Abstract
On the Ontology and Doctrine of Appearance of the Real External World (1916) is the first publication from a vast corpus of writings by Hedwig Conrad-Martius (CM), a phenomenologist from the Munich School. The phenomenon of “the real external world” encloses within itself everything that “exists outside” (Daraußenseinde) and that is “of the external world” (Außenweltliches). The “self-presentation” that deeply characterizes the sensory givenness is an essential foundation in the phenomenon of the reality, to the extent that it distinguishes it from everything that “lacks a Being- for-itself” and thus misses what might be presented externally. Although sensory appearance is not itself the totality of the external world, CM determines that the pure observation of what the sensory appearance presents by itself and in itself, and not of what is above and beyond it, provides the “framework for the whole” of the research, since by sensory presentation “the book of the real world is being opened”. The paper proposes a critical explication of both constitutive phenomena of the sensory givenness, “feeling’s givenness” and “manifest appearance givenness”, and suggests a metaphysical interpretation that explicates them in terms of the relation between immanence and transcendence that seems to be a key to the understanding the phenomenology of reality that that unifies the entirety of CM’s writings.
This is a preview of subscription content, log in via an institution to check access.
Access this chapter
Tax calculation will be finalised at checkout
Purchases are for personal use only
Notes
- 1.
Hedwig Conrad-Martius, “Zur Ontologie und Erscheinungslehre der realen Außenwelt” [1913], in Jahrbuch für Philosophie und phänomenologische Forschung 3 (1916), pp. 353–354. References to this book are given in the body text. Bolds in citations follow the original. In the works of CM, the year mentioned first is the year of the work’s writing, while the second year denotes the year of publication. Archive materials are taken from the Munich Estate Archive, Die Nachllässe der Münchener Phänomenologen, Die Bayerische Staatsbibliotheck, München (BSM, Nachlass). CM explains that the title Doctrine of Appearance refers to an object domain that is between “nature” and “life’s essence” in which the human subject is CM, Zur Ontologie und Erscheinungslehre der realen Auβenwelt”, pp. 345–542, n. 1). However, the aspect of the nature as such remains in this book as a latent layer that will be revealed only in her later writings. See in particular: Hedwig Conrad-Martius, Der Selbstaufbau Der Natur, Entelechien und Energien (Munich: Kösel-Verlag, 1961). Doctrine of Appearance is an exploration of the first chapter in her first essay (Hedwig Conrad-Martius, Die erkenntnistheoretischen Grundlagen des Positivismus [1912] (Bergzabern: Heinrich Müller, 1920). pp. 10–24), that received an award from the department of philosophy at the University of Göttingen. The subtitle “associated with a critique of positivistic theories”, as well as the debate with positivism throughout the text (CM, “Zur Ontologie und Erscheinungslehre der realen Auβenwelt”, pp. 345–347; 352; 357–358; 361–365; 378; 382–386; 390–391; 398–400; 423; 425) clearly indicate its roots in the first essay. In 1912 Alexander Pfänder recognized Doctrine of Appearance as a Ph.D. thesis in the University of Munich (Ursula Avé-Lallemant, “Hedwig Conrad Martuis”, in Jahrbuch der Evangelischen Akademie Tutzing XV (1965/1966), p. 212). In 1913, the expanded chapter of the award-winning essay was printed and submitted as a dissertation, in a version almost identical to Doctrine of Appearance. In the epilogue to the special print in 1920 (Hedwig Conrad-Martius, Die erkenntnistheoretischen Grundlagen des Positivismus, pp. 130–131), CM referred to this fact and explained that she left behind the direction of criticism of positivism in favor of an ontological direction. Indeed, the plan to elaborate the rest of the chapters has never been carried out. Eberhard Avé-Lallemant, CM’s assistant, estate curator, collector, and editor of her published writings told me (conversation, Munich, July 4th, 2003) that the publication of Doctrine of Appearance in 1913 was well received at the time.
- 2.
The Munich Circle included a group of intellectuals and philosophers from Munich, the first generation of the phenomenologists, whose prominent members included: Alexander Pfänder, Johannes Daubert, Moritz Geiger, Theodor Conrad, Adolf Reinach, Dietrich von Hildebrand, Maximilian Beck, Max Scheler, Jean Hering, Alexander Koyré, Roman Ingarden, Edith Stein, and Hedwig Conrad-Martuis. For further reading about this circle see: Eberhard Avé-Lallemant, Phänomenologie und Realität: Vergleichende Untersuchungen zur ‘München-Gittinger’ und ‘Freiburger’ Phänomenologie (Habilitationsschrift) (Munich, 1971), pp. 19–38.
- 3.
Alexanader Pfänder, cited from Eberhard Avé-Lallemant, “Die phänomenologische Bewegung. Ursprung, Anfänge und Ausblick”, in Hans Reiner Sepp (ed.), Edmund Husserl und die phänomenologische Bewegung (Freiburg/Munich: Alber, 1988), p. 69.
- 4.
Jean Hering, cited from Franz Georg Schmücker, Die Phänomenologie als Methode der Wesenerkenntnis, unter besondere Berücksichtigung der Auffassung der München-Göttinger Phänomenologenchule (Dissertation) (München: 1956), p. 32.
- 5.
Hedwig Conrad-Martius, “Naturwissenschaft und Naturphilosophie” [1950], in Schriften zur Philosophie, 3 vols. (Munich: Kösel-Verlag, 1964), Vol. 2, p. 4. Also in Doctrine of Appearance, CM argues that no matter how we characterize the phenomenological investigation, it will never define in advance its mission and the essence belonging to the matter under discussion (CM, “Zur Ontologie und Erscheinungslehre der realen Außenwelt”, p. 354, n. 1). See also Edmund Husserl, Ideen zu einer reiner Phänomenologie und phänomenologischen Philosophie, Husserliana III (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1950), §63. For the realist phenomenologists the main point is that definitions indeed do not meet the object itself. For further discussion of the differences between a defending approach and “intuition of essence”, see: Gerhard Ebel, Untersuchungen zu einer Realistischen Grundlegung der Phänomenologischen Wesensschau (Dissertation) (Munich, 1965), pp. 19–15.
- 6.
Edmund Husserl, Logische Untersuchungen II (Hamburg: Felix Meiner Verlag, 2009), p. 19, p. 22. This saying is widely discussed, see for example: Josef Seifert, “Was ist Philosophie? Die Antwort der Realistische Phänomenologie”, in Zeitschrift für Philosophische Forschung 49/3 (1995), pp. 92–98; Helmut Kuhn, “Phänomenologie und Realität”, in Zeitschrift für Philosophische Forschung 23/3 (1969), pp. 397–399.
- 7.
The early phenomenologists were inspired by Husserl’s struggle in “Logical Investigations” against psychologism, relativism, and varying reductionism (Edmund Husserl, Logische Untersuchungen I, p. 81, p. 117), in particular by his principle that it is possible to observe consciousness’ condition apart from the thinking subject (Edmund Husserl, Logische Untersuchungen I, p. 240). See also: Franz Georg Schmücker, Die Phänomenologie als Methode der Wesenerkenntnis, unter besondere Berücksichtigung der Auffassung der München-Göttinger Phänomenologenchule, p. 31; Gerda Walther, Phänomenologie der Mystik (Olten: Freiburg im Breisgau, 1955), p. 190. CM admits the influence of “Logical Investigations” on her (CM, “Zur Ontologie und Erscheinungslehre der realen Außenwelt”, p. 355, n. 1). The principles of the object’s oriented observation were phrased by Hering (Jean Hering, “Bemerkung über das Wesen, die Wesenheit und die Idee”, in Jahrbuch für Philosophie und phänomenologische Forschung VI (1921), p. 496). For a detailed discussion of this observation in regard to the Munich Circle, see: Eberhard Avé-Lallemant, Phänomenologie und Realität: Vergleichende Untersuchungen zur ‘München-Göttinger’ und ‘Freiburger’ Phänomenologie, pp. 89–105; Schmücker, op. cit., pp. 3–8.
- 8.
Alexandra Elisabeth Pfeifer, Hedwig Conrad-Martuis, Eine Phänomenologische sicht auf Nature und Welt (Würzburg: Orbis Phenomenologicus, Königshausen & Neumann, 2005), p. 15; Eberhard Avé-Lallemant, query “Hedwig Conrad-Martius (1888–1966): Phenomenology and Reality’, in Herbert Spiegelberg (ed.), The Phenomenological Movement: A Historical Introduction (3rd ed., The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1982), p. 212.
- 9.
Walther, op. cit., p. 21.
- 10.
Adolf Reinach, Was ist Phänomenologie (Munich: Kösel-Verlag, 1951), pp. 71–73.
- 11.
Wilhelm Schapp, Beiträge zur Phänomenologie der Wahrnehmung (Göttingen: Kaestner, 1910), p. 12.
- 12.
Hedwig Conrad-Martius, “Über das Wesen des Wesens” [1956], in Schriften zur Philosophie, 3 vols. (Munich: Kösel-Verlag, 1965), Vol. 3, p. 347.
- 13.
Hedwig Conrad-Martius, “Phänomenologie und Spekulation” [1956], in Schriften zur Philosophie, 3 vols. (Munich: Kösel-Verlag, 1965), Vol. 3, p. 377.
- 14.
For further reading about the method of “intuition of essence”, especially in the realistic school of phenomenology, see: Adolf Reinach, Die apriorischen Grundlagen des bürgerlichen Rechtes (2nd ed., Halle: Max Niemeyer, 1913), pp. 1–163; Alexander Pfänder, “Zur Psychologie der Gesinnung”, in Jahrbuch für Philosophie und Phänomenologische Forschung 1 (1913), pp. 325–404; Pfeiffer, op. cit., pp. 27–35; Schmücker, op. cit., pp. 1–33; Ebel, op. cit., pp. 1–25.
- 15.
Similarly to CM, Friz Heinemann also wrote about the affinity of phenomenology to the concrete being. He mentioned another essay by CM (“Phänomenologie und Spekulation”) but surprisingly not “Zur Ontologie und Erscheinungslehre der realen Auβenwelt”, in which she established this theme.
- 16.
CM hardly mentions other philosophers who dealt with the theme of the external world. Besides her, also Roman Ingarden, another realist phenomenologist, has discussed this issue. See: Roman Ingarden, Der Streit um die Existenz der Welt, vol. 1, Existenzialontologie, (Tübingen: Max Niemeyer, 1964). On his approach to the essences, see: Roman Ingarden, “Essentiale Fragen”, in Jahrbuch für Philosophie und phänomenoligische Forschung 7 (1925), pp. 125–304. Franz Josef Brecht criticised the realistic orientation of the Munich Circle for not dealing with the problem of transcendentalism. See: Franz Josef Brecht, Bewußtsein und Existenz: Wesen und Weg der Phänomenologie (Habilitationsschrift) (Bremen: J. Storm, 1948), p. 42 n. 2. However, this judgment cannot be addressed to CM, who dealt with it early in 1916.
- 17.
This argument is valid also for the research that dealt with CM’s understanding of the world (see for example: Angela Ales Bello, “The Controversy about the Existence of the World in Edmund Husserl’s Phenomenological School: A. Reinach, R. Ingarden, H. Conrad-Martius, E. Stein”, in Analecta Husserliana LXXIX (2004), pp. 97–115). Exceptions to this are Schmücker, who mentioned it as a “decisive breakthrough” (Schmücker, op. cit., p. 39, n. 1) and Ebel, who mentioned it four times in his dissertation (see: Ebel, op. cit., p. 16, n. 42; p. 17; p. 22 n. 48; p. 42). Still, neither of them delivered a systematic and comprehensive discussion of the issues at stake in this essay.
- 18.
For the “semblance of reality” typical for perception’s objects, see: CM, “Zur Ontologie und Erscheinungslehre der realen Außenwelt”, p. 380.
- 19.
Kuhn, op. cit., p. 399. See in this context Husserl’s argument that alongside the grounding of the value of the original givenness there is also an acknowledging that things are given to us under restriction (Husserl, Ideen zu einer reiner Phänomenologie und phänomenologischen Philosophie, I, β24, “The principle of all principles”).
- 20.
See in particular CM, “Zur Ontologie und Erscheinungslehre der realen Außenwelt”, pp. 355, 370, 398, 407, 413, 418, 423, 446, 496, 500, 513. Husserl regarded skepticism as a denial of apodicticity, i.e., necessary and universal truths that are essential for any theory to make sense. He distinguished between three forms of skepticism: “logical”, “noetic”, and “metaphysical”. See: Husserl, Logische Untersuchungen, I, Chap. 10, §57–§61. As for Husserl, so also for CM in Doctrine of Appearance the metaphysical skepticism that denies the objective knowledge of the real world is the most problematic. For further discussion, see: Brice R.Wachterhauser, “Introduction: the Shipwreck of Apodicticity? ”, in James M. Edie and Brice R. Wachterhauser (eds.), Phenomenology and Skepticism: Essays in Honor of James M. Edie, (Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 1996), pp. 1–62, 227–238. Regarding Husserl’s certitude, see: Leszek Kolakowski, Husserl and the Search for Certitude (New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 1975).
- 21.
CM criticizes skepticism in the context of positivism, see: CM, “Zur Ontologie und Erscheinungslehre der realen Außenwelt”, p. 398, p. 358.
- 22.
Regarding dogmatisms, see also: CM, “Zur Ontologie und Erscheinungslehre der realen Außenwelt”, p. 347.
- 23.
CM explains that it is a mistake (quite common in positivistic approaches) to identify “existence’s independence of consciousness” with the “real external world”, see: CM, “Zur Ontologie und Erscheinungslehre der realen Außenwelt”, p. 391.
- 24.
The distinction between the natural and reflexive approaches recalls Husserl’s division between the natural attitude and the phenomenological one (Husserl, Ideen zu einer reiner Phänomenologie und phänomenologischen Philosophie, I, pp. 3–15), except that Husserl directed the reflexive approach to the transcendental subject and founded upon it the phenomenological reduction. However, similar to the early phenomenologists (see: Helmuth Plessner, “Bei Husserl in Göttingen, in H.L.Van Breda and J. Taminiaux (eds.), Edmund Husserl 1859–1959: Recueil commémoratif publié à l’occasion du centenaire de la naissance du philosophe (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1959), p. 38; Otto Pöggeler, “Eine Epoche gewaltigen Werdens”, in Otto Pöggeler, Ernst Wolfgang Orth et al. (eds.), Die Freiburger Phänomenologie (Freiburg/Munich: K. Alber, 1996), pp. 15–17), CM’s approach was directed towards the object, and later on she will explicitly reject the phenomenological reduction. See: CM, “Seinsphilosophie” [1931], in Schriften zur Philosophie, 3 vols. (Munich: Kösel-Verlag, 1963), Vol. 1, p. 17; CM, “Die transzendentale und die ontologische Phänomenologie” [1958], in Schriften zur Philosophie, 3 vols. (Munich: Kösel-Verlag, 1965), Vol. 3, pp. 394–402.
- 25.
Like CM, Spiegelberg also argues that genuine phenomena are not influenced by theoretical or other interpretations, while untrue ones collapse as soon as their falsification is uncovered. See: Spiegelberg, op. cit., p. 164. Spiegelberg’s ideas in this essay closely resemble those of CM in Doctrine of Appearance. Obviously he was familiar with her work, but surprisingly neither Doctrine of Appearance nor any of CM’s later writings are even mentioned in his essay. However, Spiegelberg provides the lacking but important background and explanation of CM’s principles of realism. I will point to the main similarities in the notes below.
- 26.
This argument is supported by a detailed discussion of two types of representation (CM, “Zur Ontologie und Erscheinungslehre der realen Außenwelt”, pp. 361–378). For further reading, see Heinemann’s discussion of the relation between “experience” (chaotic in its concrete manifestations) and “appearance” (the dynamic dimension in the static, the unshaped that becomes shaped) (Heinemann, op. cit., p. 188).
- 27.
In her later writings, CM continued to deal with affinity between the suchness of the object and its substantial being, see: CM, Das Sein (Munich: Kösel-Verlag, 1957), p. 57. See Gerhard Ebel’s criticism of the realistic direction in phenomenology, including CM’s, for not being able to produce a genuine realism, and instead turns reality into a sheer “phenomenon” of reality, which is therefore especially not real (Ebel, op. cit., p. 2). Ebel admits that CM brought to the fore aspects unnoticed by the realistic school. Yet in his opinion these are insufficient (ibid, p. 42). For supportive evaluation of this school for suggesting the suchness-experience alternative, see: Seifert, op. cit., pp. 97–98. Like Seifert, Heinemann also speaks for the value of phenomenology’s focus on appearance, see: Heinemann, op. cit.
- 28.
A comparison of CM and Heidegger in Being and Time, is crucial for the understanding of the novelty of CM’s idea of transcendentalism in Doctrine of Appearance and later in her entire writings. Yet this exceeds the scope of this article. CM criticized Heidegger in several contexts. See: CM, Die Zeit (Munich: Kösel-Verlag, 1954), pp. 13–31; CM, “Heidegger ‘Sein und Zeit’, Metaphysische Quellpunkte” [1930], in BSM, Nachlass, AIII6a, pp. 1–42; CM, “Heidegger ‘Sein und Zeit’ ” [1932], in Schriften zur Philosophie, 3 vols. (Munich: Kösel-Verlag, 1963), Vol. 1, pp. 185–193. For further reading, see: Wolfgang Behler, Realität und Ek-Sistenz, Auseinandersetzung mit der Konzeption Martin Heidegger in Konfrontation mit der ontologischen Schriften von Hedwig Conrad–Martius (Dissertation) (Frankfurt am Main, 1956).
- 29.
Schmücker, op. cit., p. 39. The intensive dealing with senses and their relation to consciousness apparently raises the expectation for a dialogue with Kant and other philosophers who dealt with the issue. Yet Kant is mentioned only one time, see: CM, “Zur Ontologie und Erscheinungslehre der realen Außenwelt”, p. 487.
- 30.
CM deals with the problem of the subject in several contexts, see: CM, “Die Problematik des Subjekts” [1932], in BSM, Nachlass, AIII8a, pp. 1–35; CM, “Existentialle Tiefe und Untiefe von Dasein und Ich” [1934], in Schriften zur Philosophie, 3 vols., (Munich: Kösel-Verlag, 1963), Vol. 1, pp. 185–193; CM, “Dasein, Substantialität, Seele” [1932], in Schriften zur Philosophie, 3 vols., (Munich: Kösel-Verlag, 1963), Vol. 1, pp. 194–227; CM, Das Sein, pp. 118–141; CM, Die Ziet, pp. 13–31; CM, “Heidegger ‘Sein und Zeit’, Metaphysische Quellpunkte”; CM, “Heidegger ‘Sein und Zeit’”.
- 31.
Herman Krings, who is admittedly influenced by CM, explains that the focus on object as a real existing being is not simply equivalent to the inversion of the Kantian beginning in which the I directs itself to consciousness. Here we assume that there is a real relation between the existent and the essence referring to it. Yet this assumption does not contain an argument about the possibility of knowing this existent, see: Krings, op. cit., pp. 193–195.
- 32.
Like CM, Spiegelberg also provides a justification for relying on sensory givens within a realistic approach. He argues that a critical and phenomenological inspection of the immediate phenomena of reality will remove the most frequent objections to the reliability of perceiving that is mediated by senses. See: Spiegelberg, op. cit., p. 153.
- 33.
Spiegelberg explains that a phenomenon and reality do not exclude each other, namely: what is real exists within itself and can be presented to us in its very existence out of itself. This means that real things in the world can remain exactly as they are, including in case of being presented and having relation to us. He designates the phenomena in which subjects are involved “subjectival”, not in the sense that they are not real or that they mislead us, but as objective parts of subjects and of their world. See: Spiegelberg, op. cit., pp.134–135. Moreover, in his opinion, the reality of subjectival phenomena is totally evident (ibid, p. 149). However the subjectival reality covers only a small part of our total reality and of Being in general (ibid, p. 135).
- 34.
Similarly, Spiegelberg argues that the reality of non-subjectival phenomena of reality can never eliminate the possibility of an illusion or a mistake (Spiegelberg, op. cit., pp. 137), hence they are always doubtful. However, despite examinations, illusions “do occur and are bound to occur” and thus present non-subjectival phenomena as dubious. In his opinion, “one principle reason for such dubiousness consist in ultimate mutual inconsistencies between our various phenomena or reality” (ibid, p. 153), and only constructive synthesis of non-subjectival phenomena of reality might achieve certainty, though not complete. Yet he determined that “it is all we can reasonably expect, considering the nature of non-subjectival reality, our own predicament, and the nature of our cognition and understanding” (ibid, p. 163).
- 35.
The early phenomenologists understood Husserl’s appeal “to return to the things themselves” as indifference towards epistemological questions. See: Ursula Avé-Lallemant, op. cit., p. 207. For the relations between phenomenology and epistemology and phenomenology, see: Spiegelberg, op. cit., pp. 130–131. Like CM, who characterized the epistemological approach as dogmatic (CM, “Zur Ontologie und Erscheinungslehre der realen Außenwelt”, p. 347) and incapable of coping with its questions (Spiegelberg, op. cit., p. 351), Spiegelberg too criticized epistemology, which in its highly speculative accounts of how knowledge works omits its first and paramount obligation to be critical itself (ibid, p. 152).
- 36.
Like CM, Spiegelberg too emphasized the ‘argument of reality’ that is inherent in the real being. In this context, he designated as a “phenomenon of reality” the joining together of self-presenting of the phenomenal object and its arguing for being real. Therefore, reality’s phenomenon is distinguished from all the “bare phenomena” that do not claim to be real. See: Spiegelberg, op. cit., p. 133. However, Heidegger did not pose this demand, but understood the phenomenon as showing itself. See: Heidegger, Martin Heidegger, Sein und Zeit (19th ed., Tübingen: Max Niemeyer, 2006), Chap. 27.
- 37.
Spiegelberg explains that the very independence of the subject should not be considered as the essence of reality but as a “fundamental and essential result of reality” (excluding real acts of the subject that of course depend on him or her). See: Spiegelberg, op. cit., p. 132, n. 2.
- 38.
The world “Qualia” signifies the subjective content’s experience of mental situations. The subjective aspect seems to resist any intra-subjective definition. Thomas Nagel characterizes “Qualia” as what “feels itself in a certain manner” (see: Thomas Nagel, “What is it like to be a bat?”, in The Philosophical Review 83/4 (October 1974), pp. 435–450). Obviously, this characterization cannot be considered as ultimately valid, because it assumes that the content of the subjective experience has already been understood. Unlike CM, many philosophers deprived “Qualia” of reality. For example, see: Daniel Dennett, “Quining Qualia”, in Anthony Marcel and Edoardo Bisiach (eds.), Consciousness in Contemporary Science (Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1993), pp. 42–77). Yet other philosophers as well as scientists regard the content of the subjective experience as undoubted. See: Ansgar Beckermann, Analytische Einführung in die Philosophie des Geistes (2nd ed., Berlin: De Gruyter, 2001). For further reading see: Clarence Irving Lewis, Mind and the World Order: Outline of a Theory of Knowledge (3rd ed., New York, Dover, 1991).
- 39.
Spiegelberg presents the probe-resistance of objects to our will as an indication, sometimes even a strong one, of their reality, see: Spiegelberg, op. cit., p. 148.
- 40.
CM clarifies that the novelty is not that such an approach might be misleading, but that the foundation of this experience is “‘in truth’ not in the belief that material sensibility has direct relations to the external world” (433), but in the actuality of these relations.
- 41.
Also at the present point, Heinemann’s words recall those of CM. In his opinion, the primordial phenomenon of man is not that of consciousness but of appearance, namely entering into the appearance and changing within it (man lives in pictures before he knows that). In contrast, consciousness is an epiphenomenon, an ex-post-facto phenomenon, a reflexive act that exists only after appearances collapse. Therefore, he designates, exactly like CM, phenomenology as a “Doctrine of Appearance”, see: Heinemann, op. cit., pp. 186–187.
- 42.
Spiegelberg characterized the peripheral field of our perception as “marginal openness”, meaning that this field is never cut as sharply as its borders. However, he emphasized that peripherality does not designate non-reality. What we perceive at the periphery of field of perception are not only vague configurations, but mostly well-defined structures that are presented in decreased clarity. More importantly, we can still see via these modifications the phenomenon itself in its uninfluenced structure, rather than the structural openness of what is given in our perception’s field. This implies that reality does not culminate at the borders of our perception, but continues beyond that. Openness teaches that the phenomena of reality stand on their own feet. See: Spiegelberg, op. cit., p. 147.
- 43.
One of the arguments typical of the realistic approach in phenomenology deals with the difference in time between Being and being perceived. See: Moritz Geiger, Die Wirklichkeit der Wissenschaften und die Mataphysik (Bonn: F. Cohen, 1930), p. 170. Spiegelberg contended that “in principle, the situation is the same in all cases of sense-perception […which] can never give what is present, but only what has just passed. And since the past no longer exists, we can never see the original object itself but only its ‘trace’ which means its cast or likeness”, Spiegelberg, op. cit., pp. 156–157.
- 44.
CM exemplifies the questions with which such a future study must cope, meaning: What is the nature of the I that allows itself to be framed by the bodily-entity and thus be restricted by it? How do the relations between the I depict themselves phenomenally? (CM, “Zur Ontologie und Erscheinungslehre der realen Außenwelt”, pp. 541–542).
- 45.
The discussion will refer to beings that appear in rigorous objectivity only, and not to what CM designates as the “loose givenness of manifest felt-being” (CM, “Zur Ontologie und Erscheinungslehre der realen Außenwelt”, p. 504ff), which remains marginal in Doctrine of Appearance.
- 46.
See in the context: Husserl, Logische Untersuchun gen II, p. 254.
- 47.
The objective closedness and shape can also describe a real moment that is not self-standing but needs to be filled inside another being in order to be able to appear concretely. This is the wide idea of objectivity. However, the narrower one, which according to CM is genuine, refers to a self-standing object. In other words, every object has an object-adhering being. But not everything that has such a being is purely for this reason an object in the narrow sense (CM, “Zur Ontologie und Erscheinungslehre der realen Außenwelt”, pp. 475–476).
- 48.
One should distinguish between the term “play” here that does not express a reduction from the reality of the appearance and the “play on the reality of objects” that is typical of the perceptive attitude that indicates the weakness of its reality dimension, CM, “Zur Ontologie und Erscheinungslehre der realen Außenwelt”, p. 379.
- 49.
Spiegelberg’s determinations, according to which “Ultimately, all these organs are themselves phenomena of reality and so are the causal links between them” illuminates the problem with which CM deals here as follows: “Is there a way back […] from the retina via the cortex and the mental processes to the original object outside which supposedly started the whole chain of physical and physiological processes?”. This problem “makes sense only on the assumption that the physical objects, as the ‘stimuli’ for our sense perception, our sense organs, and the physiological process within, are ascertained realities (…and) as long as it is possible to know some real objects themselves” (Spiegelberg, op. cit., pp. 150–151).
- 50.
See: CM, “Zur Ontologie und Erscheinungslehre der realen Außenwelt”, p. 373, pp. 395–396.
- 51.
Elsewhere I discussed in length the relation between immanence and transcendence, see: Ronny Miron, Karl Jaspers: From Selfhood to Being (Amsterdam/New York: Rodopi, 2012), p. 207.
- 52.
Similar to Husserl, who rejected what he designated in “Logical Investigations” as “positive sciences” that prefer facts to essences (Husserl, Logische Untersuchungen I, 81, 117; Husserl, Ideen zu einer reiner Phänomenologie und phänomenologischen Philosophie, I, §3), CM too binds the rejection of facts together with preference of essences. For further reading regarding Husserl, see: Jitendra Nath Mohanty, Phenomenology: Between Essentialism and Transcendental Philosophy (Evanston, Illinois: Northwestern University Press, 1977), pp. 3–5; Robert Sokolowski, Introduction to Phenomenology (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2000), pp. 9–10. For further reading, see Spiegelberg’s distinction between “critical realism” and “critical phenomenological realism”. The first “does not grant reality to any of the phenomena but tries to infer a real world different from the one presented to us”, while overlooking “that a world beyond all appearances would of necessity remain inaccessible to us”. This kind of realism “seems to be unable to cope adequately with the constant conflict among non-subjectival phenomena of reality”. The second “does not transcend the phenomena of reality but either merely (…) strives for an integration of the phenomenal field by filling gaps left by a ‘naïve’ phenomenological realism that relies exclusively on isolated phenomena of reality”, Spiegelberg, op. cit., pp. 165–166. (see also: Herbert Spiegelberg, “Three Types of the Given: The Encountered, the Search-found and the Striking”, in Jitendra Nath Mohanty and Karl Schumann (eds.), Husserl Studies 1 (1984), pp. 69–78).
- 53.
Undoubtedly these phrases serve as founding stones in the investigation of the transcendental aspects that are involved in CM’s realistic philosophy. Actually these appear to provide the essential infrastructure for CM’s later idea of the subject, as she moved away from dealing with the phenomenology of the external world.
- 54.
In ‘Realontologie’, the first essay that appeared after Doctrine of Appearance, CM will clearly distinguish between the idea of transcendence upon which her realistic approach is based and the mistaken one. The first designates a “continuing maintaining” ( fortdaurende Erhaltung) of the real thing in its real being that is established by-itself and in-itself. The second is characterized as fragile and suffering from possible dependence on immanence because of its rootedness in the human spirit, see: CM, Realontologie [1923], special print in Jahrbuch für Philosophie und phänomenologische Forschung VI (Halle: Max Niemeyer, 1924), §26, pp. 185–186.
- 55.
Throughout Doctrine of Appearance, CM stresses her rejection of the metaphysical approach as being unjustified (CM, “Zur Ontologie und Erscheinungslehre der realen Außenwelt”, p. 346, p. 348) and unnecessary for her study (ibid., pp. 355–356). Later on, she will not reject metaphysics but argue that the presumption of the existence of the real world is an indispensable condition without which there is no metaphysics at all, see: CM, “Was ist Metaphysik?” [1931], in Schriften zur Philosophie, vol. 1(Munich: Kösel-Verlag, 1963), Vol. 1, p. 38. This argument is repeated also in: CM, “Bemerkungen über Metaphysik und ihre methodische Stelle” [1932], in Schriften zur Philosophie, (Munich: Kösel-Verlag, 1963), Vol. 1, pp. 49–88; CM, “Die fundamentale Bedeutung eines substantiallen Seinsbegriffs für eine theistische Metaphysik” [1931], in Schriften zur Philosophie, vol. 1 (Munich, Kösel-Verlag, 1963), Vol. 1, pp. 257–267.
- 56.
Spiegelberg presents the non-dependence as an indication of the reality of phenomenal objects if not even of their total independence. See: Spiegelberg, op. cit., pp. 147–148.
Author information
Authors and Affiliations
Corresponding author
Editor information
Editors and Affiliations
Rights and permissions
Copyright information
© 2014 Springer International Publishing Switzerland
About this chapter
Cite this chapter
Miron, R. (2014). The Outside’s Inside: The Phenomenology of the External World in Hedwig Conrad-Martius’ Thought. In: Tymieniecka, AT. (eds) Phenomenology of Space and Time. Analecta Husserliana, vol 116. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-02015-0_24
Download citation
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-02015-0_24
Published:
Publisher Name: Springer, Cham
Print ISBN: 978-3-319-02014-3
Online ISBN: 978-3-319-02015-0
eBook Packages: Humanities, Social Sciences and LawPhilosophy and Religion (R0)