulations issued from May to December 2000 within the same Parliamentary term (although no figures are available). The years in which the largest numbers of regulations were issued were 2003 in the seventh Parliamentary term and 2009 in the eighth, with 145 and 164 regulations, respectively. In 2003, Lombardia, Campania and Puglia issued the largest volume of regulations with 23, 19 and 17 regulations, respectively. However, in 2009, it was Puglia, Piemonte, Toscana and Calabria that made the greatest use of this source of law, issuing, respectively, 36, 22, 22 and 18 regulations. Lombardia never reached the 2003 figure again; in the eighth Parliamentary term, its largest output was in 2006 with ten regulations. However, in 2009 Calabria recorded the first significant figure since the promulgation of its Regional Statute in 2004; for in the years prior to 2009 the Region had only issued four regulations (in 2006 and 2008), six (in 2007) and seven (in 2005). The 2009 figure must therefore be monitored in the coming years, even though 2010 has already confirmed the tendency to make greater use of regulations; for the Calabria Region issued a further 18 regulations that year.

  97. 97.

    The breakdown of the figures reveals that, like the laws, the number of regulations issued varied considerably from one Region to another. To cite a few examples, Puglia issued 129 regulations compared with six in Veneto, which accounted, respectively, for 19.9 and 0.9 % of the total regulations issued, which varied very little from the situation in the seventh Parliamentary term in which Puglia once again headed the list with 66 regulations (14.6 %) with Veneto issuing only 11 regulations (2.4 %). In the eighth Parliamentary term, apart from Puglia as already mentioned, only the Toscana Region exceeded 15 % (15.5 %), while Piemonte and Lazio exceeded 10 % (12.8 and 12.2 %, respectively). The percentages for the other Regions varied from 6 to 9 % (Lombardia, Calabria and Umbria) followed by a group of between 2 and 5 % (Emilia-Romagna, Marche, Liguria, Basilicata and Campania).

  98. 98.

    For the individual regions, the percentages range between two extremes: 3.8 (Veneto) and 41.3 (Puglia). In the seventh Parliamentary term, the percentage range was between 6.4 for Veneto and 34.4 for Puglia.

  99. 99.

    “Agriculture” alone accounted for 28.8 %; if “hunting, fisheries and fish farming” (14.7 %) are taken into account, the total rural development area accounts for 43.5 % of the whole “economic development and productive activities” macro-sector.

  100. 100.

    With 34.5 % of the total regulations issued.

  101. 101.

    With 30.8 % of the total regulations issued.

  102. 102.

    With 26.7 % of the total regulations issued.

  103. 103.

    With 22.0 % of the total regulations issued.

  104. 104.

    With 20.9 % of the total regulations issued.

  105. 105.

    Con il 19.9 % of the total regulations issued.

  106. 106.

    For example, the statistics on the eighth Parliamentary term show that 4.2 % referred to “manufacturing”, 3.7 % to “support for innovation in production sectors” and “energy prospecting, transport and production”, 3.4 % to “civil protection”, 2.8 % to “education”, “cultural heritage and activities” and “sport”, 2.6 % to “professions”, and 2.1 % to “roads”.

  107. 107.

    Ronchetti (2009), p. 486.

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Correspondence to Aida Giulia Arabia .

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Arabia, A.G. (2014). Legislation by the Ordinary Statute Regions: Powers and Subjects. In: Mangiameli, S. (eds) Italian Regionalism: Between Unitary Traditions and Federal Processes. Essays on Federalism and Regionalism, vol 1. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-03765-3_7

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