Abstract
The increasing proliferation of ballistic missiles and weapons of mass destruction poses new risks worldwide. For a threatened nation and given the characteristics of this threat a layered ballistic missile defence system strategy appears to be the preferred solution. However, such a strategy involves negotiations with other nations concerning the use of their defence systems as part of the layered defence system. This paper introduces the Cooperative Ballistic Missile Defense Game, \(\mathcal{CBMDG}\), to support the strategic negotiations between a threatened nation and the possible coalition nations. The model determines the assignment of ballistic missile interceptors to the coalition nations that minimizes the expected number of interceptors required to achieve the desired defence level in case of an attack. Simultaneously, it identifies the bargaining strength of each coalition of nations, in order to determine the compensation for participating in the layered defence system to protect the threatened nation.
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Evers, L., Barros, A.I., Monsuur, H. (2013). The Cooperative Ballistic Missile Defence Game. In: Das, S.K., Nita-Rotaru, C., Kantarcioglu, M. (eds) Decision and Game Theory for Security. GameSec 2013. Lecture Notes in Computer Science, vol 8252. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-02786-9_6
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-02786-9_6
Publisher Name: Springer, Cham
Print ISBN: 978-3-319-02785-2
Online ISBN: 978-3-319-02786-9
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