Remote Attestation Mechanism for User Centric Smart Cards Using Pseudorandom Number Generators

Conference paper
Part of the Lecture Notes in Computer Science book series (LNCS, volume 8233)


User Centric Smart Card Ownership Model (UCOM) gives the “freedom of choice” of respective applications to the smart card users. The user-centric architecture requires a trusted entity to be present on the smart card to provide security assurance and validation to the requesting application providers. In this paper, we propose the inclusion of a trusted computing platform for smart cards that we refer as the Trusted Environment & Execution Manager (TEM). This is followed by the rationale behind the changes to the traditional smart card architecture to accommodate the remote security assurance and validation mechanism. We propose an attestation protocol that provides an on-demand security validation of a smart card by its respective manufacturer. Finally, the attestation protocol is informally analysed, and its test implementation and performance measurements are presented.


Smart Card Advance Encryption Standard Communicate Sequential Process Physical Unclonable Function Security Assurance 
These keywords were added by machine and not by the authors. This process is experimental and the keywords may be updated as the learning algorithm improves.


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Copyright information

© Springer International Publishing Switzerland 2013

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.Cyber Security Lab, Department of Computer ScienceUniversity of WaikatoHamiltonNew Zealand
  2. 2.ISG Smart card CentreRoyal Holloway, University of LondonSurreyUnited Kingdom

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