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Antitrust: The Person-centred Approach pp 137–176Cite as

Antitrust Pluralism and Justice

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Abstract

So far, this thesis has sought to establish the person-centred approach as an account that can truly strive towards justice as inclusiveness. It is hoped that this account will escape the ills of the prevailing approaches as revealed through the deconstruction analysis in Chap. 1. So far, the construction exercise seem to be taking due account of the position of the “Other”. It is however yet to be seen how the approach will hold up when concrete decisions are to be made. It is indeed very crucial that the person-centred approach is able to live up to its promise of inclusiveness at this decision-making stage; it would live up to its promise if the procedure is able to avoid subjectivity inherent in the deconstructed traditional approaches as well as the discourse ethics.

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Notes

  1. 1.

    Sen (2009), p. 296.

  2. 2.

    Derrida (1990).

  3. 3.

    Sen (2009), pp. 215–221.

  4. 4.

    Sen (2009), pp. 215–221.

  5. 5.

    Sen (2009), pp. 215–221.

  6. 6.

    Sen (2009), pp. 225–230.

  7. 7.

    See explanation about culmination and comprehensive outcomes in Sect. 5.2 above.

  8. 8.

    See Michelin II, COMP/E-2/36.041-PO/Michelin.

  9. 9.

    See generally OECD Competition Committee Policy Roundtables on Fidelity and Bundled Rebates and Discounts 2008. http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/41/22/41772877.pdf.

  10. 10.

    See generally OECD Competition Committee Policy Roundtables on Fidelity and Bundled Rebates and Discounts 2008. http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/41/22/41772877.pdf, para 227. See also Monti (2007), 24, n 17.

  11. 11.

    The quest for broadness would however have to be done within reason. Cost burden and other relevant factors would have to be taken into account in determining the width and breadth of the informational focus.

  12. 12.

    COMP/38.233- Wanadoo Interactive. COMP/38.233 Wanadoo Interactive, Commission Decision of 16 July 2003. Note that we do not make judgment about the propriety of applying a form-based approach. The problem is that in arriving at the decision, it does not appear that the Commission addressed other options.

  13. 13.

    Case T-340/03, France Télécom [2007] E.C.R. II-107; C-202/07 P, France Télécom [2009] 4 CMLR 25 para 333. Note that analysis of recoupment in para 336 was merely subsidiary. This position was confirmed by both the General Court and the Court of Justice.

  14. 14.

    Kolm (1996), p. 4.

  15. 15.

    The practical limitations will likely differ from jurisdiction to jurisdiction.

  16. 16.

    Sen (2009), p. 297.

  17. 17.

    For example wealth transfer and allocative efficiency can both be seen as means of achieving equality. The problem therefore is that there is no principled reason to follow one interpretation and not the other.

  18. 18.

    Word borrowed from Kőlm (1996).

  19. 19.

    See Schuad (1998), p. 121.

  20. 20.

    Bertea (2007), p. 69; Bańkowski (2001), pp. 39–42.

  21. 21.

    Van den Bergh (2002), p. 35. Legal certainty is particularly a strong requirement in Europe. Though its necessity cannot be doubted, claims based on the idea of legal certainty can be linked to the bounded rationality problem of “availability heuristic”. As such, it must be noted that whatever the position of the law may be, there will always be criticisms based on legal uncertainty.

  22. 22.

    This is, for example, the motivation behind the provision of section 267 TFEU which grants the Court of Justice the power to grant preliminary rulings. See also Case C-63/93 Fintan Duff v Ministry of Agriculture and Food and Attorney General, [1996] ECR I-569.

  23. 23.

    Schuab (1998), p. 126.

  24. 24.

    For example see generally Townley (2009).

  25. 25.

    Andriychuk (2010), p. 163.

  26. 26.

    Sunstein (1996), p. 99.

  27. 27.

    See Raz (1994), p. 261. Raz emphasises that “[c]oherence conveys a specific good, the value of which is undeniable. What is incoherent is unintelligible, because it is self-contradictory, fragmented, disjointed.”

  28. 28.

    Bork (1978), p. 72.

  29. 29.

    Bertea (2005), pp 370–391, p. 371.

  30. 30.

    Bertea (2005), pp 370–391, p. 371.

  31. 31.

    Christie (1995), p. 115.

  32. 32.

    Schuab (1998), p. 125. Hawk also observed the consensus among stakeholders from different enforcement regimes. He reveals that there is a considerable gap between the rhetoric of competition law objectives and the reality of their actual implementation. See Hawk (1998), p. 353.

  33. 33.

    Case C-250/92 Gøttrup-Klim v Dansk Landbrugs, para (1994) I ECR 5641, 5654.

  34. 34.

    Rodger (2000), pp. 303–304.

  35. 35.

    Case 56/65, Société Technique Minière, [1966] ECR 337.

  36. 36.

    The reader might feel a sense of déjà vu with this ascertaining task as the reasoning here is similar to that given for the semantics of right as well as the explanation under the capability approach. Rightly, the same thread of reasoning runs through these concepts. But rather than being mere repetitions, it is important that they are explained separately. This is because while the semantics of right addresses the issue of broadness through the position of the parties involved, the capability approach addresses it from the policy perspective while the ascertaining task addresses it from an adjudicative perspective. Also, the explanation under the ascertaining task gives greater details on the working of the whole system.

  37. 37.

    As it was stated in Joined Cases 56/64 and 58/66, Consten and Grundig, [1966] ECR 429.

  38. 38.

    For example, we might be defining object-based infringement through revealed preference whereby restrictions of competition by object are seen as those with such high potential of negative effect on competition that it is unnecessary to demonstrate actual effect on the market. The freedom-based theories could hold that certain agreements are restricted by object because they breach a sacrosanct and inalienable market right.

  39. 39.

    Odudu (2009), p. 4.

  40. 40.

    Lerner (1934), p. 157.

  41. 41.

    Van den Bergh and Camesasca (2006), p. 110.

  42. 42.

    That is by using econometric methods.

  43. 43.

    That is through the use of structural approach.

  44. 44.

    Copenhagen (2006).

  45. 45.

    See e.g. Baxter (1982) pp. 661, 693; Fox (1981) p. 1140; Liebeler (1982), p. 1; Pitofsky (1979), p. 1051.

  46. 46.

    Copenhagen (2006), p. 29.

  47. 47.

    Copenhagen (2006), p. 32.

  48. 48.

    It is important as “the broader the scope, the higher the risk that coordination leads to significant anti-competitive effects per se.” Copenhagen (2006).

  49. 49.

    Copenhagen (2006), p. 34.

  50. 50.

    Copenhagen (2006).

  51. 51.

    Copenhagen (2006), p. 37.

  52. 52.

    Copenhagen (2006), p. 36. In Delimitis for instance, the Court of Justice, deciding on the anti-competitive effect of beer supply agreements stated that: “the contribution of the individual contracts entered into by the [supplier] to the sealing-off of [a] market … depends on their duration. If the duration is manifestly excessive in relation to the average duration of … supply agreements generally entered into in the relevant market, the individual contract falls under the prohibition under Article [101(1)].”

  53. 53.

    Article 3 of the Block Exemption Regulation provides that the market share in any particular Article 101 TFEU issue is constituted by an analysis of the supplier's market share on the market where it sells the contract goods or services and the buyer's market share on the market where it purchases the contract goods or services. The Article provides further that in order for the block exemption to apply, the supplier’s and the buyer’s market share must each be 30 % or less. Also, para 88 and 89 of the Vertical Guidelines (2010) states how market share is to be calculated from both the buyer and supplier’s perspective.

  54. 54.

    See European Commission (2000), pp. 1–44.

  55. 55.

    See http://www.competition-commission.org.uk/inquiries/ref2005/somerfield/.

  56. 56.

    European Commission Decision Case No COMP/M.1980.

  57. 57.

    Copenhagen (2006), pp. 53–55.

  58. 58.

    European Commission (2004).

  59. 59.

    See Copenhagen (2006), p. 56.

  60. 60.

    See Copenhagen (2006), p. 56.

  61. 61.

    See Copenhagen (2006), p. 60.

  62. 62.

    Commission 2004, para 73.

  63. 63.

    Commission 2004, para 74.

  64. 64.

    Commission 2004, para 78.

  65. 65.

    Commission 2004, para 78.

  66. 66.

    Marenco (1999) referred to in Townley (2009), p. 205, n 17.

  67. 67.

    Möschel (1991), p. 7.

  68. 68.

    Townley (2009).

  69. 69.

    Townley (2009), p. 206.

  70. 70.

    Richard Whish said that the failed attempts to define “restriction of competition” remain the central conundrum to EC competition law. See Ehlermann and Laudati (1998), p. 461. See also Odudu (2005), p. 97.

  71. 71.

    See generally Monti (2007).

  72. 72.

    T-112/99 Metropole Television (M6) v Commission [2001] ECR II-2459.

  73. 73.

    T-112/99 Metropole Television (M6) v Commission [2001] ECR II-2459, para 76.

  74. 74.

    Monti (2007). This implies that behaviours that results in ancillary restraints do not fall foul of competition rules.

  75. 75.

    See generally Monti (2007).

  76. 76.

    Williamson (1989), p. 105, 107; Williamson (1977), p. 708, n 27.

  77. 77.

    Hammer (2000), p. 878. Note however that the Borkean version of total welfare is even stricter as he expressed his reservation to Williamson’s model. He believes that economic analysis would show that cost saving or social loss does not exist. He also argues that since all consumers are also owners of businesses and hence benefit from monopolistic price increases, efficiency with price increases would not hurt the average consumer. See Bork (1978), p. 110.

  78. 78.

    For example Bork (1978) prefers this confined analysis on welfare.

  79. 79.

    For example Hammers argues that analytically, second-best concerns are the flip side of the same coin as Williamson's productive efficiency defence, and both fit comfortably within a total welfare orientation. See Hammers (2000), p. 879.

  80. 80.

    See generally Williamson (1989).

  81. 81.

    Townley (2011a), pp. 490–499.

  82. 82.

    See generally Odudu (2005) on the goal of Article 101(1).

  83. 83.

    This is evident from the General Court’s assessment in Glaxo case.

  84. 84.

    In contrast to the second-best theory addressed above.

  85. 85.

    Reindl (2011), p. 5.

  86. 86.

    Nazzini (2006), pp. 497, 514–517.

  87. 87.

    See generally Townley (2009).

  88. 88.

    For instance, it is believed that to allow a trade-off between allocative inefficiency and a range of efficiencies and gains (other than purely productive efficiency and dynamic efficiency) as well as the pursuit of multitude of non-efficiency goals is detrimental to consumer interest. See Buttigieg (2009), p. 133.

  89. 89.

    Guidelines on Article 81(3), para 83–104; Copenhagen (2006), p. 98.

  90. 90.

    Guidelines on Article 81(3), para 83–104; Copenhagen (2006), p. 99.

  91. 91.

    The distinction between these cost savings reflects the difference between short run and long run effects.

  92. 92.

    Copenhagen (2006), p. 101.

  93. 93.

    Townley (2011b), p. 580.

  94. 94.

    Sherman Act, February 30, 1890, ch. 647, 26 Stat. 209, 15 U.S.C.

  95. 95.

    Berlin (1998), XLV.

  96. 96.

    Case C-8/08 T-Mobile Netherlands BV and Others Raad van bestuur van de Nederlandse Mededingingsautoriteit. 2009 [ECR] I-4529.

  97. 97.

    Note though that this second example is not as serious as the first one.

  98. 98.

    See e.g. Hawk (1998), p. 353.

  99. 99.

    Finnis (1987), p. 357.

  100. 100.

    Alexy (1998), pp. 205, 206.

  101. 101.

    Alexy (1998), pp. 205, 206.

  102. 102.

    Alexy (1998), p. 208.

  103. 103.

    See generally Dworkin (1986).

  104. 104.

    See generally Dworkin (1986), p. 255.

  105. 105.

    See generally Dworkin (1986).

  106. 106.

    Finnis (1987), p. 372.

  107. 107.

    Finnis (1987), pp. 372–373.

  108. 108.

    As dealt with in Chap. 4.

  109. 109.

    See Dworkin (1977), pp. 340–341; Dworkin (1986).

  110. 110.

    Finnis (1987), pp. 373–374.

  111. 111.

    Note however the argument in Da Silva (2011), pp. 273–301.

  112. 112.

    As expressed by Grisez (1978), pp. 21, 46–47.

  113. 113.

    Nagel (2001), pp. 110–111.

  114. 114.

    Alexy (2007), p. 49.

  115. 115.

    For example, naked cartelist behaviours.

  116. 116.

    Sen (2009), p. 201.

  117. 117.

    Leiter (2001), p. 2.

  118. 118.

    Leiter (2001), p. 2.

  119. 119.

    Leiter (2001), p. 3. He states that “we can get no purchase on the notion of a ‘distorting factor’ without reference to the ‘things’ we are trying to know”.

  120. 120.

    Postema (2001), p. 99.

  121. 121.

    Sen (2009), p. 95.

  122. 122.

    Sen (2009), p. 95.

  123. 123.

    Craven (1992), p. 1.

  124. 124.

    Sen (2009), p. 109.

  125. 125.

    It is otherwise called ordinal non-comparable preferences.

  126. 126.

    Craven (1992), p. 126.

  127. 127.

    Harsanyi (1953), p. 455

  128. 128.

    Fleurbaey and Hammond (2004).

  129. 129.

    Sen (2009), p. 106.

  130. 130.

    Sen (1992), p. 54.

  131. 131.

    Sunstein (1996), vii.

  132. 132.

    In addition to Sen’s Overlapping Consensus, other accounts that seem to favour prudence are in forging prudence are Rawls notion of Reflective Equilibrium and Sunstein’s Incompletely Theorised Agreements In Particular Cases.

  133. 133.

    Boot (2012), p. 2, 18.

  134. 134.

    Boot (2012), p. 19.

  135. 135.

    Chapman (1994), pp. 42–43.

  136. 136.

    Reason may not play such as essential role in politics and in market transactions. In this regard, Chapman states that, in politics for instance, “while the final vote may be preceded by much discussion and exchange of reasons, the authority of the vote is not affected by the quality of this discussion … [I]n market transacting, so long as one has the property right in question, one need only justify, or defend with reasons, one’s willingness or reluctance to trade. What makes a political vote or market transaction ultimately authoritative is simply the fact that those different acts of choosing have occurred, not the cogency of the reasoning involved.”

  137. 137.

    Arrow (1977).

  138. 138.

    Easterbrook (1982), pp. 802, 814.

  139. 139.

    Easterbrook (1982), pp. 802, 814.

  140. 140.

    Allingham (2002), p. 94.

  141. 141.

    Stucke (2009); Marsden and Waller (2009), p. 16.

  142. 142.

    See Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development, Policy Roundtables: Competition on the Merit 23 (2005). http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/7/13/35911017.pdf.

  143. 143.

    It should be noted however that a regime such as Europe would still trade-off some level of certainty because of the peculiarity of the field. The present initiative of moving away from the more certain rule-based approach and towards the more economic approach is a good example.

  144. 144.

    Bork (1978), p. 427.

  145. 145.

    Neven et al. (1998), pp. 18, 19.

  146. 146.

    Stucke (2009), p. 16.

  147. 147.

    Chapman (1994); Easterbrook (1982), p. 803.

  148. 148.

    Chapman (1994); Easterbrook (1982), p. 803.

  149. 149.

    Chapman (1994), pp. 42–43.

  150. 150.

    Easterbrook (1982), p. 824.

  151. 151.

    Levine and Plott (1977), pp. 561, 564.

  152. 152.

    Levine and Plott (1977), p. 588.

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    Abayomi Al-Ameen

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Al-Ameen, A. (2014). Antitrust Pluralism and Justice. In: Antitrust: The Person-centred Approach. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-01724-2_5

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