A Mechanism to Improve Efficiency for Negotiations with Incomplete Information

  • Quoc Bao Vo
Conference paper
Part of the Lecture Notes in Computer Science book series (LNCS, volume 8272)


Classic results in bargaining theory state that private information necessarily prevents the bargainers from reaping all possible gains from trade. In this paper we propose a mechanism for improving efficiency of negotiation outcome for multilateral negotiations with incomplete information. This objective is achieved by introducing biased distribution of resulting gains from trade to prevent bargainers from misrepresenting their valuations of the negotiation outcomes. Our mechanism is based on rewarding concession-making agents with larger shares of the obtainable surplus. We show that the likelihood for the negotiators to reach agreement is accordingly increased and the negotiation efficiency is improved.


Nash Equilibrium Private Information Bargaining Problem Negotiation Protocol Costly Delay 
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Copyright information

© Springer International Publishing Switzerland 2013

Authors and Affiliations

  • Quoc Bao Vo
    • 1
  1. 1.Faculty of Information & Communication TechnologiesSwinburne University of TechnologyMelbourneAustralia

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