Security Games with Ambiguous Information about Attacker Types

  • Youzhi Zhang
  • Xudong Luo
  • Wenjun Ma
Part of the Lecture Notes in Computer Science book series (LNCS, volume 8272)


There has been significant recent interest in security games, which are used to solve the problems of limited security resource allocation. In particular, the research focus is on the Bayesian Stackelberg game model with incomplete information about players’ types. However, in real life, the information in such a game is often not only incomplete but also ambiguous for lack of sufficient evidence, i.e., the defender could not precisely have the probability of each type of the attacker. To address this issue, we define a new kind of security games with ambiguous information about the attacker’s types. In this paper, we also propose an algorithm to find the optimal mixed strategy for the defender and analyse the computational complexity of the algorithm. Finally, we do lots of experiments to evaluate that our model.


Mass Function Mixed Strategy Attack Type Stackelberg Game Focal Element 
These keywords were added by machine and not by the authors. This process is experimental and the keywords may be updated as the learning algorithm improves.


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Copyright information

© Springer International Publishing Switzerland 2013

Authors and Affiliations

  • Youzhi Zhang
    • 1
  • Xudong Luo
    • 1
  • Wenjun Ma
    • 2
  1. 1.Institute of Logic and CognitionSun Yat-sen UniversityGuangzhouChina
  2. 2.School of Electronics, Electrical Engineering and Computer ScienceQueen’s University BelfastBelfastUK

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