Abstract
In this article, I analyze how interests affect the results of scientific change through concept representation and categorization. I first review two models offered by cognitive psychology, which use frames as the representational structure to account for how interests actually affect concept representation and categorization. I then use a historical case from nineteenth-century optics to illustrate how the interests of historical figures influenced their concept representations, then their classifications and finally the results of their theory appraisal. I conclude that the impact of interests on science is constrained by the states of the world and interests alone can never decide the results of scientific change.
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Acknowledgements
Portions of this work were presented at the Conference of Concept Types and Frames, Düsseldorf, Germany, August 2007. I am grateful to the support of the organizers of the conference.
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Chen, X. (2014). Interests in Conceptual Changes: A Frame Analysis. In: Gamerschlag, T., Gerland, D., Osswald, R., Petersen, W. (eds) Frames and Concept Types. Studies in Linguistics and Philosophy, vol 94. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-01541-5_5
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-01541-5_5
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