Abstract
Husserlian phenomenology and Freudian psychoanalysis both offer a theory of the emergence of the self-other relationship, but end up in very different accounts. Husserl argues that all experiences are essentially accompanied by primordial self-awareness, and that there is, from the start, an insurmountable difference between self and others. Freud and his early successors famously claim on the contrary that infantile experience originally involves no clearly demarcated borderline between self and other, and that selfhood is rather something that the infant comes to acquire in the course of development. In this paper, I will set off with the received view which suggests that there is an unbridgeable gap between Husserlian phenomenology and Freudian psychoanalysis. I will argue that the relationship between phenomenology and psychoanalysis is more complex than that. By explicating the different ways in which the early distinction/indistinction between self and other is portrayed in psychoanalytic scholarship, my central claim will be that instead of comprising two contradictory views concerning the early distinction/indistinction between self and other, the psychoanalytic view is united in a peculiar sense: although the self-other distinction is there from the start thanks to kinesthesis, the distinction might still, at the same time, be absent in the register of fantasy. I argue that, considered in this manner, the psychoanalytic view is not incompatible with, but complementary to the phenomenological account.
This is a preview of subscription content, log in via an institution to check access.
Access this chapter
Tax calculation will be finalised at checkout
Purchases are for personal use only
Notes
- 1.
See Taipale 2014: 99–117.
- 2.
I will not distinguish between self and ego in this article. For a detailed discussion on the psychoanalytic concepts of ego and self, see Blum 1982; Kernberg 1982; Rangell 1982; Richards 1982; Ticho 1982. For a discussion on the relation between the psychoanalytic and phenomenological terminology, see Ricoeur 1986; Chessick 1992; Karlsson 2010.
- 3.
Otto Kernberg notes that this division to some extent runs parallel with the division between psychoanalytic “schools”: whereas Melanie Klein and other advocates of the so called “object-relation theory” conceived the infant to have the capacity to differentiate himself from his mother from the beginning of life, Freud, Jacobson, Mahler, Kerberg, and Winnicott instead question this idea and assume an initially undifferentiated state (see Kernberg 1982: 901). The idea is that an object-relation already presupposes an elementary differentiation (see, e.g., Sander 1980: 185). It seems, however, that Winnicott’s account is not clear, since he admits the presence of an original subjective feeling of existence (see Winnicott 1965: 239).
- 4.
It should be noted right away that even though the concept of symbiosis is derived from the field of biology, in Freud and others it relates not first and foremost to an objective biological fact, but to an experience.
- 5.
The parts of the latter book that I discuss here are written either by Mahler or by Mahler and Pine – the third author, Anni Bergman, wrote the third part, which is the reason that she is not mentioned in the text.
- 6.
Pine argues later that terms such as undifferentiatedness, merger, and boundarylessness might had been more appropriate over symbiosis which is derived from the field of biology (see Pine 2004: 515–516). Louise Kaplan embraces Mahler’s idea but favors the term “oneness”: “From the infant’s point of view there are no boundaries between himself and mother. They are one” (Kaplan 1978: 28: 72). Stern criticizes Mahler’s choice of terms when he writes that to become more and more social does not mean to become less and less autistic (Stern 1985: 234).
- 7.
Mahler refers here to Freud’s concept of purified “pleasure-ego” (reines Lust-Ich) (see Freud 1974b: 200). I will come back to this notion later.
- 8.
See also Mahler et al. (1975: 8), where symbiosis is characterized as “a feature of primitive cognitive life wherein the differentiation between self and mother has not taken place, or where regression to that self-object undifferentiated stage has occurred”.
- 9.
Alice Balint (1952a: 127) critically notes – or, more precisely, critically anticipates such an account by noting – that the idea of a “dual-unit” already involves a “very primitive object-relation”.
- 10.
In contrast, Husserl writes: “The ego remains concealed insofar as it is not thematic as ego. Yet it is a centrum of affection and action, identification, [and] ability” (Husserl 1973b: 605). Elsewhere Husserl specifies that this is the case already in the womb: “Das Neugeborene oder vielmehr der in die Welt tretende Embryo […] ist keine Person. Aber es ist doch Ich-Zentrum und Feld” (Husserl 2008: 230).
- 11.
Peterfreund’s main criticism toward the symbiosis theory is focused on its alleged tendency to adultomorphize and pathomorphize infantile experiences: “many of the problems inherent in the [classical] psychoanalytic characterizations of infancy stem […] from two fundamental conceptual fallacies especially characteristic to psychoanalytic thought: the adultomorphization of infancy, and the tendency to characterize early states of normal development is terms of hypotheses about later states of psychopathology” (Peterfreund 1978: 427; see also Gergely 2000: 1199).
- 12.
Peterfreund illustrates: “The simple observable fact that a hungry infant roots to and nurses from the breast and not from a stick of wood or from its own fingers negates any idea of an undifferentiated phase in which the infant cannot distinguish inner and outer stimuli or distinguish between himself and inanimate objects. The infant’s nursing behavior indicates that that some rudimentary distinctions are being made, which, when more fully developed, will eventually be classified by adults and called ‘inside’ and ‘outside’ as well as ‘animate’ and ‘inanimate’” (Peterfreund 1978: 433).
- 13.
- 14.
- 15.
The empirical evidence for the claim that infantile self-awareness is fundamentally body-based is discussed in, e.g., Pipp (1993: 186).
- 16.
The emphasis of the boundaries reminds us of the Husserlian view that the “ego is not conceivable without the non-ego, to which it is intentionally related” (Husserl 1973a: 244).
- 17.
Further, in psychoanalysis too, the so called “double sensations” have an important role to play in the constitution of selfhood. As Pine puts it: “The point regarding the difference between touching the mother and touching oneself is important. While this distinction has been present all along, and does not first come into being in the differentiation subphase, we assume that it contributes heavily to the infant’s learning about otherness in this subphase. After all, touching one’s own body produces a double stimulation (in the fingertips or hand and in the touched place), whereas touching the mother, or objects, or any “not me” thing produces only the single stimulation felt in the fingers or hand. The correlation is in each case perfect (double sensation equals “me”; single sensation equals “not me”), and we have assumed that this regularity underlies some of the learning of differentiation all along” (Pine 2004: 521–522; Cf. Gergely 2000: 1203ff.).
- 18.
Mahler also argues that the mouth thus originally pertains to the body-self, the hands are to be understood as subsequent “active extensions” of the body-self (Mahler and McDevitt 1982: 837).
- 19.
Cf. Rochat (1998, 102ff).
- 20.
It is worth noting here that Husserl thinks that though originally uncontrolled, kinaesthesis is essentially a subjective, volitional matter (see Cairns 1976: 64).
- 21.
cf. Husserl (2008: 477): “Das Ego im Uranfang (der Urgeburt) ist schon Ich gerichteter Instinkten”; cf. Husserl (2008: 475): “Habitualitäten […] verflochten mit Instinkten”; Husserl (2008: 476): “Ist die Empfindungssinnlichkeit nicht zugleich Instinktsinnlichkeit und dabei mit Gefühlsintentionalität verwoben?” In another recorded conversation with Cairns, six days earlier than the one quoted above, Husserl explicitly subscribes to the view that elementary emotions do not yet relate to external objects, since objects in this proper sense do not yet exist; instead, “objects” are originally simple sources of pleasure: ”the infant is impelled to evoke actively those kinaesthetic sequences which show themselves to bring about the endurance or recurrence of something valued, in the first instance something pleasant. Yet not a pleasant ‘object’ in the full sense – such objects are not yet constituted – but a pleasant feeling. The whole psychic life is determined to evoke or constitute the enduring, the self-identical, the recurrent” (Cairns 1976: 64). In psychoanalytic terms, what Husserl means is that objects are first and foremost “libidinal objects”, and they emerge as such before they are (or can be) objectified as mere things (see e.g. Spitz 1965: 15; Freud 1975c: 86).
- 22.
“The body begins by being interoceptive”, as Merleau-Ponty puts it (Merleau-Ponty 1997: 183). That is to say, the frequent, constantly repeating bodily rhythms, such as heart-beat and “the whole respiratory apparatus [give] the child a kind of experience of space (Merleau-Ponty 1997: 183). It might be worthwhile to compare this with what Levinas says about enjoyment: “Subjectivity originates in the independence and sovereignty of enjoyment” (see Levinas 1969: 114 and ff.). See also Bergmann (1963: 100): “The ego boundary coincides with the entire world.” Here yet another direction of comparison can be found in what Freud wrote about animism: “Animism came to primitive man naturally and as a matter of course. He knew what things were like in the world, namely just as he felt himself to be” (Freud 1974a: 379).
- 23.
One can find resemblances of this idea to the phenomenological analysis of incorporation: the clothes that we are wearing, e.g., become part of our perceiving body so that instead of primarily feeling our gloves as being on our hands, or our t-shirt as surrounding us, we palpate and feel the world with our gloved hands and clothed bodies: in a somewhat similar manner the mother is “incorporated” into the lived-body of the infant.
- 24.
As Merleau-Ponty puts it: “rather than truly perceiving those who are there, he [the infant] feels incomplete when someone goes away” (Merleau-Ponty 1997: 186).
- 25.
One might also add that Winnicott thinks that the mother is part of the infant’s stimulus barrier in the sense that she protects her child from overstimulation.
- 26.
Concerning the relationship between Stern and Mahler, see also Weinberg (1991).
- 27.
Pine illustrates: “The reality-attuned cognitive performances of the infant will be mainly during the periods of alert inactivity […] which occur sporadically through the day (and for progressively longer time periods through the early months), but not [e.g.,] at moments of vigorous sucking, melting into the mother’s body, and falling asleep. A sense of boundarylessness can be present; and conversely, articulated awareness of boundaries […] will fade. […] But these are only the intense moments. The many quiet and sustained background moments when the half-asleep infant is cradled in the mother’s arms, sensing her warmth, her smell, her sounds in another prime candidate for subjective merger experiences. […] I have in mind those moments when the infant is being carried in the mother’s arms while she is in motion, the infant moving with her body, the two of them in complete synchrony” (Pine 1990: 238–239). Stern suggests that during moments of alert inactivity the infant either “reaches through” the stimulus barrier or the “threshold” of the latter “sinks to zero” (Stern 1985: 232).
- 28.
Pine adds: “the more realistic (in adult terms) perceptions will not automatically be dominant. They are not reliably dominant in all adults, even when the fact of self-other differentiation is far more strongly established. In fact, if the realistic perceptions were automatically the dominant ones, there would be no need for psychoanalytic or psychodynamic psychotherapic treatments at all. Quite the reverse is the case” (Pine 1990: 239). In psychoanalysis, “fantasy” refers to a realm in which the reality-principle serves the pleasure-principle. Fantasy accordingly means “[a]n imaginary scene in which the subject is a protagonist, representing the fulfilment of a wish (in the last analysis, an unconscious wish) in a manner that that is distorted to greater or lesser extent by defensive processes” (Laplanche 1988: 314).
- 29.
According to the so called ecological theory, perceptual environment appears as the realm of “affordances” (for example, the bottle on the table appears as something that can be grasped, which is another way of saying that it affords grasping). On the ecological theory, see Neisser (1991) and (1993).
- 30.
In a similar vein, psychoanalyst Robert Fliess writes: “sensory spheres are fusion points with the outside world. It is at these points that the two environments, body and outside world, adhere to each other and are mutually requisite to each other. The existence of these particular parts of the body ego is dependent upon the perception of the object-world” (Fliess 1961: 210).
- 31.
Stern explains that learning does not primarily aim at forming a “sense of self”, but the latter is one of the “by-products” of the former (Stern 1985: 47). He also formulates that “the emergence of organization is nothing but a form of learning” (Stern 1985: 45). Husserl, too, endorses the view that infants must first learn to perceive external things: “Das vorgebende Wahrnehmungsfeld in der frühen Kindheit enthält also noch nichts, was in bloßem Ansehen als Ding expliziert werden könnte” (Husserl 1950: 112).
- 32.
For some reason that does not become clear, Stern maintains that the sense of self does not begin to emerge until birth. I see no reason why this development could not begin already in intrauterine life. As Sandor Ferenczi provocatively puts it, “[I]t would be foolish to believe that the mind begins to function only at the moment of birth” (Ferenczi 2005 [1945], 112).
- 33.
See Cairns 1976: 35: “The whole of life and the activity self-constitution and the constitution of objects is guided by a telos, is directed toward the achievement of consistency or harmony”.
- 34.
Cf. Freud (1975b: 18–19); my italics: “It will rightly be objected that an organization which was a slave to the pleasure principle and neglected the reality of the external world could not maintain itself alive for the shortest time, so that it could not have come into existence at all. The employment of a fiction like this is, however, justified when one considers that the infant - provided one includes with it the care it receives from its mother - does almost realize a psychical system of this kind. […] [T]he dominance of the pleasure principle can really come to an end only when a child has achieved complete psychical detachment from its parents”. Cf. Freud (1975b: 20–21): “A general tendency of our mental apparatus, which can be traced back to the economic principle of saving expenditure, seems to find expression in the tenacity with which we hold on to the sources of pleasure at our disposal, and in the difficulty with which we renounce them. With the introduction of the reality principle one species of thought-activity was split off; it was kept free from reality-testing and remained subordinated to the pleasure principle alone. This activity is phantasying, which begins already in children’s play, and later, continued as day-dreaming, abandons dependence on real objects.”
- 35.
Cf. Stern (1985: 31–32): ”all domains of relatedness remain active during development. The infant does not grow out of any of them; […] none become developmentally obsolete or get left behind. […] Once formed, the domains remain forever distinct forms of experiencing social life and self. None are lost in adult life”.
References
Balint, A. (1952a). Love for the mother and mother love. In M. Balint (Ed.), Primary love and psycho-analytic technique. London: Maresfield Library.
Balint, M. (1952b). Primary love and psycho-analytic technique. London: Maresfield Library.
Bergman, A. (2000). Preface. In M. S. Mahler, F. Pine, & A. Bergman (Eds.), The psychological birth of the human infant. New York: Basic Books.
Bergmann, M. (1963). The place of Paul Federn’s ego psychology in psychoanalytic metapsychology. Journal of the American Psychoanalytic Association, 11, 97–116.
Blum, H. (1982). Theories of the self and psychoanalytic concepts: Discussion. Journal of the American Psychoanalytic Association, 30(4), 959–978.
Cairns, D. (1976). Conversations with Husserl and Fink. The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff.
Case, R. (1991). Stages in the development of the young child’s first sense of self. Developmental Review, 11, 210–230.
Chessick, R. (1992). Phenomenology of the emerging sense of self. Psychoanalysis and Contemporary Thought, 15(1), 57–88.
Federn, P. (1952). Ego psychology and the psychoses. New York: Basic Books.
Fenichel, O. (1945). The psychoanalytic theory of neurosis. New York: Norton.
Ferenczi, S. (2005). Stages in the development of the sense of reality (J. Ernest, Trans.). In J. S. Teslaar (Ed.), An outline of psychoanalysis. Whitefish: Kessinger Publishing.
Fliess, R. (1961). Ego and body ego. Contributions to their psychoanalytic psychology. New York: International Universities Press.
Freud, S. (1971) [1925]. Hemmung, Symptom und Angst. In Sigmund Freud Studienausgabe (Band VI). Frankfurt am Main: S. Fischer.
Freud, S. (1974a) [1912–13]. Totem und Tabu. Einige Übereinstimmungen im Seelenleben der Wilden und der Neurotiker. In Sigmund Freud Studienausgabe (Band IX). Frankfurt am Main: S. Fischer.
Freud, S. (1974b) [1929]. Das Unbehagen in der Kultur. In Sigmund Freud Studienausgabe (Band IX). Frankfurt am Main: S. Fischer.
Freud, S. (1975a) [1923]. Das Ich und das Es. In Sigmund Freud Studienausgabe (Band III). Frankfurt am Main: S. Fischer.
Freud, S. (1975b) [1911]. Formulierungen über die zwei Prinzipien des psychischen Geschehens. In Sigmund Freud Studienausgabe (Band III). Frankfurt am Main: S. Fischer.
Freud, S. (1975c) [1915]. Triebe und Triebschicksale. In Sigmund Freud Studienausgabe (Band III). Frankfurt am Main: S. Fischer.
Freud, S. (1975d) [1914]. Zur Einführung des Narzismus. In Sigmund Freud Studienausgabe (Band III). Frankfurt am Main: S. Fischer.
Freud, A. (1992). In J. Sandler (Ed.), The Harvard lectures. London: Karnac Books.
Gallagher, S., & Meltzoff, A. N. (1996). The earliest sense of self and others: Merleau-Ponty and recent developmental studies. Philosophical Psychology, 9, 211–233.
Gallese, V., & Goldman, A. (1998). Mirror neurons and the simulation theory of mind-reading. Trends in Cognitive Sciences, 12, 493–501.
Gallese, V., Fadiga, L., Fogassi, L., & Rizzolatti, G. (1996). Action recognition in the premotor cortex. Brain, 119, 593–609.
Gallup, G., Jr. (1970). Chimpanzees: Self recognition. Science, 167, 86–87.
Gergely, G. (2000). Reapproaching Mahler: New perspectives on normal autism, symbiosis, splitting and libidinal object constancy from cognitive developmental theory. Journal of the American Psychoanalytic Association, 48, 1197–1228.
Grossman, W. (1982). The self as fantasy: Fantasy as theory. Journal of the American Psychoanalytic Association, 30(4), 919–937.
Husserl, E. (1950). In S. Strasser (Ed.), Cartesianische Meditationen und Pariser Vorträge. Husserliana Gesammelte Werke (Band I). Haag: Martinus Nijhoff.
Husserl, E. (1952). In M. Biemel (Ed.), Ideen zu einer reinen Phänomenologie und phänomenologische Philosophie. Zweiter Buch: Phänomenologische Untersuchungen zur Konstitution. Husserliana Gesammelte Werke (Band IV). Haag: Martinus Nijhoff.
Husserl, E. (1954). In W. Biemel (Ed.), Krisis der europäischen Wissenschaften und die transzendentale Phänomenologie. Eine Einleitung in die Phänomenologische Philosophie. Husserliana Gesammelte Werke (Band VI). Haag: Martinus Nijhoff.
Husserl, E. (1973a). In I. Kern (Ed.), Zur Phänomenologie der Intersubjektivität. Texte aus dem Nachlass. Zweiter Teil: 1921–1928. Husserliana Gesammelte Werke (Band XIV). Haag: Martinus Nijhoff.
Husserl, E. (1973b). In Kern (Ed.), Zur Phänomenologie der Intersubjektivität. Texte aus dem Nachlass. Dritter Teil: 1929–1935. Husserliana Gesammelte Werke (Band XV). Haag: Martinus Nijhoff.
Husserl, E. (2008). In R. Sowa (Ed.), Die Lebenswelt. Auslegungen der vorgegebenen Welt und ihrer Konstitution. Texte aus dem Nachlass (1916–1937). Husserliana Gesammelte Werke (Band XXXIX). Dordrecht: Springer.
Iacoboni, M. (2008). Mirroring people: The new science of how we connect with others. New York: Farrar, Straus & Giroux.
Iacoboni, M., Woods, R. P., Brass, M., Bekkering, H., Mazziotta, J. C., & Rizzolatti, G. (1999). Cortical mechanisms of human imitation. Science, 286, 2526–2528.
James, W. (2007). The principles of psychology (Vol. 1). New York: Cosimo.
Kaplan, L. (1978). Oneness and separateness. From infant to individual. New York: Simon and Schuster.
Karlsson, G. (2010). Psychoanalysis in a new light. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Kernberg, O. (1982). Self, ego, and drives. Journal of the American Psychoanalytic Association, 30(4), 893–917.
Laplanche, J. (1988). The language of psychoanalysis. English translation by Hogarth Press Ltd, 1973. (Reprinted by Karnac Books)
Lehtonen, J. (1997). On the origins of the body ego and its implications for psychotic vulnerability. In V. Volkan & S. Aktar (Eds.), The seed of madness. Constitution, environment, and fantasy in the organization of the psychotic core. Madison: International Universities Press.
Levinas, E. (1969). Totality and infinity. An essay on exteriority (L. Alphonso, Trans.). Pittsburgh: Duquesne University Press.
Lewis, M. (1991). Ways of knowing: Objective self-awareness or consciousness. Developmental Review, 11, 231–243.
Mahler, M. (1968). On human symbiosis and the vicissitudes of individuation. Infantile psychosis. Madison: International Universities Press.
Mahler, M., & McDevitt, J. (1982). Thoughts on the emergence of the sense of self, with a particular emphasis on the body self. Journal of the American Psychoanalytic Association, 30(4), 827–848.
Mahler, M., Pine, F., & Bergman, A. (1975). The psychological birth of the human infant. New York: Basic Books.
Malloch, S., & Trevarthen, C. (Eds.). (2009). Communicative musicality. Exploring the basis of human companionship. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Merleau-Ponty, M. (1945). Phénoménologie de la perception. Paris: Gallimard.
Merleau-Ponty, M. (1997). Les relations avec autrui chez l’enfant. In M. Merleau-Ponty (Ed.), Parcours 1935−1951. Paris: Verdier.
Neisser, U. (1991). Two perceptually given aspects of the self and their development. Developmental Review, 11, 197–209.
Neisser, U. (1993). The self perceived. In U. Neisser (Ed.), The perceived self. Ecological and interpersonal sources of self-knowledge. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Peterfreund, E. (1978). Some critical comments on psychoanalytic conceptualization of infancy. International Journal of Psycho-Analysis, 59, 427–441.
Piaget, J. (1973 [1929]). The child’s conception of the world (J. Tomlinson & A. Tomlinson, Trans.). St. Albans: Paladin.
Pine, F. (1990). Drive, ego, object, and self. A synthesis for clinical work. New York: Basic Books.
Pine, F. (2004). Mahler’s concepts of ‘Symbiosis’ and separation-individuation: Revisited, reevaluated, refined. Journal of the American Psychoanalytic Association, 52(2), 511–533.
Pipp, S. (1993). Infant’s knowledge of self, other, and relationship. In U. Neisser (Ed.), The perceived self. Ecological and interpersonal sources of self-knowledge. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Rangell, L. (1982). The self in psychoanalytic theory. Journal of the American Psychoanalytic Association, 30(4), 862–891.
Reddy, V. (2008). How infants know minds. Cambridge: Harvard University Press.
Richards, A. (1982). The superordinate self in psychoanalytic theory and in the self psychologies. Journal of the American Psychoanalytic Association, 30(4), 939–957.
Ricoeur, P. (1986). The self in psychoanalysis and phenomenological philosophy. Psychoanalytic Inquiry, 6(3), 437–458.
Rochat, P. (1998). Self-perception and action in infancy. Experimental Brain Research, 123, 102–109.
Rochat, P. (2003). Five levels of self-awareness as they unfold early in life. Consciousness and Cognition, 12, 717–731.
Sander, L. (1980). New knowledge about the infant from current research: Implications for psychoanalysis. Journal of the American Psychoanalytic Association, 28(1), 181–198.
Silverman, D. (2004). Early developmental issues reconsidered: Commentary on Pine’s ideas on symbiosis. Journal of the American Psychoanalytic Association, 53(1), 239–251.
Spitz, R. (1955). The primal cavity. A contribution to the genesis of perception and its role for psychoanalytic theory. The Psychoanalytic Study of the Child, 10, 215–240.
Spitz, R. (1965). The first year of life. A psychoanalytic study of normal and deviant development of object-relations. New York: International Universities Press.
Stern, D. (1985). The interpersonal world of the infant. A view from psychoanalysis and developmental psychology. New York: Basic Books.
Stone, J., Smith, H., & Murphy, L. (Eds.). (1973). The competent infant: Research and commentary. New York: Basic Books.
Taipale, J. (2014). Phenomenology and embodiment. Husserl and the constitution of subjectivity. Evanston: Northwestern University Press.
Ticho, E. (1982). The alternate schools and the self. Journal of the American Psychoanalytic Association, 30(4), 849–862.
Trevarthen, C. (1977). Descriptive analyses of infant communicative behaviour. In H. R. Schaffer (Ed.), Studies in mother-infant interaction. London: Academic Press.
Trevarthen, C. (1978). Secondary intersubjectivity: Confidence, confiding and acts of meaning in the first year. In A. Lock (Ed.), Action gesture and symbol, the emergence of language. London: Academic Press.
Trevarthen, C. (1979). Communication and cooperation in early infancy: A description of primary intersubjectivity. In M. Bullowa (Ed.), Before speech: The beginning of interpersonal communication. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Weinberg, L. (1991). Infant development and the sense of self: Stern vs. Mahler. Clinical Social Work Journal, 19(1), 9–22.
Winnicott, D. W. (1965). The maturational processes and the facilitating environment. Studies in the theory of emotional development. New York: International Universities Press.
Winnicott, D. W. (1989) [1965]. The family and individual development. London/New York: Routledge.
Zahavi, D. (1999). Self-awareness and alterity. A phenomenological investigation. Evanston: Northwestern University Press.
Zahavi, D. (2003). Inner time-consciousness and pre-reflective self-awareness. In D. Welton (Ed.), The new Husserl. A critical reader (pp. 157–180). Bloomington: Indiana University Press.
Author information
Authors and Affiliations
Corresponding author
Editor information
Editors and Affiliations
Rights and permissions
Copyright information
© 2013 Springer International Publishing Switzerland
About this chapter
Cite this chapter
Taipale, J. (2013). Facts and Fantasies: Embodiment and the Early Formation of Selfhood. In: Jensen, R., Moran, D. (eds) The Phenomenology of Embodied Subjectivity. Contributions to Phenomenology, vol 71. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-01616-0_13
Download citation
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-01616-0_13
Published:
Publisher Name: Springer, Cham
Print ISBN: 978-3-319-01615-3
Online ISBN: 978-3-319-01616-0
eBook Packages: Humanities, Social Sciences and LawPhilosophy and Religion (R0)