Abstract
Simple bargaining problems with transferable utility are considered. By associating a quasi-additive cooperative game with each one of them, a Shapley rule for this class of problems is derived from the Shapley value for games. The analysis of this new rule includes axiomatic characterizations and a comparison with the proportional rule.
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Acknowledgments
Research partially supported by Grants SGR 2009-01029 of the Catalonian Government (Generalitat de Catalunya) and MTM 2009-08037 of the Science and Innovation Spanish Ministry and the European Regional Development Fund.
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Carreras, F., Owen, G. (2014). A New Allocation Method for Simple Bargaining Problems: The Shapley Rule. In: Helber, S., et al. Operations Research Proceedings 2012. Operations Research Proceedings. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-00795-3_33
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-00795-3_33
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