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3) Treatment of Impossibility in Swiss and Turkish Laws

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Impossibility in Modern Private Law

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Abstract

The Swiss Code of Obligations (OR) has been influential on legal systems of many countries, including Turkey. In fact, in 1926 the Turkish lawmakers decided to adopt the OR with very minor changes. Although Turkey made a reform of law of obligations in 2011, the provisions of the OR and Turkish Code of Obligations are still significantly similar. More specifically, the legal regime of impossibility in Swiss and Turkish laws is based on Friedrich Mommsen’s doctrine of impossibility dated 1853. Consequently, both of the codes fail to follow the modern legal trend regarding regulation of impossibility.

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Notes

  1. 1.

    Honsell, ZSR 2011 II, 5, 9.

  2. 2.

    Honsell, ZSR 2011 II, 5, 16.

  3. 3.

    Honsell, ZSR 2011 II, 5, 15 ff.

  4. 4.

    Oğuz, AÜHFD 2006, 195, 197.

  5. 5.

    Oğuz, AÜHFD 2006, 195, 200.

  6. 6.

    Except for the Commercial Code, which was adopted from Germany.

  7. 7.

    During the discussions about modernization of the civil law, adoption of one of the three major civil codes were considered: ZGB, BGB and French Civil Code (CC). However, ZGB was chosen for adoption, as it was believed to be more modern and democratic than its alternatives. In particular, ZGB was found to be more modern than CC and more adaptable and concrete than BGB. Oğuz, AÜHFD 2006, 195, 201; Oğuzman/Barlas, p. 22.

  8. 8.

    Oğuz, AÜHFD 2006, 195, 201; Bucher, p. 217.

  9. 9.

    See the Preamble of the law, p. 2–3, available at: <http://www.tbmm.gov.tr/sirasayi/donem23/yil01/ss321.pdf>.

  10. 10.

    For the book: “Die Unmöglichkeit der Leistung in ihrem Einfluss auf obligatorische Verhältnisse”, see Mommsen, p. 1 ff. For a critique of Mommsen’s doctrine of impossibility, see Wollschläger, p. 159 ff.

  11. 11.

    According to Zimmermann, if Mommsen’s doctrine did not manage to impress Bernhard Windscheid and through him the fathers of BGB, such doctrine would probably be largely forgotten. Zimmermann, Law of Obligations, p. 810.

  12. 12.

    In fact, Turkish lawmakers have adhered to such doctrine even after the reform of TCO.

  13. 13.

    von Büren, p. 120; Serozan, § 14, Nr. 17; Esser/Schmidt, § 22, III; Huber, Leistungsstörungen I, § 4 III 3, p. 115.

  14. 14.

    Mommsen, p. 2.

  15. 15.

    Zimmermann, Law of Obligations, p. 810; Immenhauser, p. 290.

  16. 16.

    Immenhauser, p. 289.

  17. 17.

    Poszewiecki, p. 4.

  18. 18.

    Emmert, p. 11.

  19. 19.

    Zimmermann, Law of Obligations, p. 810.

  20. 20.

    Mommsen, p. 2 ff. Sutschet, Garantiehaftung, p. 84.

  21. 21.

    Mommsen, p. 3 ff.

  22. 22.

    Zimmermann, Law of Obligations, p. 810.

  23. 23.

    Zimmermann, Law of Obligations, p. 810.

  24. 24.

    Brunner, p. 87.

  25. 25.

    Mommsen, p. 6 and p. 103 ff.

  26. 26.

    Mommsen, p. 228 ff.

  27. 27.

    Mommsen, p. 295.

  28. 28.

    Mommsen, p. 47.

  29. 29.

    Mommsen, p. 232.

  30. 30.

    Poszewiecki, p. 1 ff.

  31. 31.

    Serozan, § 14, Nr. 17.

  32. 32.

    “Impossibility should not be classified based on the debtor’s fault, but in general whether the debtor can be held responsible for such impossibility or not.” Yarg. HGK., 2010/14-386 E., 2010/427 K., 29.9.2010.

  33. 33.

    Similarly, Article 27/I TCO, titled as “Voidness” states that “…where the subject of a contract is impossible, such contract is null and void.”

  34. 34.

    Keller/Schöbi, p. 79; Basler/Huguenin, Art. 19–20, N. 1; Schwarz, p. 358; Topuz/Canbolat, AÜHFD 2008, 673, 681; Eren, p. 295; Altunkaya, p. 47.

  35. 35.

    Altunkaya, p. 66.

  36. 36.

    In one of its decisions, the Turkish Court of Appeals ruled that the construction agreement regarding establishment of a five storey building is void due to initial impossibility, since the relevant regulation, which was in effect on the date of contract formation, prohibited such construction. Yarg. 15. HD., 1981/331 E., 1981/1050 K., 7.5.1981. Also according to the Turkish Court of Appeals, if at the date of contract formation, the subject-matter land is a protected area, the construction agreement concerning such land is invalid due to legal impossibility. Yarg. 15. HD., 1993/1707 E., 1994/1232 K., 2.3.1994. For similar decisions, see Yarg. 15. HD., 1997/1995 E., 1997/2319 K., 1.5.1997; Yarg. 15. HD., 1999/1573 E., 1999/3113 K., 13.9.1999; Yarg. 15. HD., 2001/2101 E., 2001/4508 K., 11.10.2001.

  37. 37.

    Basler/Huguenin, Art. 19–20, N. 46; Gauch/Schluep, Band II, Nr. 2525; Koller, § 13, Nr. 41; Bucher, p. 247; Zürcher/Oser/Schönenberger, Art. 20, N. 3; CHK/Kut, OR 19–20, Rdnr. 32; Reisoğlu, p. 105; Oğuzman/Öz, p. 78; Eren, p. 295; Topuz/Canbolat, AÜHFD 2008, 673, 681. “Impossibility within the meaning of Article 20 OR is likely only if it has existed from the beginning; the promised performance must be definitely unperformable due to factual or legal reasons.” BGE 96 II 18, 21.

  38. 38.

    Oğuzman/Öz make a distinction between impossibility of the subject of the contract and impossibility of performance. The authors use the former for cases of initial impossibility and the latter for subsequent impossibility. Oğuzman/Öz, p. 78.

  39. 39.

    If performance becomes somehow possible later on, the contract does not become valid. Eren, p. 298; Oğuzman/Öz, p. 78. However, it is also argued in the doctrine that if there is a time interval between the conclusion and performance of the contract, impossibility of performance must be evaluated by taking the time of performance into consideration. In other words, if initial impossibility of performance disappears on the date of performance, the contract would not be null and void due to initial impossibility. Similarly, it is argued that in conditional contracts, if performance which was impossible at the time of contract formation, becomes possible at the time of occurrence of the condition, the provision would not apply. Tunçomağ, p. 179. On the other hand, Oğuzman/Öz state that disappearance of initial impossibility prior to performance (i.e., between contract formation and performance) eliminates voidness of the contract only if the parties have concluded the contract with an expectation that performance will be possible in the future. Oğuzman/Öz, p. 78.

  40. 40.

    Guhl/Koller, § 7, Nr. 18; Berner/Becker, Art. 20, N. 2; Gauch/Schluep, Band I, Nr. 634; Basler/Huguenin, Art. 19–20, N. 46; Koller, § 13, Nr. 28; Schwarz, p. 359; Huguenin, Nr. 570; Bucher, p. 248; CHK/Kut, OR 19–20, Rdnr. 32; Topuz/Canbolat, AÜHFD 2008, 673, 682; İnan, p. 194; Eren, p. 295; Reisoğlu, p. 105; Akıntürk, Borçlar, p. 137; Uygur, p. 1020; Oğuzman/Öz, p. 78. According to the Turkish Court of Appeals, “… if it is found that performance impossibility occurred before the formation of the contract (as expropriation of the land, recognition of the land as green area or allocation to public service…), since the subject-matter of the contract would be ‘objectively impossible’ for everyone, such contract is void.” Yarg. 15. HD., 2003/6203 E., 2004/3318 K., 14.6.2004.

  41. 41.

    Zürcher/Oser/Schönenberger, Art. 20, N.3; von Tuhr/Escher, p. 96; Guhl/Koller, § 38, Nr. 35; CHK/Kut, OR 19–20, Rdnr. 32; Schwenzer, Obligationenrecht, Nr. 64.02; Koller, § 13, Nr. 28; Eren, p. 295; Topuz/Canbolat, AÜHFD 2008, 673, 682.

  42. 42.

    In one of the cases resolved by the Turkish Court of Appeals: at the date of the sales contract, although the subject-matter immovables were registered under his name at the land registry, the seller could not perform the preliminary sales contract due to an engagement with the Ministry of Treasury in a lawsuit. The Court of Appeals ruled that due to the possibility of performance at the end of the lawsuit between the seller and the Ministry of Treasury, there is no impossibility and the preliminary sales contract is valid. Yarg. HGK., 2010/14-386 E., 2010/427 K., 29.9.2010.

  43. 43.

    Serozan, § 14, Nr. 17.

  44. 44.

    Theories of invalidity are separated into two groups as classical theory and modern theory. The classical theory accepts invalidity as a defect in the valid formation of legal transactions. On the other hand, according to the modern theory invalidity is a sanction (a legal result). Accordingly, the classical theory classifies invalidity as voidness and cancellation (voidability). However, the modern theory accepts that there are mid-categories of invalidity in between voidness and cancellation. Eren, p. 299. In the Turkish legal doctrine, the main types of invalidity are: non-existence, incompleteness, voidness and cancellation.

  45. 45.

    BGE 97 II 108, 115.

  46. 46.

    Guhl/Koller, § 7, Nr. 38; Berner/Becker, Art. 20, N. 11; Olgaç, p. 90; Kocayusufpaşaoğlu, § 43, Nr. 21. Voidness is an exceptional case that enables third parties to interfere with the relativity of the contract and claim invalidity of the contract. Tekinay/Akman/Burcuoğlu/Altop, p. 375.

  47. 47.

    Berner/Becker, Art. 20, N. 11.

  48. 48.

    Berner/Becker, Art. 20, N. 10; Basler/Huguenin, Art. 19–20, N. 53; Huguenin, Nr. 397; Gauch/Schluep, Band I, Nr. 681; Eren, p. 301; Tekinay/Akman/Burcuoğlu/Altop, p. 376; Topuz/Canbolat, AÜHFD 2008, 673, 683; Oğuzman/Barlas, p. 167–168.

  49. 49.

    Gauch/Schluep, Band I, Nr. 634; Serozan, § 14, Nr. 16. According to the Turkish Court of Appeals: “…since the person who has sold the immovable may buy it from the owner and deliver to the buyer, the impossibility hereunder is not the absolute impossibility which is shown as a reason of voidness under the said article (Article 27 of TCO)” Yarg. 13. HD., 1977/2466 E., 1977/2982 K., 24.5.1977.

  50. 50.

    In this opinion, see Schwenzer, Obligationenrecht, Nr. 64.08; Guhl/Koller, § 7, Nr. 18.

  51. 51.

    In this opinion, see Serozan, § 14, Nr. 26.

  52. 52.

    Also, under the new BGB, one might argue that there will be (at least quite often) an implicit guarantee of the debtor that there is no subjective initial impossibility.

  53. 53.

    The author assumes that there is a gap in Article 27 of TCO, which must be filled by analogy to the provisions of TCO, where a guarantee liability is set forth for specific cases of subjective initial impossibility. Serozan, § 14, Nr. 26.

  54. 54.

    Serozan, § 14, Nr. 24–26. According to the author, only exception to such guarantee liability is atypical risks, i.e., force majeure. Serozan, § 14, Nr. 27.

  55. 55.

    Eren, p. 303.

  56. 56.

    In Turkish law, the same provision is regulated under Article 27/II of TCO.

  57. 57.

    Such provision is opposite to § 139 BGB, titled as “Partial invalidity”: “If a part of a legal transaction is void, then the entire legal transaction is void, unless it is to be assumed that it would have been undertaken even without the void part.”

  58. 58.

    There are two types of partial voidness: modified partial voidness and extended partial voidness. The first refers to the cases, where the invalid provision is replaced by a provision of the law. On modified partial nullity, see Koller, § 13, Nr. 77 ff. Gauch/Schluep, Band I, Nr. 703 ff.; Başpınar, p. 152 ff. The extended partial voidness refers to the cases where the voidness of the provisions of a contract is extended to cover such contract’s other provisions, which would be unacceptable by the parties due to the voidness of the former part. In other words, if any remaining part of the contract is unacceptable for the parties, such part would also be deemed as void. Oğuzman/Barlas, p. 170–171. Article 20/II OR refers to extended partial voidness.

  59. 59.

    Topuz/Canbolat, AÜHFD 2008, 673, 684; Eren, p. 304; Başpınar, p. 57.

  60. 60.

    In the doctrine it is accepted that the provision on partial nullity is not a mandatory provision. Therefore parties are entitled to make a voidness agreement regarding the results of the voidness of some provisions of their contract. Accordingly, they may choose to accept that partial voidness does not affect the remaining provisions or void provisions would be replaced by certain secondary provisions. Gauch/Schluep, Band I, Nr. 696; Basler/Huguenin, Art. 19–20, N. 68; Eren, p. 308–309.

  61. 61.

    Topuz/Canbolat, AÜHFD 2008, 673, 684; Başpınar, p. 87. It is argued that assessment of the presumed wills of the parties must be made objectively. It must be considered, how the reasonable honest parties would react to conclude the contract provided that they were aware of the partial voidness at the time of contract formation. Gauch/Schluep, Band I, Nr. 700; Basler/Huguenin, Art. 19–20, N. 64; Eren, p. 308. This criterion actually refers to the exception in Article 20/II OR and Article 27/II s. 2 TCO, which set forth that, when it is clearly understood that the contract would not be concluded without such provisions, the whole contract is void.

  62. 62.

    Tekinay/Akman/Burcuoğlu/Altop, p. 379.

  63. 63.

    Tekinay/Akman/Burcuoğlu/Altop, p. 379; Eren, p. 303.

  64. 64.

    Tekinay/Akman/Burcuoğlu/Altop, p. 380.

  65. 65.

    Serozan, § 14, Nr. 3; Topuz/Canbolat, AÜHFD 2008, 673, 683; Tekinay/Akman/Burcuoğlu/Altop, p. 376. “Following a validly concluded immovable contract, if performance of the contract becomes impossible, the sales price that was paid to the seller may be claimed back at the market value on the date, when performance has become impossible.” Yarg. 13. HD., 2009/5788 E., 2009/13309 K., 16.11.2009.

  66. 66.

    Yarg. 13. HD., 1984/2594 E., 1984/4113 K., 29.5.1984; Serozan, § 14, Nr. 21; Tunçomağ, p. 182; Altunkaya, p. 238.

  67. 67.

    Berner/Weber, Art. 97, N. 109; Schwenzer, Obligationenrecht, Nr. 63.06; Kramer, Obligationenrecht, N. 218; Bucher, p. 249; Huguenin, Nr. 395; Brieskorn, p. 48; Serozan, § 14, Nr. 21; Altunkaya, p. 239; Tekinay/Akman/Burcuoğlu/Altop, p. 377; Oğuzman/Öz, p. 79.

  68. 68.

    Serozan, § 14, Nr. 21.

  69. 69.

    Such provision corresponds to Article 136 of the TCO, which is titled as “Performance Impossibility”. During the reform of TCO, the lawmakers have amended the provision and added a final paragraph regarding the duty of notification. The amended paragraph reads as follows: “If the debtor fails to immediately notify the creditor about the occurrence of performance impossibility and to take necessary precautions for prevention of increase of damages, the debtor is obliged to cover the loses arising therefrom.”

  70. 70.

    “If … afterwards (the formation of the contract), performance of the obligation has become impossible with the fault of the debtor, Article 96 (former Article 112 TCO) should apply…” Yarg. 15. HD., 2003/1513 E., 2003/2093 K., 21.4.2003. For a similar decision, see Yarg. 11. HD., 1988/9411 E., 1990/1087 K., 20.2.1990.

  71. 71.

    If expropriation takes place after the formation of the lease agreement, there is impossibility of performance in accordance with Article 117 (former Article 136) of TCO. Yarg. 14. HD., 2008/520 E., 2008/1833 K., 18.2.2009.

  72. 72.

    In this opinion, see Schwenzer, Obligationenrecht, Nr. 64.09; von Tuhr/Escher, p. 94; Berner/Weber, Art. 97, N. 121; Basler/Wiegand, Art. 97, N. 13; Tunçomağ, p. 482; Serozan, § 15, Nr. 1.

  73. 73.

    In this opinion, see Gauch/Schluep, Band II, N. 2533 and N. 2575; Zürcher/Aepli, Art. 119, N. 47; Eren, p. 1249; Dural, Sonraki İmkansızlık, p. 89.

  74. 74.

    For instance, if construction is prevented as a result of the amendments to relevant zoning legislation after the formation of the contract, this would cause extinguishment of the obligation under Article 117 (former Article 136) of TCO. Yarg. 15. HD., 2001/5744 E., 2002/2065 K., 25.4.2002; Yarg. 15. HD., 2004/1009 E., 2004/5441 K., 27.10.2004; Yarg. 16. HD., 2001/4839 E., 2001/4786 K., 24.10.2001. “Due to their private laws, state enterprises must take permission of the Ministry prior to the sale of immovables. Therefore, it must be accepted that there is impossibility under Article 117 (former Article 136) since the sale of the immovables have been halted by the order of the Ministry, despite the obligation of sale under the protocol.” Yarg. HGK., 1987/11-539 E., 1989/320 K., 6.4.1988.

  75. 75.

    Guhl/Koller, § 31, Nr. 3; Kälin, recht 2004, 246, 248; Zürcher/Aepli, Art. 119, N. 44; Eren, p. 1250.

  76. 76.

    However, as in German law, objective impossibility may occur regarding limited debt in kind. Berner/Weber, Art. 97, N.115; Zürcher/Aepli, Art. 119, N. 50.

  77. 77.

    Gauch/Schluep, Band II, Nr. 2572.

  78. 78.

    “If performance has become impossible without the debtor’s fault after the formation of the obligatory relationship, in such case the obligation is extinguished (TCO Article 117 (former Article 136)). However, if the performance of the obligation becomes excessively difficult for the debtor, this lies outside the scope of Article 117. Excessive difficulty must not be confused with impossibility of performance.” Yarg. 13. HD., 1990/5697 E., 1990/8708 K., 14.12.1990. In a decision, where the claimant argued performance impossibility due to devaluation, the Turkish Court of Appeals ruled that during the said years the Turkish press was frequently publishing articles on the loss of value of Turkish liras. Therefore, the claimant cannot argue that he could not expect devaluation. Yarg. HGK., 1978/11-773 E., 1980/2310 K., 17.10.1980. In another decision, where the claimant argued that the foreign exchange bottle-neck caused impossibility, the court ruled that the foreign exchange bottle-neck was a known reality in Turkey; therefore there is no impossibility. Yarg. 13. HD, 1981/2749 E., 1981/3786 K., 14.5.1981. For a similar decision, see Yarg. HGK., 1982/13-264 E., 1984/501 K., 2.5.1984. In another decision, where the claimant argued that devaluation caused impossibility, the court ruled that “It (impossibility) does not enable adaptation of the contract to the new circumstances. Therefore the case at hand should not be dealt with under impossibility, but excessive difficulty.” Yarg. 13. HD., 1996/3653 E., 1996/3920 K., 16.4.1996. “The respondent Soil Products Office, who knows the Turkish import regime and the authorities of the Ministry of Finance with regard to allocation of foreign exchange could have taken the necessary precautions; it could have made the foreign exchange allocation beforehand as in the former contracts or at least, as it did in the former contract, it could bind the import to the requirement of foreign exchange allocation by the competent authority. It cannot be accepted that the party, who incurs debt without taking necessary precautions, relies on an event of impossibility that could be prevented by taking such precautions.” Yarg. HGK., 1984/11-139 E., 1984/426 K., 18.4.1984.

  79. 79.

    For adaptation of the contract under Swiss law, see Kälin, recht 2004, 246, 251 ff.

  80. 80.

    BGE 101 II, 17, 21.

  81. 81.

    “A judicial intervention at the request of the debtor, based on Article 2 of the ZGB is permitted only if the relationship between the obligation and counter-obligation is disturbed because of exceptional change in circumstances such that the insistence of the creditor on his contractual claim is simply an excessive exploitation of the disproportion so that it constitutes a manifest abuse of right, which finds no legal protection under Article 2, paragraph 2 of the ZGB (BGE 93-II-188, 68-II-173, 67-I-300, 62-II-45, 59-II-378/9 ).” BGE 107 II 343, 348.

  82. 82.

    Schwenzer, Obligationenrecht, Nr. 35.07.

  83. 83.

    Schwenzer, Obligationenrecht, Nr. 35.10.

  84. 84.

    “Is there lack of such a contractual or statutory rule, for the adaptation of the contract by the judge the hypothetical wills of the parties must be taken into account… The court must determine, therefore, what the parties would have agreed in accordance with the principle of good faith, if they had taken into consideration the ordinary course of events.” BGE 127 III, 300, 307.

  85. 85.

    The provision reads as follows: “If a condition, which at the time of the conclusion of the contract could not be foreseen by the parties and it cannot also be expected that the parties should have foreseen it, arises with a reason not originating from the debtor and changes the facts present at the time of the conclusion of the contract against the debtor in such a way that demanding performance from him results against the principles of good faith, and if the debtor has not performed yet or he has performed by reserving his/her rights arising from the excessive difficulty of performance, the debtor has the right to demand from the judge adaptation of the contract to the new conditions, or if this is not possible, he has the right to avoid the contract. In long-term contracts, in principle, the debtor uses a right of termination rather than avoidance.”

  86. 86.

    If the balance between the obligations of the parties is excessively damaged after contract formation, the modern legal systems—including Swiss and Turkish laws—require either the adaptation of the contract by the judge, or termination of the contract. For a detailed study on adaptation of the contract in Turkish law, see Baysal p. 1 ff. For detailed information and an analysis of the concept of economic impossibility from the perspective of law and economics, see Aksoy/Schäfer, EJLE 2012, 105, 105 ff.

  87. 87.

    Unless there is a specific provision in law or in the contract, the level of care to be followed by the debtor would be determined by considering the concepts and perspectives in trade and also the principle of good-faith. Tunçomağ, p. 494; Oğuzman/Öz, p. 343. Therefore the criterion to be used when evaluating the existence of the debtor’s fault is an objective one. The debtor would be deemed to be careful only if he has acted like any careful person from such community would act under the same circumstances. Tunçomağ, p. 494.

  88. 88.

    According to Article 100 OR (and similarly in Article 115 TCO), “Any agreement purporting to exclude liability for unlawful intent or gross negligence in advance is void.” Moreover in some cases regulated under the proceeding paragraphs, the law has even prevented exclusion of liability for light negligence.

  89. 89.

    The provision corresponds to Article 114/I s. 2 and s. 3 TCO.

  90. 90.

    There are other provisions, which rule that the debtor is liable for impossibility regardless of his fault. For instance, according to Article 101 OR (Article 116 TCO), debtor is strictly liable for impossibility caused by his assistants in performance of the obligation. Similarly, Article 103 OR (Article 119 TCO) rules that in case of his default, the debtor is also liable for damage and loss (impossibility) caused by accident.

  91. 91.

    Gauch/Schluep, Band II, N. 2612; Topuz/Canbolat, AÜHFD 2008, 673, 687; Oğuzman/Öz, p. 342.

  92. 92.

    For a study on impossibility for which the creditor is responsible see Giger, p. 1 ff.

  93. 93.

    In one of its decisions, the Turkish Court of Appeals ruled that in cases, where impossibility is caused by the fault of the creditor, provisions of Article 117 (former version of Article 119) would not apply. Yarg. HGK, 1984/11-139 E., 1984/426 K., 18.4.1984.

  94. 94.

    “As it has been determined … that the immovable, which is subject matter to the lawsuit burned down as a result of a fire, which broke out when the immovable was at the use of the claimant and the immovable has become unusable, the lease agreement is extinguished due to TCO Article 117 (former Article 136).” Yarg. HGK., 1982/11-553 E., 1984/830 K., 19.10.1984.

  95. 95.

    Oğuzman/Öz, p. 345; Topuz/Canbolat, AÜHFD 2008, 673, 687. “As a result of an earthquake, the collapse of the building, which is the subject-matter to the lease agreement constitutes force majeure and it must be accepted that the contract is extinguished.” Yarg. 19. HD., 2002/10423 E., 2003/7437 K., 4.7.2003. Also see, Yarg. 19. HD., 1996/8299 E., 1997/2559 K., 13.3.1997.

  96. 96.

    Topuz/Canbolat, AÜHFD 2008, 673, 687.

  97. 97.

    Huguenin, Nr. 580; Schwenzer, Obligationenrecht, Nr. 64.29; Dural, Sonraki İmkansızlık, p. 170; Serozan, § 15, Nr. 11; Oğuzman/Öz, p. 282; Akıntürk, p. 55. In such cases, the debtor must prove that impossibility is caused by the creditor. Barth, p. 124; Akıntürk, p. 54.

  98. 98.

    Basler/Wiegand, Art. 97, N.23; Zürcher/Aepli, Art. 119, N. 152; Schwenzer, Obligationenrecht, Nr. 64.29; Oğuzman/Öz, p. 282; Dural, Sonraki İmkansızlık, p. 173–174.

  99. 99.

    Article 101 OR: “A person who delegates the performance of an obligation or the exercise of a right arising from a contractual obligation to an associate, such as a member of his household or an employee is liable to the other party for any loss or damage the associate causes in carrying out such tasks, even if their delegation was entirely authorised.”

  100. 100.

    Although the assistants of debtor are listed under Article 101/I OR as “his member of his household or an employee”, in the doctrine it is accepted that such list is not exhaustive but exemplary. Zürcher/Oser/Schönenberger, Art. 101 N. 5; Akıntürk, p. 45; Oğuzman/Öz, p. 352. Therefore the assistants of the debtor are all people who conduct actions under knowledge and consent of the debtor for the performance of his obligation. Schwenzer, Obligationenrecht, Nr. 23.04; Zürcher/Oser/Schönenberger, Art. 101 N. 5; Koller, § 54, Nr. 92; Akıntürk, p. 45; Oğuzman/Öz, p. 353. Moreover, there is no requirement that the assistants of debtor be dependent on the debtor. Koller, § 54, Nr. 94; Schwenzer, Obligationenrecht, Nr. 23.04; Akıntürk, p. 46; Oğuzman/Öz, p. 352.

  101. 101.

    Schwenzer, Obligationenrecht, Nr. 23.10; Oğuzman/Öz, p. 358. In cases, where the assistant of the debtor is at fault in occurrence of the impossibility of performance, the debtor would be responsible at all times. von Tuhr/Escher, p. 128; Oğuzman/Öz, p. 359.

  102. 102.

    Zürcher/Oser/Schönenberger, Art. 101, N. 12; Oğuzman/Öz, p. 359; Akıntürk, p. 48.

  103. 103.

    Oğuzman/Öz, p. 358.

  104. 104.

    According to Article 101/II OR (and Article 116/II OR), in principle, such liability may be restricted or excluded by prior agreement. The exception to such principle may be found under Article 101/III OR (and Article 116/III TCO with some changes).

  105. 105.

    Article 97 OR reads as follows: “An obligor who fails to discharge an obligation at all or as required must make amends for the resulting loss or damage unless he can prove that he was not at fault.” The provision corresponds to Article 112 TCO.

  106. 106.

    In other words, the risk of investment, which includes the expenses to be made by the debtor, would be born by the debtor. This is regarded as the amount of the profit that the debtor would incur, if he could perform. Serozan, § 15, Nr. 7a.

  107. 107.

    CHK/Killias/Wiget, OR 119, Rdnr. 35; Zürcher/Aepli, Art. 119, N. 62; Dural, Sonraki İmkansızlık, p. 126.

  108. 108.

    It cannot be argued that the provision eliminates the secondary claims in its entirety. For instance, it will be explained below that similar to German law, in Swiss and Turkish laws the creditor is entitled to demand substitutes from the debtor, if any.

  109. 109.

    von Büren, p. 386; Tunçomağ, p. 485; Dural, Sonraki İmkansızlık, p. 125–126.

  110. 110.

    In the same opinion, see Basler/Wiegand, Art. 119, N. 4; Kälin, recht 2004, 246, 246.

  111. 111.

    Serozan, § 15, Nr. 9.

  112. 112.

    Zürcher/Aepli, Art. 119, N. 69; Basler/Wiegand, Art. 119, N. 9; Tunçomağ, p. 486.

  113. 113.

    In the doctrine it is argued that the obligation of the debtor to return the counter-obligation that has already been performed is not based on unjust enrichment in technical terms. This is actually an obligation to return, which arises from the law. The reason why the law makes reference to unjust enrichment is that provisions regarding unjust enrichment and the method of return would apply by analogy to the debtor’s obligation to return the counter-obligation in case of subsequent impossibility. Kramer, Obligationenrecht, N. 486; Oğuzman/Öz, p. 430; Dural, Sonraki İmkansızlık, p. 163; Serozan, § 15, Nr. 9.

  114. 114.

    Basler/Wiegand, Art. 119, N. 18; Topuz/Canbolat, AÜHFD 2008, 673, 688; Eren, p. 1253; Dural, Sonraki İmkansızlık, p. 164.

  115. 115.

    Accordingly, subsequent impossibility for which the debtor is not responsible will cause extinguishment of the obligations of both parties. This means that the creditor will not receive the performance by the debtor, but also the debtor will not receive the counter-performance. Since none of the parties will compensate the other, each will bear his own loss.

  116. 116.

    According to Aepli, accomplishment and destruction of purpose are not impossibility under Article 119 OR. Zürcher/Aepli, Art. 119, N. 51. In the same opinion, see Basler/Wiegand, Art. 119, N. 6. Similar to German law, cases of an impossibility of use are not regarded as impossibility under Article 119 OR. Zürcher/Aepli, Art. 119, N. 31.

  117. 117.

    Gauch/Schluep, Band II, Nr. 2561.

  118. 118.

    Serozan, § 13, Nr. 7–12.

  119. 119.

    Berner/Becker, Art. 119, N. 1; Basler/Wiegand, Art. 119, N. 15; Zürcher/Aepli, Art. 119, N. 125 ff. Schwenzer, Obligationenrecht, Nr. 64.14; von Tuhr/Escher, p. 131; Koller, § 54, Nr. 14; Guhl/Koller, § 38, Nr. 38; Serozan, § 15, Nr. 7; Arık, p. 215; Reisoğlu, p. 325; İnan, Bankacılar, p. 148; Olgaç, p. 905; Dural, Sonraki İmkansızlık, p. 185; Eren, p. 1254; Arsebük, p. 802; Akıntürk, Borçlar, p. 139.

  120. 120.

    Gauch/Schluep, Band II, N. 2598; Basler/Wiegand, Art. 119, N. 15; Schwenzer, Obligationenrecht, Nr. 64.14; Serozan, § 15, Nr. 6; Topuz/Canbolat, AÜHFD 2008, 673, 687; Arık, p. 215; Akıntürk, Borçlar, p. 139.

  121. 121.

    “Although Art. 119 OR has not expressly adopted the common law claim of substitute benefits, it emerges from the meaning of the provision. (BGE 51 II 175 E. 3: claim for the insurance sum in case of destruction of the purchase object by fire; BGE 43 II 233 E. 5: claim of compensation acquired from the military authorities for the confiscation of the purchase object, but BGE 46 II 436 E. 2, where a claim of the profit of the seller as a result of otherwise disposal of the vacant purchase object was rejected.” BGE 112 II 235, 239. “If the debtor has obtained a substitute, which replaces the performance, which has become impossible without the responsibility of the debtor, in other words, if a surrogate benefit has replaced the performance, the obligatory relationship is not extinguished and it continues with a change of its subject. In the case at hand, instead of the immovable, which was promised for sale, the expropriation price, in other words the value that replaces it, would come.” Yarg.13. HD, 1986/4826 E., 1986/5536 K., 17.11.1986. In a similar decision, the Court has also ruled that the creditor is entitled to ask for the payment of such substitute to him. Yarg. 13. HD., 1991/8883 E., 1991/11265 K., 10.12.1991.

  122. 122.

    Serozan, § 15, Nr. 15.

  123. 123.

    von Tuhr/Escher, p. 133; Bucher, p. 425; Zürcher/Aepli, Art. 119, N. 133; Gauch/Schluep, Band II, Nr. 2598; Basler/Wiegand, Art. 119, N. 15; Dural, Sonraki İmkansızlık, p. 183; Serozan, § 15, Nr. 7.

  124. 124.

    Eren, p. 1255; Dural, Sonraki İmkansızlık, p. 196.

  125. 125.

    Huguenin, Nr. 579; Oğuzman/Öz, p. 432; Eren, p. 1255; Arık, p. 215; Serozan, § 15, Nr. 15; Dural, Sonraki İmkansızlık, p. 197; Arsebük, p. 805.

  126. 126.

    Gauch/Schluep, Band II, Nr. 2602; Basler/Wiegand, Art. 119, N. 16; CHK/Killias/Wiget, OR 119, Rdnr. 29.

  127. 127.

    CHK/Killias/Wiget, OR 119, Rdnr. 29; Gauch/Schluep, Band II, Nr. 2603; Basler/Wiegand, Art. 119, N. 16; Serozan, § 15, Nr. 15. According to Eren, if the value of the substitutes is higher than the counter-obligation, the creditor may only request as much amount of the substitute as his counter-obligation. On the other hand, if the value of the substitutes is less than the value of the counter obligation, the creditor may not request more than what the debtor has received as substitute. Eren, p. 1255.

  128. 128.

    Basler/Wiegand, Art. 119, N. 15; Dural, Sonraki İmkansızlık, p. 184.

  129. 129.

    Dural, Sonraki İmkansızlık, p. 187.

  130. 130.

    The provision covers non-performance of the obligation in the broadest sense. Default of the debtor, defective performance, positive breach of contract and finally non-performance due to impossibility are all covered by the provision.

  131. 131.

    In this opinion, see Schwenzer, Obligationenrecht, Nr. 64.20; Basler/Wiegand, Art. 97, N. 47; Serozan, § 16, Nr. 3; Tekinay, p. 639. Oğuzman/Öz are against the prevailing opinion in the doctrine. The authors argue that without a distinction of culpability, in cases of subsequent impossibility the obligations of the parties are extinguished because it would be illogical to expect someone to perform something impossible. Therefore the creditor would not perform his obligation in return of compensation. If the creditor has already performed his obligation prior to impossibility, his obligation would be returned in accordance with the regime in Article 136 TCO—Article 119 OR. According to this view, the creditor’s compensation claim is a new obligation arising from the law. Therefore, the creditor is entitled to claim compensation prior to the due date of the obligation contemplated in the contract. Oğuzman/Öz, p. 301–304. Also against the prevailing opinion, see Eren, p. 311.

  132. 132.

    BGE 117 II 273, 278; Basler/Wiegand, Art. 97, N. 47; Schwenzer, Obligationenrecht, Nr. 64.20.

  133. 133.

    Oğuzman/Öz, p. 301.

  134. 134.

    Tunçomağ, p. 498.

  135. 135.

    Schwenzer, Obligationenrecht, Nr. 64.22.

  136. 136.

    Schwenzer, Obligationenrecht, Nr. 64.22; Tekinay, p. 640; Serozan, § 16, Nr. 3.

  137. 137.

    As explained above, according to the exchange theory, when claiming compensation from the debtor, the creditor must also perform the counter-obligation. On the other hand, the difference theory which is the modern opinion, argues that the creditor does not have to perform the counter-obligation. However, the value of the creditor’s counter-obligation must be deducted from the compensation that he would receive from the debtor.

  138. 138.

    In the same opinion, see Gauch/Schluep, Band II, N. 2590; Schwenzer, Obligationenrecht, Nr. 64.26.

  139. 139.

    Basler/Wiegand, Art. 119, N. 15; Schwenzer, Obligationenrecht, Nr. 64.23.

  140. 140.

    Serozan, § 16, Nr. 16.

  141. 141.

    Serozan, § 16, Nr. 16.

  142. 142.

    Berner/Weber, Art. 97, N.118; Gauch/Schluep, Band II, N. 2587 ff.; Basler/Wiegand, Art. 97, N. 58; Bucher, p. 339 ff.; Schwenzer, Obligationenrecht, Nr. 64.27; Serozan, Dönme, p. 292.

  143. 143.

    Schwenzer, Obligationenrecht, Nr. 64.27; Serozan, Dönme, p. 292.

  144. 144.

    Serozan, Dönme, p. 292.

  145. 145.

    This being the rule, if the creditor was already aware or could have been aware of impossibility, the debtor is not under the obligation to notify. Zürcher/Aepli, Art. 119, N.107; Barth, p. 57; Dural, Sonraki İmkansızlık, p. 131.

  146. 146.

    Zürcher/Aepli, Art. 119, N. 104; Oğuzman/Öz, p. 431; Tunçomağ, p. 488; Dural, Sonraki İmkansızlık, p. 131.

  147. 147.

    Bucher, p. 423; Zürcher/Aepli, Art. 119, N. 104; Tunçomağ, p. 488; Serozan, § 15, Nr. 6.

  148. 148.

    Berner/Becker, Art. 119, N. 10; Zürcher/Aepli, Art. 119, N. 104; Bucher, p. 423.

  149. 149.

    Zürcher/Aepli, Art. 119, N. 108; Berner/Becker, Art. 119, N. 10; Oğuzman/Öz, p. 488; Dural, Sonraki İmkansızlık, p. 132.

  150. 150.

    Art. 137 TCO: “If performance of the obligation becomes partially impossible due to reasons the debtor cannot be made responsible, the debtor is released only from that part of the obligation, which has become impossible. However, when it is clearly understood that the parties would not have concluded such contract, if they could foresee such partial performance impossibility, the obligation is extinguished in full.

    In case of reciprocal contracts, if obligation of either party becomes partially impossible and the creditor accepts partial performance, the counter-obligation would be performed in the same ratio. If the creditor does not accept such performance or the counter-obligation is indivisible by nature, provisions of full impossibility would apply.”

  151. 151.

    See, Berner/Weber, Art. 97, N. 141; Bucher, p. 420; Zürcher/Aepli, Art. 119, N. 111 ff.; Berner/Becker, Art. 119, N. 13; Schwenzer, Obligationenrecht, Nr. 64.31.

  152. 152.

    Serozan, § 15, Nr. 7.

  153. 153.

    Serozan, § 15, Nr. 3.

  154. 154.

    See Serozan, § 14, Nr. 17.

  155. 155.

    In case of unjust enrichment, the party, who is bound to return may argue that the enrichment has decreased. In other words, his obligation to return may be limited to what remains from the enrichment.

  156. 156.

    Article 127 OR as well as Article 146 TCO sets forth that the prescription period based on contractual claims is, in principle, ten years from the date that the receivable is due.

  157. 157.

    After the reform of TCO, Article 82 TCO has increased the prescription period for claims based on unjust enrichment (from one year) to two years from the date that the party to claim return becomes aware of the right to return.

  158. 158.

    Serozan, § 14, Nr. 21; Schwenzer, Obligationenrecht, Nr. 63.06; Kramer, Obligationenrecht, N. 218; Bucher, p. 249; Huguenin, Nr. 395.

  159. 159.

    See Serozan, § 14.

  160. 160.

    The scope of a legal norm may be too wide, as it fails to consider an atypical condition that requires a restrictive exception to such provision. In such cases, that norm needs to be restricted in accordance with its own purpose and the principle of justice because the expression of the norm does not fit into the exceptional characteristics of the case and an application of such provision creates unfair results. Despite such necessity of restriction, a narrow interpretation of the norm may not be sufficient to restrict its wide expression. Then it is accepted that there is hidden gap in the law. Kırca, AÜHFD 2001, 91, 96; Serozan, Medeni Hukuk, p. 116–117. According to Article 1 of the ZGB—as well as TCC—, the hidden gap in the law must be filled by the judge. Since hidden gap refers to a wide legal norm, which fails to cover the exceptional features of the case, if such norm’s clear expression clearly contradicts with its own purpose, the gap must be filled through restriction of the norm in accordance with its purpose (ratio legis). As a result, restriction in accordance with the purpose of the norm (teleologische Reduktion or teleologische Restriktion) refers to a restriction of the clear expression of the law (which is very wide and fails to cover the features of the exceptional case) in accordance with its purpose to be determined following an interpretation of the provision. The said purpose (teleology), may be (i) the enactment of such legal norm in the first place, (ii) the principal purpose of another law, which cannot be maintained by any other means, (iii) the nature of things (Natur der Sache), or (iv) a fundamental principle of law. Larenz, Methodenlehre, p. 392. For discussions on the teleological reduction of Article 20 OR (equivalent to Article 27 TCO), see Ziegler, p. 14 ff.

  161. 161.

    Ergüne, p. 238. Such opinion arises from the application of the Austrian law.

  162. 162.

    In such cases, “risk liability” independent from the fault of the debtor has been contemplated. For instance, according to Article 171 OR—as well as Article 191 TCO—, in case of sale of receivables, the seller is liable under a guarantee to the buyer regarding the existence of the subject matter receivable at the time of assignment. Serozan, § 14, Nr. 18.

  163. 163.

    Serozan, § 14, Nr. 3; Ergüne, p. 238.

  164. 164.

    Serozan, § 15, Nr. 7.

  165. 165.

    Serozan, § 14, Nr. 19.

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  1. Faculty of Law, Bilkent University, Ankara, Turkey

    Hüseyin Can Aksoy

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Aksoy, H.C. (2014). 3) Treatment of Impossibility in Swiss and Turkish Laws. In: Impossibility in Modern Private Law. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-01704-4_3

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