Bisimulation for Single-Agent Plausibility Models

  • Mikkel Birkegaard Andersen
  • Thomas Bolander
  • Hans van Ditmarsch
  • Martin Holm Jensen
Part of the Lecture Notes in Computer Science book series (LNCS, volume 8272)


Epistemic plausibility models are Kripke models agents use to reason about the knowledge and beliefs of themselves and each other. Restricting ourselves to the single-agent case, we determine when such models are indistinguishable in the logical language containing conditional belief, i.e., we define a proper notion of bisimulation, and prove that bisimulation corresponds to logical equivalence on image-finite models. We relate our results to other epistemic notions, such as safe belief and degrees of belief. Our results imply that there are only finitely many non-bisimilar single-agent epistemic plausibility models on a finite set of propositions. This gives decidability for single-agent epistemic plausibility planning.


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© Springer International Publishing Switzerland 2013

Authors and Affiliations

  • Mikkel Birkegaard Andersen
    • 1
  • Thomas Bolander
    • 1
  • Hans van Ditmarsch
    • 2
  • Martin Holm Jensen
    • 1
  1. 1.DTU ComputeTechnical University of DenmarkDenmark
  2. 2.LORIA, CNRSUniversité de LorraineFrance

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