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On a Game-Theoretic Model of Environmental Pollution Problem

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Advances in Dynamic Games

Part of the book series: Annals of the International Society of Dynamic Games ((AISDG,volume 13))

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Abstract

We consider a dynamic conflict model of environmental pollution in which n enterprises contaminate a water reservoir by dumping a pollutant in the production process. This process is formalized by the n-person differential game with separated dynamics and continuous payoff functions. The existence of the \(\varepsilon\)-Nash equilibrium for the class of the piecewise-programmed strategies is proved in this game. Some numerical examples are presented.

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Acknowledgements

This work was partly supported by grant No. 4402 of the Ministry of Education and Science of the Russian Federation. The author would like to thank Prof. O. A. Malafeyev, Prof. S. G. Pyatkov, and Prof. N. D. Botkin for helpful suggestions and discussions.

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Correspondence to Marianna Troeva .

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Troeva, M., Lukin, V. (2013). On a Game-Theoretic Model of Environmental Pollution Problem. In: Křivan, V., Zaccour, G. (eds) Advances in Dynamic Games. Annals of the International Society of Dynamic Games, vol 13. Birkhäuser, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-02690-9_11

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