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Time-Stealer: A Stealthy Threat for Virtualization Scheduler and Its Countermeasures

Conference paper
Part of the Lecture Notes in Computer Science book series (LNCS, volume 8233)

Abstract

Third-party Cloud Computing, Amazon’s Elastic Compute Cloud (EC2) for instance, provides Infrastructure as a Service (IaaS) solutions that pack multiple customer virtual machines (VMs) onto the same physical server with hardware virtualization technology. Xen is widely used in virtualization which charges VMs by wall clock time rather than resources consumed. Under this model, manipulation of the scheduler vulnerability may allow theft-of-service at the expense of other customers.

Recent research has shown that attacker’s VM can consume more CPU time than fair share on Amazon EC2 in that Xen 3.x default Credit Scheduler’s resolution was rather coarse. Although considerable changes have been made in Xen 4.x Credit Scheduler to improve the performance in case of such stealing attacks, we’ve found another alternative attack called Time-Stealer which can obtain up to 96.6% CPU cycles stealthily under some circumstances on XenServer6.0.2 platform by analyzing the source code thoroughly. Detection methods using benchmarks as well as a series of countermeasures are proposed and experimental results have demonstrated the effectiveness of these defense techniques.

Keywords

Cloud Computing Virtualization Xen Credit Scheduler vulnerability 

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Copyright information

© Springer International Publishing Switzerland 2013

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.State Key Laboratory of Complex Electromagnetic Environment Effects on Electronics and Information SystemNational University of Defense TechnologyChangshaChina

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