Correlation and Truth
The concept of correlation is the building block of almost any Bayesian attempt to capture or explicate any interesting aspect of scientific reasoning in terms of probabilities. This paper discusses one particularly simple correlation measure which is highly significant for almost any such attempt within the philosophy of science or epistemology. In particular, it shows how this correlation measure is related to central attempts to capture essential aspects of scientific reasoning such as confirmation, coherence, and the explanatory power of hypotheses. This intimate connection between correlation and scientific reasoning necessitates answering the question of how correlation and truth are related. This paper proposes an answer to this question and outlines its consequences for epistemology and the philosophy of science.
KeywordsExplanatory Power Correlation Measure Scientific Reasoning Coherence Measure Intimate Connection
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