Correlation and Truth

  • Peter BrösselEmail author
Conference paper
Part of the The European Philosophy of Science Association Proceedings book series (EPSP, volume 2)


The concept of correlation is the building block of almost any Bayesian attempt to capture or explicate any interesting aspect of scientific reasoning in terms of probabilities. This paper discusses one particularly simple correlation measure which is highly significant for almost any such attempt within the philosophy of science or epistemology. In particular, it shows how this correlation measure is related to central attempts to capture essential aspects of scientific reasoning such as confirmation, coherence, and the explanatory power of hypotheses. This intimate connection between correlation and scientific reasoning necessitates answering the question of how correlation and truth are related. This paper proposes an answer to this question and outlines its consequences for epistemology and the philosophy of science.


Explanatory Power Correlation Measure Scientific Reasoning Coherence Measure Intimate Connection 
These keywords were added by machine and not by the authors. This process is experimental and the keywords may be updated as the learning algorithm improves.


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Copyright information

© Springer International Publishing Switzerland 2013

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.Department of PhilosophyUniversity of MainzMainzGermany

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