Improving of Non-Interactive Zero-Knowledge Arguments Using Oblivious Transfer

Conference paper
Part of the Advances in Intelligent Systems and Computing book series (AISC, volume 224)

Abstract

We study non-interactive zero-knowledge (NIZK) arguments using oblivious transfer (OT) that correspond to interactive proof protocols but assuming that the prover is computationally bounded. As opposed to the single theorem NIZK proof protocols using common random string, NIZK argument protocols using OT are «multilingual» that is language L or the one-way function can be chosen and declared by prover in non-interactive mode. These protocols use m-out-of-n OT with public keys given by verifier to prover in the initialization phase and common element with unknown to prover and verifier pre-image. It is shown that due to usage of different verifier’s secret encryption keys the implementation of NIZK argument protocols can be simplified using a single randomizer for p successive elementary transactions. For systems using 1-out-of-2 OT, proposal allows increase the information rate approximately to 5p/(3p+1) times or reduce the soundness probability of NIZK arguments to the same degree. The above factor for single use NIZK is about two that corresponds to almost quadratic decreasing of soundness probability. For NIZK argument using t+1-out-of-2 t OT (t>1), it is shown that its soundness probability for small t is essentially lower in comparison with soundness probability of NIZK arguments using 1-out-of-2 OT.

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Copyright information

© Springer International Publishing Switzerland 2013

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.National Research University Moscow Power Engineering InstituteMoscowRussian Federation

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