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A Covert Channel Using Event Channel State on Xen Hypervisor

Conference paper
Part of the Lecture Notes in Computer Science book series (LNCS, volume 8233)

Abstract

Covert channel between virtual machines is one of serious threats to cloud computing, since it will break the isolation of guest OSs. Even if a lot of work has been done to resist covert channels, new covert channels still emerge in various manners. In this paper, we introduce event channel mechanism in detail. Then we develop a covert channel called CCECS(Covert Channel using Event Channel State) and implement it on Xen hypervisor. Finally we quantitatively evaluate CCECS and discuss the possible mitigation methods. Results show that it can achieve larger bit rate than most existing covert channels.

Keywords

Covert Channel Virtualization Event Channel 

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Copyright information

© Springer International Publishing Switzerland 2013

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.School of Software and MicroelectronicsPeking UniversityBeijingChina
  2. 2.MoE Key Lab of Network and Software AssurancePeking UniversityBeijingChina
  3. 3.Institue of SoftwareChinese Academy of SciencesBeijingChina

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